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1. INTRODUCTION  
This Staff Working Document is the ninth EU Accountability Report on Financing for 
Development in a series of annual progress reports drafted since 2003 (previously labelled 
‘Monterrey report’). It assesses where the EU and its Member States stand in relation to their 
common commitments. The Report fulfils the Council’s mandate1 to the European Commission to 
monitor progress and report annually on common EU commitments, which were initially with a 
view to the International Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 and have been further 
developed and extended. The Council expanded the monitoring mandate to the Commission 
accordingly to cover aid effectiveness2, aid for trade3, good governance in tax matters and 
development4 and fast-start climate finance.5  
 
The report is also an input to EU preparations for several international meetings in 2011, namely the 
UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Istanbul (May 2011) the Busan High 
Level Forum IV on aid effectiveness (HLF4) in late November 2011, the follow-up meetings to the 
Cancun UNFCCC climate conference of December 2010, and the bi-annual WTO/ OECD 
monitoring meeting on aid for trade by all donors. 
 
The report builds on the input provided by the EU Member States and Commission staff in (i) the 
annual questionnaire on Financing for Development 2010/11 (formerly known as the ’Monterrey 
questionnaire’), which covers all EU commitments related to the international financing for 
development agenda, (ii) the bi-annual trade and development WTO/ OECD survey of 2010, (iii) 
the complementary in-country monitoring of aid for trade provided by EU donors, through EU 
Delegations and (iv) the third questionnaire on the implementation of the EU Fast Track Initiative 
on Division of Labour and Complementarity. Germany, in close cooperation with the European 
Commission, led the monitoring of the Fast Track Initiative. 
 
The Council also called on the Commission to make the annual progress report a model of 
transparency and accountability6. For this reason, in contrast to previous years, this year the 
Commission is presenting a single, comprehensive report covering all topical issues of the 
international financing for development agenda. For the first time, 22 of the 27 Member States have 
agreed to the publication of their replies to the annual questionnaire on financing for development. 
The replies can be consulted online7. Extra information will be included in the EU Donor Atlases 
20118. Annex 1 lists the bibliography for all chapters, Annex 2 presents the methodology applied 
for analysing ODA indications/ forecasts provided by EU Member States. Annex 3 is the Statistical 
Annex on ODA trends (including individual graphs for all EU Member States showing the gaps 
from 2010 to reaching 2015 targets for ODA to Africa and ODA to LDCs). Annex 4 reports the 
results of the EU Fast Start Climate Finance (FSF) monitoring exercises. Annex 5 is the Third 
Monitoring Report and Progress Review of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour. 
                                                 
1 Council Conclusions of 21 May 2003 and 24 May 2005. 
2 Different Council Conclusions on the EU Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, last of 10 December 2010 (on 
transparency and mutual accountability). 
3 Council Conclusions of 15 May 2007 on the European Conduct of Division of Labour in development policy, Council 
Conclusions of 29 October 2007 on the EU Aid for Trade Strategy. 
4Council Conclusions of 14 June 2010 
5 Council conclusions of 7 December 2010. 
6Council Conclusions of 15 June (on the MDGs) and 10 December (on transparency and mutual accountability). 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/accountability/eu-annual-accountability-reports/index_en.htm  
8 The donor atlases will be available on http://development.donoratlas.eu. 
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Annex 6 enclosed the Aid for Trade Report for 2011. Annex 7 reflects Member States’ replies to 
the most pertinent questions on the questionnaire, while Annex 8 gives an overview of the overall 
outcome of the survey. 
 
Financing for development aims to create a favourable environment for development by addressing 
the responsibilities of both developing countries and the global community. The UN Doha Follow-
up Conference on Financing for Development in 2008 reiterated that sustainable development 
depends on mobilising financial resources for development and using them effectively. It also 
recognised that each country bears primary responsibility for its own development and that national 
policies, domestic resources and national development strategies are essential. 
 
The EU and other donors need to live up to their commitments and to keep their part of the 
agreement on what is needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
 
This report shows that over the period 2004-2010, the EU and its Member States accounted for 57% 
of net ODA to developing countries from all DAC and EU donors, and for 65% of the global EUR 
25.7 billion increase in ODA during this period; in 2010, the EU and its Member States missed their 
collective 2010 target of 0.56% by a wide margin (by almost EUR 15 billion), but the positive trend 
continued and the EU and its Member States together reached the highest ODA/GNI ratio of the last 
20 years, i.e. 0.43%. The EU scaling-up process has been uneven, with asymmetric efforts. Member 
States not contributing their fair share to the burden-sharing effort endanger the performance of the 
EU as whole and substantially increase the risk of failure on future ODA targets.  
 
The third Monitoring Report and Progress Review of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of 
Labour (see Annex5) was drafted by Germany, in close coordination with the European 
Commission. Together with trends since 2008, that report shows that in the 17 partner countries 
involved in the initiative since the beginning, there has been encouraging progress. There is 
widespread use and institutionalisation of donor mappings as an aid management instrument, an 
upward trend in country-level agreement on sector definitions as an important precondition for 
Division of Labour and solid use of ‘lead donor’ arrangements that can generate more momentum 
for Division of Labour in the future. 
 
The Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration recognise the importance of other financial 
flows for development besides ODA. To achieve sustainable progress towards the MDGs the 
financing discussion should look holistically at increasing developing countries’ overall revenue 
base for development. The EU can effectively support its partners’ with increasing their domestic 
resources for development in line with the principles of good governance in tax matters 
(transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition). Enhanced international 
cooperation in tax matters in particular will not only increase domestic revenues in developing 
countries by reducing tax evasion, it will also help to address money laundering, corruption and the 
financing of terrorism. 
 
The EU has consistently supported developing countries in using trade as a tool for development. 
As part of its joint Aid for Trade strategy the EU as a whole agreed to actions to increase Aid for 
Trade and enhance its impact. The EU’s combined annual Aid for Trade was EUR 10.5 billion in 
2009, matching the all-time high recorded the year before. As regards the EU and Member States’ 
Trade Related Assistance – a subcomponent of Aid for Trade, a substantial increase was reported in 
2009, bringing the collective amount to EUR 3 billion), well above the target (as from 2010) of 
EUR 2 billion per year. 
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2. INCREASING FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES 
2.1. Improving Domestic Resource Mobilisation  
The objective of this chapter is to present progress in implementing the Monterrey consensus and 
subsequent Doha declaration in the area of tax and development. This area was not covered in depth 
in previous accountability reports – the EU Council asked in 2010 that it be from 2011 onwards.  
The analysis is based on the current international debate on issues identified in recent European 
Commission documents on the subject. Taxation should also be seen in the context of the 
diminishing importance of debt relief. Domestic resource mobilisation is crucial create more and 
sustainable fiscal space to implement and sustain development programmes. The review is also 
informed by feedback provided by the EU and Member States. The focus is on two topics: (a) 
strengthening good governance in tax matters in developing countries; and (b) harnessing EU 
instruments to provide enhanced support.  
2.1.1. Providing enhanced support for domestic resource mobilisation  
EU Commitments 
Current EU thinking on tax and development set out in the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and 
Social Committee of 21 April 2010,Tax and Development - Cooperating with Developing 
Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters9 and the accompanying Staff 
Working Document10.  Its recommendations were backed up by the Council Conclusions of 
14 June 2010 11. 
 
Taxes are essential for sustainable development, the legitimacy of the State, economic stability, and 
the financing of public services and infrastructure. The Communication on Tax and Development12 
argued that development aid policies should contribute to building effective, efficient, fair, and 
sustainable tax systems in line with the principles of good governance in tax matters 
(transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition) and generate sustainable revenues 
in EU partner countries.  
 
When attempting to increase domestic tax revenues, developing countries are often confronted with 
the incidence of corruption, lack of capacity of tax administrations and the structure and 
competitiveness of their economy (large informal sectors. Some developing countries rely to a large 
extent on revenues stemming from extractive industries which tend to be less predictable. The 
effectiveness of national tax systems could also be affected by the use of tax incentives to attract 
foreign investment. In addition, implementing domestic tax rules is becoming ever more difficult in 
a world with an increasing geographical mobility of taxpayers and the existence of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions and harmful tax practices. In view of these challenges, the EU, in its Council 
Conclusions on Tax and Development of 14 June 2010, stated that it would ‘support developing 
countries in tax policy, tax administration and tax reforms, including the fight against tax evasion 
and other harmful practices’. This covered 10 points: 
                                                 
9COM(2010)163 of 21.04.2010 . 
10http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/com_reports/taxation/sec(2010)426_
en.pdf 
113023rd FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Luxembourg, 14 June 2010 
12 COM(2010)163 of 21.04.2010 
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1. Mobilising domestic resources for development through efficient and fair tax systems; 
2. Discouraging capital flight, including tax evasion and avoidance, and illicit financial 
flows; 
3. Supporting proposals outlined in earlier Commission communications; 
4. Recognising that developing countries bear primary responsibility for building and 
improving efficient and fair tax systems and committing the necessary resources 
thereto, with EU and Member States supporting these efforts; 
5. Using budget support programmes to accelerate tax reform; 
6. Emphasising programme-based and comprehensive approaches; 
7. Enhancing support for the EITI; 
8. Promoting the principles of good governance in tax matters and working towards a 
transparent and cooperative international tax environment; 
9. Encouraging the participation of developing countries in structures and procedures for 
international tax cooperation; and  
10. Facilitating this process by covering these aspects in the annual Financing For 
Development Report. 
It is for each partner country to define its policies and reforms. This is particularly true of taxation 
policy. Development aid should be adapted to each country according to its economic situation, 
international position and policies.   
 
In the case of low income countries the main challenges could be to increase generally low tax 
revenues by expanding the tax base. A recent study13 states that, as a rule of thumb, according to the 
UN, these countries would need to increase revenues by about 4 percent of GDP, although a low 
tax-to-GDP ratio does not necessarily reflect a poor tax performance. Therefore, it is important not 
only to increase domestic revenues, but possibly to consider the tax system as a whole:  its 
composition, its impact on economic activity and private investment, its redistributive effects and 
its impact on state-building.  
 
There is limited systematic and comparable information on the tax systems of developing countries. 
The annual PWC / World Bank ’Doing Business’ report provides an estimate of the impact of tax 
policy and governance in most developing countries. While limited in scope, the information is 
available and updated annually and could provide a useful indicator of relative and absolute 
progress on the tax reforms pursued by developing countries to improve the business climate. 
However, extreme care is needed in interpreting the results as some of the underlying assumptions 
can lead to misleading results in some countries. Similarly, the PEFA measurement framework14 
includes four indicators on revenues, transparency and effectiveness. For some specific indicators, 
measurement of progress (and accountability) is straight forward such as the conclusion of bilateral 
tax treaties or tax information exchange agreements. Measuring progress in partner countries is 
complicated due to incomplete information on donor support. Donor support in the area of tax and 
development is embedded in either policy reform programmes or technical assistance/capacity 
                                                 
13 http://ec.europa.eu/development/services/events/tax_development/docs/td_tax_challenges_bird.pdf 
14 See for instance recent ITC study of 26 countries: 
http://taxcompact.net/pdf/ITC%20PEFA%20paper%20first%20draft%2012102010.pdf 
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building projects. Sometimes policy reforms are also embedded in government commitments in the 
context of budget support operations. They may be complemented by assistance to institutions, 
typically over the medium-term, e.g. with technical advice, drafting laws and regulations, 
consensus-building, and setting up and/or building institutions. Frequently, tax-related activities are 
a component of a larger programme and/or project assisting a country. As seen in the responses to 
the questionnaire discussed below, technical assistance and capacity-development activities tend to 
be quite varied.   
 
During the 2000s, developing countries received support from multilateral and bilateral donors, 
notably the EU and its Member States to build tax systems. Available information indicates that in 
the last decade some 65 developing countries undertook tax reforms with donor support – but 
efforts were sustained in fewer than 10 countries. Furthermore, following Monterrey, there has been 
no visibly increased emphasis on tax reform in developing countries; in contrast to the significant 
scale-up of reforms in public expenditure management (PEM, i.e., public financial management and 
procurement).   
 
There are several possible explanations for the limited importance of support for tax reforms in the 
2000s. One is that budget support operations and the related policy dialogue tend to focus more on 
public expenditure management and social sectors than on revenue mobilisation. Another is that the 
agenda in the 1990s was driven by the tariff reform that took place in most countries, together with 
strong demand for support on taxation in former communist countries. While this agenda has to 
some extent been exhausted, developing countries still require country-specific support in the area 
of tax policy and administration. 
 
Tax reform and related institutional support is complex and needs to be sustained over time, to 
implement a full agenda and also to benefit from experience of what does and does not work in 
order to fine-tune the arrangements as needed. Given the importance of tax reforms and their central 
role in the Monterrey agenda, EU donors may consider accelerating progress in this area through 
promoting more domestic resource mobilisation in line with the principles of good governance in 
tax matters, inter alia in the context of budget support operations.  
 
2.1.2. EU assistance to developing countries in tax and customs reform and related capacity 
building  
 
This section is based on EU Member States’ replies to the 25 questions in the annual survey of 
progress on the implementation of the Monterrey commitments. The questions and statistics on the 
replies are given in Annex 8. These are analysed in the light of the 10 points listed in the previous 
section. Before discussing the replies, a few issues warrant mention. The space to reply to some 
questions was left blank and the feedback received may be incomplete. The analysis assumes in 
such cases that the donor does not provide significant support in the area.   
 
Furthermore, part of the information provided concerns ongoing support, some of which may have 
begun a few years back while in other cases, it may refer to possible future involvement. Moreover, 
some of the answers given had to be discounted because they were not relevant to the question 
asked or a positive answer was given even though the explanatory text suggested the opposite. 
Finally, the level of details provided differed from one Member State to another – with some 
countries providing extensive answers and specific examples. 
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2.1.2.1. Mobilising domestic financial resources for development 
The questionnaire did not ask about the volume of support provided to tax and customs systems. 
However, the OECD/DAC collects information on assistance to public financial management and 
trade facilitation (mainly customs) in the Creditor Reporting System. These data show that the 15 
EU DAC members committed some EUR 125 million of such assistance in 2008 and 2009. 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden reported the most assistance to these sectors.  
 
A quarter of EU countries do not provide any support to tax systems and revenue mobilisation, five 
of them having joined the EU only recently. While aid levels are not quantified, in terms of donor 
focus ACP countries tend to receive support from most other EU Member States, reflecting the fact 
that the poorest countries are given priority. On average, each donor covers two or more 
regions/country groupings, typically ACP, EU candidates, EU neighbourhood policy, or Asia – 
support for Latin America is less frequent. The two EU-related groups seem to be considered 
important for economic and, no doubt, political reasons. In addition to the EU, France, Hungary, 
Spain and the UK were the only Member States to be active in all five regions listed in the 
questionnaire, some of them indirectly. The remaining member countries were typically involved in 
only one or two regions. These figures may reflect selectivity and division of labour, but also seems 
to indicate that broad based support for tax systems and resource mobilisation is not yet a priority 
for many Member States. 
 
The most common type of support provided is to tax administrations, followed by tax policy. A 
handful of Member States provide other types of support such as training and capacity 
development, notably in customs administration and the judiciary. These contribute significantly to 
improved revenue mobilisation and to the effectiveness, efficiency and fairness of tax systems. It is 
less apparent whether Member States pursue coordinated and complementary approaches to avoid 
aid fragmentation and unmet demand in some countries – especially those with less donor presence.  
 
Ministries of Finance are the primary beneficiaries of this aid. Over half the EU donors also 
help customs and/ or semi-autonomous revenue authorities. A handful of respondents reported that 
they provided support to other institutions, for example a Prevention of Money Laundering Office. 
The choice of counterparts seems justified by the fact that Ministries of Finance bear primary 
responsibility for tax reform and revenue collection, whereas many developing countries have 
chosen not to set up semi-autonomous revenue authorities yet. National governments are the most 
frequent beneficiaries of capacity-building for financial management. Over two-thirds of EU and 
Member States support national supreme audit institutions, with civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and parliaments being helped less frequently. The relatively low level of engagement with CSOs 
and national parliaments may lead to low level of stakeholder ownership of tax reform. Where 
CSOs are weak, key stakeholders in reforms may lack a voice. Similarly, parliaments lacking an 
adequate understanding of public financial management issues may not fully appreciate the 
importance of the laws presented to them in this area, and may not sufficiently scrutinise public 
expenditure and hold governments to account.  
2.1.2.2. Promoting good governance in the tax area  
The EU and most Member States provide support for addressing tax evasion and harmful tax 
competition, and promote the principles of good governance in tax matters in their 
cooperation policy. According to comments made in reply to the questionnaire, the approaches 
vary from one donor to another. Most commonly, donors use budget support as an entry point, 
together with technical assistance, dialogue and monitoring agreements.   
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Under the 10th European Development Fund’s (EDF) ‘governance incentive’ tranche, the EU may 
offer additional funding in return for detailed commitments on the principles of good governance in 
taxation. A number of encouraging and concrete commitments have been made by ACP countries. 
In March 2010, in the second revision of Cotonou Agreement, the EU and ACP countries agreed, 
subject to further ratification at national level, to include a provision allowing EU support for the 
implementation of international best practices in tax matters, including transparency and exchange 
of information. The main challenge would appear to be to ensure that commitments are translated 
into concrete measurable and effective actions and that sufficient technical cooperation is provided 
to achieve this. 
 
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has launched 
the International Tax Compact15 (ITC) – an informal international action and dialogue platform 
grouping bilateral and multilateral donors to strengthen international cooperation with developing 
and transition countries to fight tax evasion and avoidance. Other EU Member States supporting 
this initiative include France, the Netherlands and Spain. The work of the ITC focuses on the 
following areas: (1) at country/regional level encouraging increased development cooperation in tax 
matters; and promoting the dissemination of successful practices and the exchange of reform 
experiences in policy formulation, legislation, and implementation, in addition to capacity 
development and institution building; (2) at international level facilitating access to and the 
exchange of information between policy makers, tax administrators, donors, civil society and the 
private sector; (3) analytical work and studies; and (4) networking and dialogue. 
 
The European Commission has since late 2008 taken part in the International Tax Dialogue (ITD). 
The ITD is a collaborative arrangement involving the IMF, OECD and World Bank Group, among 
others, to encourage and facilitate discussion of tax matters among national tax officials, 
international organisations, and a range of other key stakeholders. The ITD Secretariat is currently 
hosted by the OECD. 
 
2.1.2.3. Adoption and implementation of the OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing 
About half of the Member States provide assistance with implementing OECD guidelines on 
transfer pricing. The reasons given for not providing support included strategic choices, a lack of 
resources, reliance on indirect support, an intention to support this area in the future and no request 
from beneficiaries. The support that was confirmed tended to go through two main channels: OECD 
and Africa Tax Administration Forum (ATAF). 
 
While transfer pricing rules could help developing countries to mobilise revenues, donor support for 
this remains rather limited. The EU encourages research on innovative approaches to implementing 
the OECD transfer pricing guidelines in developing countries, such as assistance by other countries 
in applying the rules, or joint tax audits by developing countries’ administrations. It also considers 
that developing countries need to strengthen their tax administrations’ assessment capacity to apply 
the arm’s length’ principle. Most of the activities of Member States tend to be part of broader 
programmes. A few EU donors provide support through the OECD (e.g. the EU, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Slovakia and the UK) or through twinning projects, discussion of fraud avoidance 
mechanisms and negotiations on double taxation (Austria, Latvia and Romania).  
                                                 
15 http://taxcompact.net/index.html 
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2.1.2.4. Assessment of the three principles of good governance in the tax area 
Most Member States say they assess beneficiaries’ commitment to the principles of good 
governance in tax matters and say they use indirect means to deal with this issue, for example when 
devising a new cooperation framework.  
2.1.2.5. Transparency 
The Commission and the majority of Member States said that they analysed the country’s situation 
in the light of international standards for the transparency of tax systems. In doing so, a number use 
comparisons with international transparency standards and many draw upon the conclusions of 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment reports and, in one case, a 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Others conduct periodic studies, use 
public information, or take advantage of opportunities, e.g. when signing tax treaties, to review this 
area. France mentioned the use of peer reviews undertaken by the Global Forum on Transparency 
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes and of the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions 
published by OECD. Overall, it appears that there is sufficient public information available for 
the EU and Member States to conduct analyses of the transparency of tax systems, even if in 
some cases the basic documentation may not be recent. 
2.1.2.6. Exchange of Information 
Half the Member States indicated that they analysed the situation in the beneficiary country in the 
light of international standards of exchange of information.  They pursued various approaches, such 
as use of PEFA – which may not be the most relevant tool - and public information sources, specific 
analysis and studies, tailor-made approaches for least developing countries and use of discussions 
on double taxation as the entry point.  The indicators used for standards of exchange of information 
may also be based on the assessment of the OECD Global Forum on taxation. One Member State 
noted that exchange of information is an important objective, but that, when the focus is on least 
developed countries the extent to which implementation of international standards emerges as 
a dominant theme in an individual programme will depend on the circumstances of that 
country and particularly the capacity and sophistication of its tax authority. The reason why certain 
EU Member States did not address this area included lack of capacity and reliance on alternative 
ad-hoc approaches.   
2.1.2.7. Fair tax competition 
While some Member States indicated that they analysed fair tax competition issues most others 
mention selectivity/ division of labour, limited relevance and reliance on indirect means as 
arguments for not being active on this issue. Where analysis was done, it was done as part of 
general comparative studies of tax systems, in preparation for a cooperation project, or it was driven 
by country circumstances. Another common practice cited was the use of available reports, notably 
PEFA and 'Doing Business Reports'. This is thus an area that, based on Member States’ 
answers, does not seem to be perceived as a priority as part of meeting the EU’s commitments.  
2.1.2.8. Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
During 2010, the vast majority of EU Member States concluded Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (TIEAs) and Double Taxation Conventions (DTC) and were drafting additional 
ones. This is an area where significant progress is being achieved. However, only two EU donors 
provide technical assistance to countries with which TIEAs or double taxation conventions 
are planned or signed, while half provide broader assistance on good governance in tax matters. 
Further technical cooperation with developing countries that are committed to the principles of 
good governance in the tax area is essential to enable them to negotiate and implement TIEA and, 
where appropriate, DTC. If non-EU countries are willing to sign and implement TIEAs with 
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Member States, technical assistance may be offered by the EU provided that funding is available 
and based on prior commitments to implement the three principles of good governance in tax 
matters (transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition).  A noteworthy approach 
to transparency pursued by the Belgian Ministry of Finance is to publish all such agreements on its 
website16. 
2.1.2.9. Donor coordination in the tax area 
The EU is also committed to harmonisation with other donors. The EU and most Member States 
indicated that they coordinated with bilateral and multilateral donors when supporting developing 
countries’ tax reform agendas.  The usual way of doing this was at country level (9) or through 
international initiatives (ATAF, Afritacs, OECD, ITC and International Tax Dialogue17 (ITD), EU, 
World Bank and IMF). Other stand-alone or complementary approaches included coordination 
through twining projects and budget support policy dialogue. However, a review of budget support 
programmes implemented during the last decade indicates that tax reform is not a major feature 
of multilateral donors’ reform agenda and coordination has not yet yielded significant 
broadening or deepening of tax reforms in budget support operations.  
 
A majority of Member States supported international or regional initiatives or organisations that are 
active in the area of tax reform. The IMF (both Regional Technical Centres and the Trust Fund on 
Tax Policy and Administration) was the most common partner and received by far the most 
financial support. In addition to the ATAF, CIAT, International Tax Dialogue and International Tax 
Compact, other institutions receiving some type of EU donor support included the Investment 
Climate Facility for Africa and OECD. While there are a number of institutions receiving support, 
there is insufficient information to assess whether this leads to inefficiency and unnecessary 
segmentation in delivery of tax reforms. 
2.1.2.10. Transparency in the extractive industry sector 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI aims at strengthening 
governance by improving transparency and accountability in the extractive industries sector. With 
35 implementing countries now, the initiative is becoming a global standard for corporate 
governance and transparency. The EITI asks companies to publish payments to governments. It 
asks governments to disclose revenues received from companies. This enhances domestic 
accountability and strengthens the demand for good governance so that corruption related to 
extractive activities should decrease. Some 3.5 billion people live in countries rich in oil, gas and 
minerals. Through good governance the exploitation of these resources can generate large domestic 
revenues to foster inclusive growth, discourage conflict and reduce poverty. 
 
The EU is an increasingly active participant in and supporter of this initiative. Its position is 
reflected in the recent European strategy on the sustainable supply of raw materials18, and in the 
follow-up to the commitments on enhanced support made in the 2010 Tax and Development 
Communication19. The EU hosted and co-financed EITI expert meetings in 2010 and 2011 and 
                                                 
16 http://www.minfin.fgov.be/portail2/fr/index.htm 
17 The International Tax Dialogue (ITD) is a collaborative arrangement involving the EC, IDB, IMF, OECD, UK 
(DFID) and World Bank Group to encourage and facilitate discussion of tax matters among national tax officials, 
international organisations, and a range of other key stakeholders. The ITD Secretariat is currently hosted by the OECD. 
http://www.itdweb.org/Pages/Home.aspx 
18COM(2011) 25,  Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/files/docs/communication_en.pdf  
19 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st11/st11082.en10.pdf, §7. 
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joined the supporting countries’ constituency in the EITI Board in order to actively contribute to 
developing this initiative further. 
 
A Multi-donor Trust Fund, administered by the World Bank, and bilateral donors including EU 
Member States provides assistance to EITI in-country implementation. The Trust Fund was set up 
in 2003 and European aid agencies such as the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID), Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD) as well as the European Commission play an important role 
in its implementation. 
 
EITI implementation is advancing; 11 countries20 have now achieved EITI-compliant status and 
several countries have become new candidates21. This is remarkable progress compared to late 
2009, when only Azerbaijan was compliant among a total of 26 implementing countries. 
 
In order to enhance revenue transparency and corporate governance, the European Commission is 
currently assessing the feasibility of asking EU listed companies to disclose financial data on a 
country-by-country basis. Such a reporting standard would be a powerful tool for parliaments and 
civil society to hold multinational enterprises and governments to account for the revenues paid and 
received respectively and could yield important benefits in terms of domestic revenue mobilisation 
by reducing corruption and harmful tax practices. 
 
Kimberley process. The European Commission is committed to supporting the Kimberley process 
(KPCS), is an active participant in the KPCS and has chaired it in 2007. The Commission 
furthermore chairs the Kimberley Process Monitoring Working Group that supervises KPCS 
implementation globally and has also funded projects, e.g. through statistical analysis, satellite 
monitoring and technical expertise, in order to enhance the capacity of the Kimberley Process to 
respond to crises, e.g. in Côte d’Ivoire or Zimbabwe. Within the EU, the KPCS is implemented by a 
Council Regulation, adopted in December 2002. The Regulation lays down the procedures and 
criteria to be followed in the import and export of rough diamonds into and from the EU, and 
creates a uniform EU Kimberley Process certificate which is used for all shipments. In Belgium, the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is being followed up by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Finance in cooperation with the diamond 
industry in Antwerp. The UK has enacted the necessary national legislation allowing it to 
implement the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme in the UK. The UK implements the EU 
Regulation as a designated Community Authority which allows it to verify incoming diamond 
shipments for conformity with the Kimberly Process and to issue Kimberly Process Certificates for 
export shipments.  
2.1.2.11. Emerging themes 
The responses to the questionnaire indicate that the area of tax policy and administration receives 
attention and support from most EU Member States. In the case of good governance in tax matters, 
this support is more uneven. Recent Member States’ support tends to be quite limited due to 
selectivity, lack of know-how, reliance on indirect approaches, insufficient resources or a lack of 
                                                 
20 Azerbaijan, Liberia, Timor Leste, Ghana, Mongolia, Central African Republic, the Kyrgyz Republic, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway and Yemen. 
21Afghanistan, Albania, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Peru, Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, Guatemala and Trinidad & Tobago. 
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demand from counterparts. This approach has the benefit of avoiding spreading donor support too 
thinly, especially in the case of smaller programmes, and may result in better division of labour.   
 
The responses suggest that many countries follow similar/coordinated approaches, even if perhaps 
more could be done. Budget support operations, programming of aid to a country, and the PEFA 
exercise appears to provide important entry points to the dialogue on various issues.  Some Member 
States, notably the UK, appear to use a tailor-made approach to each country, with inherent 
differences between low and middle income countries. There are also specific examples of 
interesting pilots involving e-government and other approaches that if successful may be replicable. 
There is also reliance on partnership with others, notably the OECD, IMF, World Bank and various 
institutions focusing on taxes. Finally, progress is monitored through different means, which range 
from donor-led studies to reliance on public information, including PEFA and investment climate 
reports. This reflects the link and complementarity between tax reform and institution building, and 
public expenditure management and investment climate reform. 
 
Member States do not seem to advocate or pursue tax policy reforms under budget support 
operations. This seems consistent with the earlier observation that this area does not receive priority 
in the macro policy dialogue with developing countries. This issue has been set out in the recent 
Commission Green Paper 'The future of EU budget support to third countries' to launch a public 
consultation22. Following on from this consultation, the Commission will issue a Communication 
on budget support later in 2011.  
 
2.2. Scaling up Official Development Assistance (ODA)23 
EU Commitments 
In 2002, the EU Member States adopted joint commitments on ODA increases. These 
commitments were further developed and broadened, and endorsed by the European 
Council in 2005 ahead of the UN World Summit that undertook the first review of progress 
on the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs. The EU and its Member States agreed to 
achieve a collective ODA level of 0.7% of GNI by 2015 and an interim target of 0.56% by 
2010, both accompanied by individual national targets. The EU Member States agreed to 
increase their ODA to 0.51% of their national income by 2010 while those countries which 
had already achieved higher levels (0.7% or above) promised to maintain these levels. The 
Member States that acceded to the EU in or after 2004 (EU-12) promised to strive to spend 
0.17% of their GNI on ODA by 2010 and 0.33% by 2015.24 
                                                 
22 COM(2010) 586 of 19.10.2010 
23Depending on data availability, the text sometimes refers to EU15 and EU20, which can nevertheless be taken as 
approximations of the EU’s collective performance. For explanations, see Annex 2: Methodology. 
24The exact wording is as follows: ‘In the context of the commitment to attain the internationally agreed ODA target of 
an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7%, the European Council notes with satisfaction that its Member States are on track to 
achievethe 0.39% target of GNI in 2006 for ODA volumes contained in the Barcelona commitments. While reaffirming 
its determination to fulfil these commitments, the Council decided on a new collective European Union target of an 
ODA/GNI ratio of 0.56% by 2010. That would result in an additional EUR20 billion a year in ODA. In this context, the 
European Council can reiterate, in accordance with the outcome of the Council on 24 May 2005, that Member States, 
which have not yet achieved an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.51% undertake to attain that level, within their respective budget 
allocation processes, by 2010, while those that are already above that level undertake to continue their efforts. Member 
States which joined the EU after 2002, and have not yet achieved an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.17%, will endeavour to 
increase their ODA to attain that level, within their respective budget allocation processes, by 2010, while those that are 
already above that level undertake to continue their efforts; Member States undertake to achieve the target of an 
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In addition the EU committed in 2005 to: (a) increase ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa and (b) 
provide 50% of the ODA increase to Africa as a whole (North Africa and Sub-Saharan 
Africa).   
In 2008 the EU as a whole also committed to provide between 0.15 and 0.20% ODA/ GNI 
to the Least Developed Countries by 2010.25  
2.2.1. EU ODA Commitments in the Global Context 
The origins of the 0.7% target  can be traced back to the late 1950s26. This was formally recognised 
in October 1970 when the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution including the goal that 
“each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development 
assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount 
of 0.7% of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the Decade.” Although the 
goal of allocating annually 0.7% of GNI to ODA is accepted by all donors except the United States 
of America, only EU donors and Norway have set a date to achieve it.  Norway attained the goal in 
1976 and, since 2000 has been providing ODA to developing countries in the order of 0.8-1% of its 
GNI27. The United States of America does not issue or approve forecasts of projected ODA; in 2010 
it provided USD30 billion (EUR 20.4 billion), 0.21% of its GNI. At the G8 Summit in Gleneagles 
in 2005, the US, Japan and Canada alongside the EU G8 members, accepted to contribute to the 
collective G8 promise to increase aid to Africa. President Obama promised to double US official 
development assistance by 201528 – a pledge that, if fulfilled, will begin to appear in ODA 
disbursements after 2010. Japan29 promised to increase its ODA volume by USD10 billion in 
aggregate over 2005-2009, but fell short by USD3.6 billion; it increased its aid by USD1.6 billion in 
2010, raising its ODA/GNI ratio to 0.20%, like the US well below the DAC average of 0.32%. 
Canada met its aim to double its 2001 International Assistance Envelope (IAE) level by 2010 to 
reach an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.33%30. Australia and Switzerland have announced their intent to reach 
an ODA/GNI target of 0.5% by 2015-2016 and 2015, respectively; their current levels are 0.32% 
and 0.41%. New Zealand has committed to 0.35% ODA/GNI in 2010-11, but fell short with only 
0.26% in calendar year 201031. Korea, the most recent DAC member, has committed to 0.25% 
ODA/GNI by 2015 with an interim target of 0.118% in 2010, which it met32”. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7% by 2015, while those which have achieved that target commit themselves to remaining above 
that target; Member States which joined the EU after 2002 will endeavour to increase their ODA/GNI ratio to 0.33% by 
2015. European Council, 18 June 2005, Doc. 10255/05 Conc. 2. 
25European Council, 11 November 2008, Doc. 15075/1/08, Rev. 1 
26T.J. Moss (2005). Ghost of 0.7%: Origins and Relevance of the International Aid Target. Center for Global 
Development. 
27 OECD-DAC Secretariat Simulation of DAC Members’ Net ODA Volumes in 2006 and 2010.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/131026367850  
28 Obama administration committed in 2009 to double foreign aid: 
http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_aug09/p5_nsc080909.html 
29DAC 2011 press release on preliminary ODA 2010: Japan’s Gleneagles promise was to give USD 10 billion more 
over the period 2005 to 2009 than if its ODA had stayed at its 2004 level over this period. It fell short by USD 3.6 
billion due mainly to severe economic and budgetary constraints, as well as significant early repayments on ODA loans 
by some borrowing countries. http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3746,en_2649_34447_44981579_1_1_1_1,00.html 
30 DAC 2011 press release: http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3746,en_2649_34447_47515235_1_1_1_1,00.html  
31OECD Development Co-operation Report 2008  
32DAC Special Review of Korea’s Development Co-operation: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/522324562341. The 
government is determined to increase Korea’s development assistance, and outlines this objective as one of 50 core 
tasks in its long-term planning manifesto, Vision 2030. The government set explicit targets, and committed to reaching 
0.118% ODA/GNI by 2010 and 0.25% by 2015 (an estimated USD 3 billion+): 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/50/42347329.pdf  
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The EU and its Member States are therefore – apart from Norway - the only group of donors to 
transform the long-standing UN 0.7% goal, considered by many as an ’aspirational goal’, into a 
realistic, time-bound target. The EU decided to move forward and achieve this goal in steps within 
15 years (2000 – 2015), in line with the deadlines of the Millennium Declaration and based on a 
mix of individual and collective intermediate targets. The first intermediate EU ODA objectives 
were defined in 2002 during the preparation for the Monterrey International Conference on 
Financing for Development, based on the EU’s ODA levels in 2000.  
 
The agreement was that the EU’s combined efforts would achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI ratio by 
2015 in three steps: 
• A first set of intermediate targets for 2006. As a first significant step, those Member States that 
had not yet reached the 0.7% target committed themselves –individually and within their 
respective budget allocation to increasing their ODA volume between 2002 and 2006 to 0.33% 
of GNI. The other Member States agreed to renew their efforts to remain at or above the target of 
0.7% ODA, so that collectively an EU average of 0.39% would be reached by 2006. These 
targets were set by the then EU 15 Member States. 
• A second set of intermediate targets for 2010 was agreed in 2005, after the enlargement of the 
EU to 25 Member States. These targets have been endorsed33and reconfirmed by the European 
Heads of State and Government on various occasions34. Bulgaria and Romania, in the context of 
their accession to the EU in 2007, also subscribed to the commitments. The new ODA targets 
were differentiated to take into account the different national income levels and the transition of 
the newer EU Member States from ODA recipients to ODA donors. The definition of the 2010 
intermediate targets took into account the EU’s collective ODA levels in 2004 (0.42% of GNI) 
and put 2010 at mid-way, i.e. 0.56% to achieving 0.7% by 2015. This collective target was 
translated into different individual targets for Member States (0.51% for EU15 and 0.17% for 
EU12). The collective target assumed that the most generous EU donors would (a) deliver on 
more ambitious national timetables (e.g. Belgium, Finland, France and the United Kingdom 
based on a steady scaling up) and (b) those already above 0.7% promised to sustain and not 
decrease their high levels. These countries were counted upon to achieve a higher collective level 
than the individual targets mentioned above.  
• A third set of targets for 2015: 0.7% is the collective target and minimum individual threshold 
for the EU15. The EU12 target was set at 0.33% corresponding to the EU15 collective outcome 
for 2000, thereby accepting that the newest 12 Member States needed a long transition phase to 
adapt to the EU acquis.   
In 2005, as part of the first review of progress on the MDGs and the G8 Summit at Gleneagles, 
these EU commitments were the main basis for calculating that the donor community would raise 
an additional USD50 billion (at 2004 prices) in official development assistance by 201035. 
2.2.2. EU ODA Performance 2005-2010 compared to other donors 
The EU has not only pledged to deliver more aid than non EU donors, but its combined efforts are 
already delivering substantially greater amounts of ODA, and individual EU countries (with a few 
                                                 
33European Council, 18 June 2005, Doc. 10255/05 
34Most recently by the European Council on 17 June 2010 
35The dollar value of the 2010 pledge was calculated by OECD DAC and backed by UN and World Bank estimates of 
incremental MDG costs, net of domestic resource contributions. 
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exceptions) are also making more substantial efforts in relative terms. Over the period 2004-2010, 
the EU and its Member States accounted for 57% of net ODA to developing countries from all 
DAC and EU donors, and for 65% of the global EUR 25.7 billion ODA increase in real terms 
during this period.   
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Figure 1 – Net ODA by Donor (EUR million, 2008 prices)  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU 36775 47083 48367 45617 50032 50152 53458
Canada 2477 3228 2889 2937 3324 3000 3382
Japan 6225 9443 8547 6018 6656 5925 6624
USA 15315 21010 17140 15428 18610 19737 20436
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Source: OECD DAC/European Commission 
 
The above statistics do not include aid from large emerging donors like Brazil, China, India, or 
Russia, as none of them report to DAC.  Overall, aid from emerging donors is estimated to amount 
to about 10-12% of total ODA from all donors (EUR10-12 billion per year). 
 
As shown in Table 1, both the EU’s per capita ODA and its ODA/GNI ratios are greater than those 
of non-EU DAC Members. Indeed, its ODA/GNI ratio is double that of Japan and the USA. The 
EU12 still have ODA/GNI ratios that are below the average for non-EU DAC donors, but they have 
been growing from a low base. Collectively, the EU outperforms most other donors by a wide 
margin. 
 
Table 1 – ODA/GNI and ODA per capita of EU Member States and Non-EU DAC Members  
(at 2008 prices) 
ODA volumes 
(EUR billion) 
ODA per 
capita (EUR)
ODA/GNI 
(%) Country 
2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 
EU 25/27 36.8 53.5 75 107 0.34 0.43 
EU 15 36.4 52.6 95 134 0.35 0.46 
EU 10/12 0.3 0.8 3 8 0.07 0.09 
USA 15.3 20.4 52 66 0.17 0.21 
Japan 6.2 6.6 49 52 0.19 0.20 
Canada 2.5 3.4 77 99 0.27 0.33 
DAC Non EU Members 29.6 38.6 58 69 0.19 0.23 
DAC Members 66.0 91.2 71 96 0.25 0.32 
Source: OECD DAC/European Commission  
2.2.3. Role of Debt Relief in EU ODA 
The growth of EU ODA in 2010 is significant if one considers the declining importance of debt 
relief in the overall ODA effort of EU Member States. In the period 2005-2006 several EU Member 
States (namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) saw an 
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increase of ODA due in large part to exceptional debt relief. Almost two thirds of the EU15 debt 
relief over the period 2004-2009 was directed to two resource rich countries: Iraq (33%) and 
Nigeria (30%).  Some smaller but still significant debt relief programmes were also implemented in 
2007 and 2008 but became minimal in 2009, except for France. 
 
One positive effect of the EU ODA commitments is that they stimulated growth in EU ODA other 
than for debt relief over the period 2005-2010, and this more than compensated for the fall in debt 
relief. Over the period 1995-2010, EU ODA net of debt relief grew by 0.06% of GNI from 0.34% in 
1995 to 0.41% in 2010 for EU27. The gap between the EU and non-EU DAC Members’ ODA net 
of debt relief had narrowed to only 0.10% of GNI by 2005, but the recent growth means that the gap 
has widened again reaching 0.23% of GNI by 2010  
 
Debt relief certainly helped increase EU ODA over the period, and especially helped meet the targets in 
2006. But it was a ’one-off’ effect exercise and not sustainable. The real challenge now for the Member 
States is to increase their national ODA budgets in a period of budget austerity.  
 
Figure 2 – EU ODA and Debt Relief as a % of GNI 
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As shown in Figure 3 below, debt relief played an important role in ODA for several Member 
States: Austria, France, Germany and Italy had a high share of debt relief in their ODA over the last 
five years. It is interesting to note that some of the Member States that are already behind schedule 
on their individual aid commitments have made the greatest use of debt relief (e.g. Germany, Italy 
and Portugal). Sudden increases in ODA shown in the country charts in Annex 3 were mainly due 
to debt relief. Portugal carried out substantial debt relief or rescheduling operations in 1995-2000 
and again in 2004. Spain did likewise in 2001 and 2005-2006, Italy in 2002-2006, Germany in 
2002-2008, France for the entire period 1995-2010 (fluctuating between 11% and 45% of total 
ODA), and Austria in 1999-2002 and 2005-2008. 
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Figure 3 – Share of Debt Relief in Net ODA (cumulative, 2004-2010, %) 
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2.2.4. Performance on ODA targets (2005-2010) 
ODA figures on 2010 net disbursements are preliminary, based on information of the EU Member 
States and the European Commission. For those EU Member States that report to the OECD/ DAC 
final and more comprehensive ODA figures will become available towards the end of 2011 
 
As anticipated in the 2010 Financing for Development annual progress report, after achieving 
its 2006 intermediate target of 0.39% of GNI, the EU and its Member States did not achieve 
their collective 2010 target of 0.56%. However, the positive trend continued reaching the 
highest ODA/GNI ratio for twenty years, notwithstanding the decline in debt relief and the 
EU-wide budget. 
 
Since 2008 the financial crisis has hit EU Member States hard, triggering the deepest global 
economic recession for decades. State-financed rescue packages for the affected banking sector, 
higher social protection costs and lower budget revenues have dramatically changed the fiscal 
situation in many Member States. Nine Member States (namely Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) achieved or 
exceeded the 2010 EU individual minimum targets. Most of them also reached their more ambitious 
national ODA targets. However, other eighteen EU Member States missed the individual 2010 
minimum thresholds and, as a consequence, also the collective target of 0.56% has not been 
achieved (see Figure 4 below).  
 
In 2009, EU-27 ODA decreased in volume terms to EUR 49 billion, but increased as a share of GNI 
from 0.40% in 2008 to 0.42% due to falling GNI levels during the crisis. ODA growth resumed in 
2010 and ODA increased by more than EUR 4.5 billion to almost EUR 54 billion, equivalent to 
0.43% of GNI. Despite the increase, this means the EU has missed the collective target of 0.56% 
ODA/GNI target in 2010 by a wide margin of about 0.13% of GNI (EUR 15 billion).  
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Low or negative economic growth rates in the EU as a consequence of the crisis, and the 
consequential austerity measures that Member States introduced, led to different pressures on ODA. 
On the one hand lower GNI growth combined with higher public expenditure elsewhere may lead to 
a cut-back in spending on development co-operation, which in turn would result in a lower 
trajectory of scaling up to meet 2015 targets. On the other hand, where aid volumes are not cut, aid 
level can appear higher when expressed as a percentage of GNI but provide no additional ODA 
funding for developing countries.  
 
 Figure 4 – Gap between 2010 and 2015 targets and 2010 results 
Gap between 2010 ODA levels and agreed individual targets of the 27 EU Member States 
and direction of change from 2009 to 2010
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Table 2: EU ODA volumes and as % of GNI 2004 – 2010 and gaps for reaching the 2010 intermediate ODA targets 
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Mill ion
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Mill ion
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Mill ion
O DA in % 
of GNI
Gap EUR 
million
Gap in % of 
GNI
O fficial Targets EU-15: 0.51 EU-15: 0.51
EU-12: 0.17 EU-12: 0.17
(or national 
target)
Austria 545 0.23 1266 0.52 1194 0.47 1321 0.50 1188 0.43 820 0.30 905 0.32 1419 0.51 513 0.19
Belgium 1178 0.41 1580 0.53 1575 0.50 1425 0.43 1654 0.48 1874 0.55 2265 0.64 2486 0.70 221 0.06
Bulgaria 1 0.00 17 0.06 13 0.04 12 0.04 31 0.09 58 0.17 27 0.08
Cyprus 4 0.03 4 0.03 21 0.15 18 0.12 26 0.17 33 0.20 34 0.20 29 0.17 0 -
Czech Republic 87 0.11 109 0.11 128 0.12 131 0.11 173 0.12 154 0.12 169 0.12 234 0.17 65 0.05
Denmark 1640 0.85 1697 0.81 1782 0.80 1872 0.81 1944 0.82 2018 0.88 2164 0.90 1901 0.80 0 -
Estonia 4 0.04 5 0.05 11 0.09 12 0.08 16 0.10 13 0.10 14 0.10 24 0.17 10 0.07
Finland 547 0.37 726 0.46 665 0.40 717 0.39 808 0.44 926 0.54 1008 0.55 910 0.51 0 -
France 6820 0.41 8067 0.47 8445 0.47 7220 0.38 7562 0.39 9048 0.47 9751 0.50 10026 0.51 274 0.01
Germany 6064 0.28 8112 0.36 8313 0.36 8978 0.37 9693 0.38 8674 0.35 9606 0.38 12888 0.51 3282 0.13
Greece 258 0.16 309 0.17 338 0.17 366 0.16 488 0.21 436 0.19 378 0.17 1139 0.51 762 0.34
Hungary 56 0.07 81 0.11 119 0.13 76 0.08 74 0.08 84 0.10 85 0.09 158 0.17 73 0.08
Ireland 489 0.39 578 0.42 814 0.54 871 0.55 921 0.59 722 0.54 676 0.53 647 0.51 0 -
Italy 1981 0.15 4096 0.29 2901 0.20 2901 0.19 3370 0.22 2368 0.16 2349 0.15 7780 0.51 5432 0.36
Latvia 7 0.06 8 0.07 9 0.06 12 0.06 15 0.07 15 0.07 12 0.06 31 0.17 19 0.11
Lithuania 8 0.04 12 0.06 20 0.08 35 0.11 35 0.11 30 0.11 28 0.10 46 0.17 18 0.07
Luxembourg 190 0.79 206 0.79 232 0.89 274 0.92 288 0.97 298 1.04 301 1.09 286 1.00 0 -
Malta 8 0.18 7 0.17 7 0.15 8 0.15 11 0.20 10 0.18 7 0.11 10 0.17 3 0.06
The Netherlands 3384 0.73 4115 0.82 4343 0.81 4547 0.81 4848 0.80 4615 0.82 4795 0.81 4654 0.80 0 -
Poland 95 0.05 165 0.07 236 0.09 265 0.10 258 0.08 269 0.09 285 0.08 581 0.17 295 0.09
Portugal 830 0.63 303 0.21 316 0.21 344 0.22 430 0.27 368 0.23 489 0.29 843 0.51 354 0.22
Romania 3 0.00 84 0.07 94 0.07 99 0.09 86 0.07 205 0.17 119 0.10
Slovak Republic 23 0.07 45 0.12 44 0.10 49 0.09 64 0.10 54 0.09 56 0.09 112 0.17 56 0.08
Slovenia 25 0.10 28 0.11 35 0.12 40 0.12 47 0.13 57 0.15 48 0.13 60 0.17 13 0.04
Spain 1962 0.24 2429 0.27 3038 0.32 3755 0.37 4761 0.45 4728 0.46 4467 0.43 5259 0.56 792 0.13
Sweden 2191 0.78 2705 0.94 3151 1.02 3170 0.93 3281 0.98 3266 1.12 3418 0.97 3500 1.00 82 0.03
UK 6362 0.36 8667 0.47 9926 0.51 7194 0.36 7973 0.43 8251 0.52 10391 0.56 8795 0.56 0 -
EU 15 TO TAL 34441 0.35 44856 0.44 47033 0.43 44954 0.39 49207 0.43 48413 0.45 52963 0.46         62532 0.56 11712 0.10
EU 12 TO TAL 317 0.07 464 0.09 635 0.09 745 0.09 825 0.09 830 0.10 854 0.09         1548 0.17 699 0.08
EU 27 TO TAL 34758 0.34 45320 0.42 47668 0.41 45699 0.37 50032 0.40 49243 0.42 53817 0.43         64365 0.53 12411 0.10
Gap to collective 2010 target 0.56%
Target in EUR million: 68,376       
Gap in EUR million 14,559       
Gap in % of GNI 0.13          
2010 (preliminary) 2010 (commitments)
2010: financial  gap to 
INDIVIDUAL targets2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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The trends among Member States varied, as the figures and tables in Annex 2 show. The 
largest increase during 2010 was made by the United Kingdom (EUR 2.1 billion), followed 
by Germany (EUR 0.9 billion), France (EUR 0.7 billion), and Belgium (EUR 0.4 billion). 
These four countries accounted for over 90% of the increase between 2009 and 2010. Cyprus 
(0.20%) exceeded its individual, intermediate target threshold of 0.17% ODA/GNI, which it 
had already achieved in 2009, one year ahead of schedule. Sweden, despite increased ODA 
volumes corresponding to 0.97% of its GNI again demonstrated how difficult it is to remain, 
year-on-year, in keeping with its national 1% target level. Belgium, although reaching a 
record level of 0.64% ODA/GNI, had planned to spend 0.7% of its GNI for development 
assistance in 2010 and beyond, in line with its national legislation and projects reaching that 
level in 2011. Ireland, severely hit by the financial crisis, had decided, in 2010, to slow down 
the scaling-up of ODA process and to align with the common EU timetable, by postponing 
the target date for reaching 0.7% ODA/ GNI from 2012 to 2015. Consequently Ireland's ODA 
spending in 2010 was cut, but less than initially feared.  
From 2009 to 2010, ODA fell in nine Member States (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Spain), although for most of them the decline was 
minor. The worst aid cuts were made in Spain (down EUR 261 million, to 0.43% ODA/GNI).  
The performance of Italy and Germany will be particularly important in helping achieve the 
2015 target as they account for almost half the shortfall. Italy has shown little commitment to 
the ODA targets and has continuously cut its aid budgets over the last five years. This has led 
to a decline in ODA/GNI ratios from 0.20% in 2002 to 0.15% in 2010, with a few occasional 
increases over the period due mostly to one-off debt relief operations that are not enough for 
sustaining ODA levels. Germany, whose ODA/GNI ratio grew from 0.27% in 2002 to 0.38% 
in 2010, also relied substantially on the one-off effects of debt relief. Contrary to its 
declaration annexed to the May 2005 Council Conclusions, Germany has not introduced the 
innovative sources of financing with sufficient revenue generation potential it had declared 
were necessary to reach the ODA targets. Increased allocations to the Development Ministry’s 
budget came too late and at much too low a level to create the necessary upward trend. 
2.2.5. Achievement of the 0.7% ODA/GNI Target by 2015 
The EU scaling-up process has been uneven, with asymmetric efforts. Member States not 
contributing their fair share to the burden-sharing effort endanger the performance of the EU 
as a whole and substantially increase the risk of collective failure on ODA targets.   
Figure 5 below shows the long-term trends in ODA volumes for the EU27.  At the current 
pace and with existing budgets, there is a delay equivalent to about 25 years on the path to 
0.7%, as ODA is projected to increase at an annual rate of 0.01% of GNI. These Commission 
simulations build on the trends of 2005 – 2010 and spending forecasts, as available, that 
Member States reported in their replies to the annual questionnaire. To reach 0.7% ODA/ GNI 
by 2015 as planned, efforts would have to be stepped up dramatically but this may not be 
realistic under current economic conditions. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4 above, the 
main effort would have to come from under-performing Member States, which would have to 
drastically increase their ODA in a short time span under tight budget conditions. To reach the 
2015 target Latvia would need to sextuple its current ODA volumes over the next five years, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic quintuple; Estonia, 
Hungary, and Malta quadruple; and Austria, the Czech Republic, Portugal and Slovenia triple 
their aid allocations.. This effort is all the more significant since the exceptional debt relief 
operations that explain, for example, the sudden increase in 2005-2006 (see Figure 5) will not 
be feasible again. 
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Figure 5 - EU 27 ODA/GNI Ratios (1995-2015)  
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Table 3: Estimates and gaps to be bridged for reaching the 2015 ODA targets, based on Member States' forecast information and Commission simulation 
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
O DA EUR 
Million
O DA in % 
of GNI
Gap EUR 
million
Gap in % of 
GNI
O fficial Targets EU-15: 0.7 EU-15: 0.7
EU-12: 0.33 EU-12: 0.33
Austria 905 0.32 929              0.32 1,053         0.35 1,046         0.34 1,099         0.34 1,034         0.31 2329 0.70 1424 0.42
Belgium 2265 0.64 2,576           0.70 2,676         0.70 2,771         0.70 2,869         0.70 2,972         0.70 2972 0.70 707 0.13
Bulgaria 31 0.09 31                0.08 36              0.09 42              0.10 49              0.11 56              0.12 151 0.33 121 0.26
Cyprus 34 0.20 34                0.19 34              0.19 35              0.18 36              0.18 36              0.17 69 0.33 35 0.16
Czech Republic 169 0.12 180              0.12 193            0.13 197            0.12 211            0.13 225            0.13 579 0.33 411 0.22
Denmark 2164 0.90 2,043           0.82 2,043         0.79 2,043         0.77 2,144         0.79 2,257         0.81 2240 0.80 76 -
Estonia 14 0.10 17                0.12 21              0.14 23              0.14 27              0.16 31              0.17 61 0.33 47 0.25
Finland 1008 0.55 1,074           0.56 1,119         0.56 1,175         0.56 1,229         0.55 1,334         0.57 1624 0.70 616 0.25
France 9751 0.50 9,555           0.47 10,044       0.48 9,128         0.42 9,513         0.43 9,940         0.43 16091 0.70 6340 0.26
Germany 9606 0.38 10,479         0.40 10,933       0.40 11,416       0.41 11,911       0.41 12,426       0.42 20851 0.70 11245 0.34
Greece 378 0.17 418              0.19 423            0.19 441            0.19 459            0.19 480            0.19 1779 0.70 1401 0.52
Hungary 85 0.09 94                0.09 96              0.09 95              0.09 94              0.08 93              0.08 379 0.33 294 0.26
Ireland 676 0.53 669              0.52 708            0.55 766            0.57 834            0.60 914            0.63 1021 0.70 345 0.20
Italy 2349 0.15 2,495           0.16 3,281         0.20 2,003         0.12 1,792         0.11 1,606         0.09 11948 0.70 9600 0.57
Latvia 12 0.06 12                0.06 12              0.06 12              0.06 13              0.06 13              0.06 74 0.33 62 0.27
Lithuania 28 0.10 33                0.11 39              0.13 46              0.14 53              0.16 63              0.18 117 0.33 89 0.22
Luxembourg 301 1.09 292              1.00 309            1.00 327            1.00 346            1.00 366            1.00 366 1.00 65 -
Malta 7 0.11 13                0.22 15              0.24 18              0.27 20              0.30 23              0.33 23 0.33 16 0.16
The Netherlands 4795 0.81 4,646           0.76 4,480         0.71 4,661         0.70 4,810         0.70 5,059         0.70 5059 0.70 264 -
Poland 285 0.08 321              0.09 357            0.09 391            0.09 428            0.10 467            0.10 1541 0.33 1256 0.26
Portugal 489 0.29 335              0.20 364            0.21 403            0.23 448            0.24 499            0.26 1340 0.70 851 0.50
Romania 86 0.07 99                0.08 119            0.09 136            0.10 157            0.11 180            0.12 510 0.33 424 0.26
Slovak Republic 56 0.09 66                0.10 63              0.09 63              0.08 63              0.07 63              0.07 297 0.33 242 0.27
Slovenia 48 0.13 60                0.17 66              0.17 69              0.17 71              0.17 73              0.17 143 0.33 96 0.20
Spain 4467 0.43 4,234           0.40 3,934         0.36 4,450         0.39 5,045         0.43 5,729         0.47 8510 0.70 4043 0.30
Sweden 3418 0.97 4,025           1.00 4,184         1.00 4,367         1.00 4,551         1.00 4,739         1.00 4739 1.00 1321 -
UK 10391 0.56 10948 0.56 11411 0.56 14878 0.70 15561 0.70 16308 0.70 16308 0.70 5917 0.23
EU 15 TO TAL 52963 0.46 54716 0.46         56962 0.46         59873 0.47         62613 0.48         65663 0.48         96238 0.71 44215 0.30
EU 12 TO TAL 854 0.09         960 0.10         1052 0.10         1128 0.10         1221 0.11         1324 0.11         3946 0.33 3092 0.25
EU 27 TO TAL 53817 0.43         55677 0.43         58014 0.43         61001 0.44         63834 0.45         66986 0.45         100181 0.68 47307 0.29
MS Projection/Budget Forecast Gap to collective 2015 target 0.7%
Target in EUR million: 103,736  
Gap in EUR million 49,919    
Gap in % of GNI 0.34       
2010 ODA on 2015 GNI 0.36       
Total 0.70       
2015 (commitments)
2015: financial gap to 
meet individual targets 2010 (preliminary) 2011 2012 2013 2014
2015 
(forecast/simulation) 
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Initial projections for 2011, based on Member Sates’ replies or budget data monitored by 
Concord/AidWatch36, point to an increase in ODA budgets below the expected GNI growth rate 
that would lead to a stable ODA/GNI ratio for 2011 of 0.43%. 
 
The prospects for 2011 according to Member States' reports are as follows: 
• The ODA budgets for Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany37, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland38, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom are expected to grow in 2011.   
• Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland39, Latvia, and the Slovak Republic will maintain their ODA 
budget essentially at the same level in nominal terms. 
• Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal40, and Spain will reduce their 
ODA budget in 2011. 
• Romania did not provide estimates for its 2011 ODA budgets and no third party 
monitoring was available. 
The ODA graphs in Annex 2 show each EU Member State's readiness to meet the individual ODA 
target levels of 0.7% and 0.33% of GNI for EU15 and EU12 respectively in 2015. Annex 1 outlines 
the methodology used to analyse ODA indicators and forecasts provided by Member States. 
 
A recent survey by OECD DAC41 reached similar conclusions; i.e. that donors’ forward budget 
plans will probably remain substantially steady in 2011. According to this survey, global Country 
Programmable Aid (CPA) is ‘programmed to grow at a real rate of 2.5% per year from 2009 to 
2012. This is good news in the light of the current climate of budgetary austerity in OECD 
countries. The bad news is that growth in planned CPA is decelerating significantly, from an 
average annual growth rate of 7% over the past three years. Almost all the planned growth was in 
2010, with a zero-forecast growth rate in 2012.’  
 
Enabling factors for increases in Member States’ ODA. There has been some progress in 
establishing what can be considered ‘multi-annual timetables’ for ODA, as repeatedly called for by 
Council Conclusions. Timetables have proven a useful tool for embedding the scaling-up of aid 
volumes in national budgets in line with stated commitments. Member States have taken different 
paths in developing timetables (see Box 1).  
 
However, even where these tools exist, they cannot stop possible reductions in ODA budgets when 
there is a strong political intent to do so, as shown by the recent events in the Netherlands or Spain. 
Nor can the tools replace the political will to increase aid where no such will exists. 
 
                                                 
36AidWatch Briefing (February 2011), Between austerity and political will: EU MS ODA budgets in 2011. Risks 
that in 2011 genuine EU aid will fall for the first time since 1997. 
37According to Aid Watch (2011), Germany’s budget for 2011 will increase to 0.40% of GNI. 
38Based on Aid Watch (2011), as no reply was provided by the Member State. 
39According to Aid Watch (2011), Ireland’s ODA budget will decline in 2011. We inserted the reply 
provided by Ireland to the Monterrey questionnaire. 
40According to Aid Watch (2011), Portugal’s ODA budget will decline in 2011.  
41See the 2010 OECD Report on Aid Predictability Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans 2010 – 2012. 
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Box 1. Approaches to maintaining or increasing ODA budgets 
Enacting legislation to make 0.7% ODA/GNI a binding obligation. Belgium has set, by law, a minimum aid 
level commitment, called the ‘growth-path’ towards the 0.7% target. The ‘growth path’ is set out in the 
solidarity notes and can also be amended by the solidarity notes. These are drafted and approved by the 
government but the government cannot amend the legally binding target of 0.7% to be reached in 2010. Despite 
this, the Belgian ODA level was 0.64% of GNI in 2010, missing its legally binding commitment to the 0.7% 
target. For many years the Netherlands has had a legal obligation to spend a fixed proportion of its GNI as 
ODA. In a letter of 26 November 2010 to the House of Representatives on its development cooperation policy 
the new ruling coalition stated that ’[the budget] will be reduced in two equal steps in the next two years, from 
0.8% to 0.7% of GNP as of 2012’. In the UK, the government will enshrine in law before April 2012 its 
commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI as ODA from 2013. There seems to be cross-party consensus on the 
importance of ODA and readiness to assume responsibility in the world, as the commitment for 2015 was kept 
notwithstanding the recent change in government.  Cross-party consensus is important in maintaining high 
ambitions even under difficult budget situations. 
Transparent multi-year budget spending plans. The UK Government has set out its commitment to 
increase Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 0.56% of GNI in 2011 and 2012 and 0.7% from 2013 in 
line with the UK’s international commitments to help the very poorest in the World. The Spending Review 
2010, published on 20 October 2010, sets out the figures for each year up to 2014 in clear spending plans 
(http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spend_sr2010_documents.htm). The UK’s ODA budget will increase every 
year between now and then, amidst budget cuts in many other areas, an indication that ODA increases are 
possible despite budget austerity, if the political will is there. 
Government-endorsed development policy documents. The Finnish Development Policy Programme42, 
i.e. Government Decision-in-Principle, has stated the commitment to ensuring the development cooperation 
appropriations which ’will take Finland towards 0.7% GNI set by the UN,  and Finland is committed to 
achieve the target of 0.51% in 2010 as established in the European Council’s decision’. Denmark’s 
commitments and strategic priorities are set down in its new development strategy ‘Freedom from Poverty - 
Freedom to change’ and the accompanying multi-annual budget forecast43. The Spanish ‘Master Plan for 
Development Cooperation 2009-2012’44 forms the basis of Spanish development cooperation at government 
level and was endorsed by the Spanish Government and Parliament. The Master Plan states that Spain aspires 
to reach an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7% by 2012. Spain has shown a significant commitment to increase its aid 
over the last few years, but ODA is always lagging behind its own national plans and has been declining 
since 2008.  Given current aid levels, it seems unrealistic to assume that Spain could achieve its national 
target, especially in light of the further aid cuts announced for 2011. 
Indicative multi-annual timetables. Four Member States (Belgium, Malta, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom)45 have indicative multi-annual timetables in place that show the path towards the achievement of 
their individual target for 2015. As part of next year’s budget process for the financial year 2012 and the 
medium-term financial plan until 2015, the German government will define its intended budgets for 
development cooperation. Nevertheless government and parliament will discuss the actual annual budgets for 
2013-2015 and how to reach this goal in the annual budget processes. 
 
                                                 
42http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=107497 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=107497  
43http://amg.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/1C903D5E-3A75-453F-BACB 
8EBF8B55F7F2/0/Priorities_danish_development_assistance20112015.pdf 
http://amg.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/1C903D5E-3A75-453F-BACB 
8EBF8B55F7F2/0/Priorities_danish_development_assistance20112015.pdf  
44http://www.maec.es/en/MenuPpal/Actualidad/NotasdePrensa/Paginas/49NP20090514EN.aspx 
http://www.maec.es/en/MenuPpal/Actualidad/NotasdePrensa/Paginas/49NP20090514EN.aspx  
45The total number of Member States with multi-annual timetables is ten. However, six are on a path away from rather 
than towards keeping their individual commitments for 2015. Denmark and Luxembourg have plans showing they will 
keep their volumes steady in nominal terms. They will, thus not meet their commitment to sustain their efforts, as levels 
and volumes in real terms are both  projected to decline. The Czech Republic and Finland have timetables till 2013 or 
2014, showing paths with significant implicit back-loading of their commitments.  Cyprus and Estonia have multi-
annual timetables that show they will not meet their 2015 target of 0.33%. 
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2.2.6. Lessons Learnt and the Way Forward 
The European Union and its Member States have repeatedly reiterated their commitments to 
achieve the 0.7% ODA to GNI ratio by 2015, as a concrete, time-bound goal. The rationale for a 
time-bound target was to provide adequate funding to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. 
This was not as an act of solidarity or charity but a strategy to tackle the root causes of poverty and 
fragility before they spiral out of control, generating refugee flows and security threats. It was also 
designed to face challenges that know no boundaries and that affect the entire globe, such as climate 
change, loss of biodiversity, desertification or the spread of infectious diseases. 
 
There are thus no grounds for seeing the 2015 goal as a mere aspiration or a declaration of intent, as 
some Member States do. ODA is not an act of charity that makes sense only in ‘good times’ but it is 
in the Union’s own interests. There is a clear need to better communicate these goals and to educate 
EU public opinion about their importance. Significantly, the latest Eurobarometer on Development 
Cooperation shows that Europeans believe it is important to help people in developing countries 
because they are facing challenges such as overwhelming poverty. Two out of three Europeans cite 
self-interested motivation for giving aid, namely trade, terrorism, migration and political relations 
with third countries.46 
 
There are several lessons to be drawn from the EU’s experience.  
 
First, the reduced ambition of some national plans has had a real impact on collective progress on 
ODA. Some of the more ambitious Member States have reduced their targets compared to the ones 
that formed the basis for the 2005 Council Conclusions. Had these commitments been met, the EU 
27 ODA/GNI47 ratio would have been closer to the 2010 target (0.50% rather than 0.43% based on 
simulations prepared for this report).  
 
Second, the current fiscal crunch has led some countries to revise their commitments and targets. 
Spain, after increasing ODA substantially under the current government, has announced a reduction 
of EUR 800 million in the next two years and has acknowledged that the 0.7% of GNI target will 
have to wait until 2015 at least, and even then will only be attained if economic conditions improve. 
The coalition treaty of the new government of the Netherlands states that ODA spending will be 
reduced from 0.8% to 0.7% for the legislative period of the new government, which goes against 
the spirit of its individual commitment as an EU country to sustain its efforts. Although the agreed 
individual EU target was to reach 0.33% by 2006 and 0.51% by 2010 Portugal translated this into 
national targets of 0.33% by 2006, 0.30% by 2009, and 0.34% by 2010. It has missed all three. At 
the UN Millennium Summit of September 2000, Ireland committed to reaching the UN target of 
0.7% GNI by 2007. Its government gradually increased ODA from 0.39% of GNI in 2003 to 0.58% 
by 2008. However, in 2005 the target date for meeting 0.7% was revised to 2012. In 2009 it was 
further postponed to 2015. Italy has consistently missed targets and its aid has declined. Without 
debt relief, which is expected to be about EUR 0.6 billion in 2011 and EUR 1.3 billion in 2012, 
respectively, Italy’s ODA is projected to remain essentially unchanged in nominal terms (at about 
EUR 2 billion per year) between 2010 and 2013 at already minimal levels. According to Social 
Watch (2010), Germany publicly announced in late 2009 that it considered the EU’s step-by-step 
ODA scaling up plan as a declaration of intent, not an obligation under international law, and could 
                                                 
46Special Eurobarometer 318 / Development Aid in times of economic turmoil Wave 71.2 – TNS Opinion & 
Social (Fieldwork: May 2009 – June 2009 Publication: October 2009) 
47Commission simulation based on public announcement and intermediate targets indicated in the OECD DAC’s 
annual Development Co-operation Report. 
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not achieve an ODA ratio of 0.51% in just one year. Finally, Greece is drawing conclusions from 
the fact that it will not be able to move away from low aid levels and indicated that 0.51% will not 
be achieved prior to 2012, and this revised target is likely still too ambitious given current economic 
circumstances. The majority of 12 newest Member States do not see the 0.17% or 0.33% targets as 
firm commitments, and have adopted lower national targets (e.g. Estonia forecast to reach 0.17% by 
2015, Cyprus 0.18% by the same year) or seem to have no plan for ODA increases.  
 
Third, back-loading the increase in ODA expenditure has been the main factor in missing target 
levels. Sustaining the scaling-up process through debt relief grants is impossible: debt relief grants 
are ‘one-off’ exercises by nature and insufficient if not replaced after the debt relief spike by ‘fresh 
money’ in ODA budgets. Experience shows that missing intermediate targets in a significant way 
leads to missing subsequent targets too. A good example is the Member States that significantly 
missed the 2006 target of 0.33% GNI:  Greece, Italy and Portugal.  Once the target was missed, 
statements were made that the 2006 target would be achieved by 2007 or 2008.  In reality, the 2006 
target has not been met by any of them even by 2010 and these three Member States ended up 
missing both the 2006 and the 2010 targets. 
 
Table 4 - Gap between 2010 ODA levels and 0.7% and 0.33% ODA/ GNI individual targets,  
by Member State 
Member State 
Funding Gap 
(EUR million) Member State 
Funding Gap 
(EUR million) 
 0.7% target  0.33% target 
Germany 11245 Poland 1256 
Italy 9600 Romania 424 
France 6340 Czech Republic 411 
UK 5917 Hungary 294 
Spain 4043 Slovak Republic 242 
Austria 1424 Bulgaria 121 
Greece 1401 Slovenia 96 
Sweden 1321  Lithuania 89 
Portugal 851 Latvia 62 
Belgium 706 Estonia 47 
Finland 616 Cyprus 35 
Ireland 345 Malta 16 
Netherlands 264    
Denmark 76    
Luxembourg 65  Total 47307 
 
Source: OECD DAC/European Commission (EU annual questionnaire on financing for development) 
 
Fourth, Europe relies not only on the medium-sized donors, but also on EU countries with large 
economies such as France, Germany, Italy and the UK to boost average aid levels so as to reach 
targets. These countries account for 70% of the gap to be filled between 2010 and 2015. If Europe is 
to meet the collective target of 0.7% ODA/GNI by 2015, it is imperative that all the big players step 
up their efforts.  
 
Table 4 above shows the funding gap between the 0.7% target and the current level of ODA from 
EU Member States. When analysing the ODA gap to 2015, we can distinguish four groups of 
Member States: 
1. Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden have already achieved the 0.7% 
target and rather than providing additional resources, may actually reduce their 
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contribution. These countries account for 3% of the gap and the risk of backtracking on 
their ODA commitments is small but not zero. Available multi-annual budgets show that 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are planning to keep their aid steady in 
nominal terms till 2014 or 2015, with declining ODA/GNI ratios. Only Sweden is expected 
to grow its aid both in volume and as a share of GNI. 
2. Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland and the United Kingdom have reached the 2010 
targets or missed it by a small margin, and could achieve their individual targets (0.7 % and 
0.33 %) on time or ahead of time. These countries account for 30% of the funding gap and 
their downside risk is limited. Their share of the gap is likely to be filled, although the 
current degree of back-loading is probably too high. 
3. Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and 
Spain have missed the 2010 targets but could step up their efforts. They account for 40% 
of the funding gap and the risk of not meeting their targets on time is relatively high. The 
most likely outcome is that only a fraction of their share of the gap will be filled on time.  
4. Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and the Slovak Republic are 
far behind and are unlikely to meet their individual targets by 2015. These countries 
account for 27% of the gap and the likelihood of major improvements is low. The current 
economic situation in Greece and Portugal in particular may place a serious constraint on 
increasing ODA budgets. 
Unless decisive action is taken, the risk is high that the 2015 target will be missed by a large margin 
as shown by the above analysis. The Commission has pointed this out in the last four annual reports 
and has, over the years, proposed several ways of stepping up efforts. The options remain the same 
as identified in last year’s report: 
1. All Member States draw up realistic and verifiable national ODA action plans outlining 
how they aim to scale up and strive to achieve the 2015 ODA targets. Each annual action 
plan should be published by the end of the year preceding the spring Foreign Affairs 
Council (Development) (FAC). Core elements of the action plan are:  
• Increasing ODA each year (by volumes and as a percentage of GNI) compared to the 
previous year in order to reach and sustain EU targets. ODA increases are an issue of 
political choice, even in difficult budgetary situations.  
• Indicating ODA estimates for the remaining period until 2015. Overall ODA increases 
in the period 2010–2015 should be commensurate with the individual target to be 
reached or sustained by and beyond 2015 (0.7% of GNI for the EU-15 and 0.33% for 
the EU-12. Higher aid levels already achieved by the strong performers should be 
maintained.  
• Describing concrete actions to build public support for development in the Member 
State concerned, including better coverage of development-related issues in the national 
media and finding new and better means of communication on development. The EU 
and its Member States need to do more to communicate development success stories, 
and should do this more systematically and jointly. A better informed and educated 
public that is supportive of development cooperation can be a powerful ally in 
government commitments to increase ODA spending. Only an educated public will be 
able to hold governments accountable for delivering on their commitments.  
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2. The European Council, in June 2010, took up partially the idea of an EU-internal annual 
ODA peer review, by requesting an annual report of the Council on the ODA situation. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the European Council will assess the progress of 
each Member State and what guidance it will give for further joint EU progress for 
attaining the agreed ODA targets..  
3. Describing mechanisms for ensuring scaling-up. National legislation ring-fencing ODA or 
making ODA targets legally binding is helping some Member States to reach the 0.7% 
target early (Belgium) or to maintain aid levels at or above that level (Sweden). Against 
this background, the Commission had also proposed that Member States should consider 
enacting national legislation on ODA levels with a view to reaching the agreed EU ODA 
targets or maintaining higher national aid levels. This could be done either through specific 
legislation, such as that currently being examined in the UK, or through specific 
annotations in the national budget laws. 
Increasing ODA levels is not a technical exercise and Member States need to decide on the way 
forward.  
2.2.7. EU not acting in line with its promise on ODA to Africa 
What share of EU ODA increases have been directed to the African continent? 
Since making the commitment to direct 50% of EU aid increases to Africa in 2005 (based on 2004 
aid levels), the combined EU aid to Africa has risen by about EUR 3.3 billion at constant prices so 
that 26% of ODA growth between 2004 and 2009 went to Africa, as shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 - ODA to Africa from EU15 in EUR million and as a % of GNI (including imputed multilateral flows)  
ODA to Africa from EU Member States reporting to DAC in EUR million and as a % of GNI
including imputed multilateral flows
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Most EU Member States stated that they have already met the commitment on ODA to Africa and 
some (e.g. Netherlands) have set up systems to monitor their performance in this respect. For some, 
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aid to Africa already accounts for most of their bilateral ODA (e.g. 80% for Ireland, 64% for 
Portugal). Few Member States will not contribute to that target through their bilateral ODA as they 
believe their comparative advantage is in other regions of the world. An important dimension is the 
imputed multilateral share of EU aid to Africa, which amounted to some EUR 8.7 billion in 2010 
and contributed 50% of the collective EU increase from 2004 to 2010.   
How did EU ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa increase since 2005? 
EU ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa grew by around EUR 2.6 billion in real terms over the period 
2004-2009, thus meeting the less demanding target of increasing EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Preliminary estimates for 2010 indicate there was no further growth. Only the Netherlands and 
Portugal decreased their ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa over this period. The growth was due to aid 
through multilateral channels (EUR 1.8 billion), and ODA excluding debt relief (EUR 1.5 billion) 
partly compensated by a decline in debt relief of EUR0.7 billion. The relative importance of Sub-
Saharan Africa declined over the period from 47% of total EU ODA to 42%.      
2.2.8. EU ODA to Least Developed Countries stable  
In November 2008, Member States promised, as part of the EU’s overall ODA commitments, to 
provide collectively 0.15% to 0.20% of their GNI to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by 2010 
while fully meeting the differentiated commitments set out in the ’Brussels Programme of action for 
the LDCs for the decade 2001-2010’. 
 
According to available OECD DAC data, LDCs' share of EU ODA has increased both in absolute 
and relative terms since 2004 and stood at EUR 15.1 billion at 2008 prices, 31% of EU ODA or 
0.13% of GNI in 2010. 
 
Ten Member States plan to achieve the LDC target of 0.15% to -0.20% by 2015 while ten think 
they will not do so, due in some cases to budgetary constraints. For the remaining seven Member 
States no information is available. 
 
According to DAC data summarised in Table 5, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom had already met the ODA to LDC target by 2009 
and stayed above it also in 2010. All of these countries had an average ODA/GNI ratio well above 
the 0.15% mark for the entire period since taking the EU commitments. Ireland is the only Member 
State that has kept a share of ODA to LDC greater than 50% for the entire period. Portugal met the 
target on average in 2004-2009 and, along with Hungary and Italy, maintained a share of LDCs in 
total ODA greater than the EU average of 30% for most of that period. Member States that have not 
reached the target need to make a deliberate effort to increase their overall ODA and, within this, to 
increase the proportion of aid that goes to LDCs.  
 
Figure 7 summarises the evolution of the ODA to LDCs over GNI ratios for EU Member States 
reporting to DAC over the period 2004-2010. The peak in 2005 and 2006 is due to large debt relief 
operations in those years. 
 EN 38   EN 
Table 5 - ODA/GNI to LDCs and LICs 48 (2009 and average 2004-2009, %) 
 
ODA/GNI 2009 
Average ODA/GNI 2004-
2009 Country  
LDC OLIC LIC LDC OLIC LIC 
 Austria  0.09 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.11
 Belgium  0.20 0.05 0.25 0.18 0.05 0.23
 Denmark  0.34 0.12 0.46 0.33 0.12 0.45
 Finland  0.19 0.05 0.24 0.15 0.04 0.19
 France  0.12 0.08 0.20 0.12 0.06 0.18
 Germany  0.10 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.13
 Greece  0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05
 Ireland  0.28 0.04 0.32 0.27 0.04 0.31
 Italy  0.05 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.08
 Luxembourg  0.39 0.09 0.48 0.34 0.08 0.43
 Netherlands  0.21 0.06 0.26 0.24 0.08 0.31
 Portugal  0.10 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.16
 Spain  0.12 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.11
 Sweden  0.34 0.09 0.43 0.30 0.07 0.38
 United Kingdom  0.18 0.06 0.24 0.15 0.08 0.23
 Czech Republic  0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.04
 Hungary  0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03
 Poland  0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03
 Slovak Republic  0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05
 Slovenia  0.03 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.07
 Total EU (20 Member 
States)49  0.13 0.05 0.17 0.12 0.05 0.17
 
Source: OECD DAC  
 
 
                                                 
48 LDCs : Low Developed Countries. LICs: low Income Countries. OLIC: Other Low Income Countries 
49For other EU Member States that are not DAC members this information is not available. 
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Figure 7 - EU ODA to LDCs as a % of GNI including imputed multilateral flows 
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2.3. Scaling up funding for tackling Climate Change and Biodiversity Challenges 
2.3.1. Climate change fast-start finance 
EU Commitments 
European Council Conclusions on 10/11 December 2009: The EU and its Member States 
are ready to contribute with fast-start funding of EUR 2.4 billion annually for the years 
2010 to 2012. 
2.3.1.1. Background 
Climate change is a global threat. The EU as a whole is committed to playing a leading role in the 
fight against global warming in order to keep global average temperature increase below 2 degrees 
Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels.50 Consequently, the EU is an active participant in the 
negotiations on climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). A key topic of these negotiations is the financing of mitigation and adaptation 
activities. Developed countries expect developing countries, especially the economically more 
advanced ones, to contribute to the overall effort to combat climate change. At the same time, 
                                                 
50See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/clima/mission/index_en.htm for an overview of EU actions on climate change 
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developing countries want to see a clear position from developed countries on finance for climate 
change related action51. 
 
During the Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, developed countries 
made pledges for short-term as well as long-term climate financing. These commitments were later 
anchored in the agreements concluded at the Climate Change Conference in Cancún (the ‘Cancún 
Agreements’) in December 2010. The collective commitment by developed countries is to provide 
new and additional resources approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012, with balanced 
allocation between adaptation and mitigation.  
 
 Funding for adaptation will be prioritised for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the 
Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States and Africa. The European Commission 
and its Member States have pledged to contribute fast-start funding totalling EUR 2.4 billion 
annually for the years 2010 to 201252. 
 
Developed countries also committed to a long-term goal of jointly providing USD 100 billion per 
year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a variety of 
sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. This 
longer term pledge has been made in the context of meaningful mitigation action by the developing 
countries. The UN Secretary General’s Advisory Group on Climate Finance has concluded that it is 
feasible to reach the USD 100 billion target, but that it will be a challenging task53. 
 
To maintain trust in the international negotiating process, it is vitally important to ensure 
transparent measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of these climate finance commitments. 
This was recognised at the Cancún conference. Developed countries were asked to provide 
information on the resources they would make available to provide their fast-start commitment and 
on the ways in which developing countries can access these resources. This information was to be 
sent to the UNFCCC secretariat for compilation into an information document in May 2011, 2012 
and 2013. It was agreed that a Standing Committee should be set up to help ensure that climate 
change financing is delivered in a more consistent and coordinated manner and to help rationalise 
the financial mechanism, mobilise financial resources and improve the measurement, reporting and 
verification of support provided to developing countries.  
 
The EU is a strong advocate of transparent reporting. It drew a comprehensive report on the 
implementation of its fast-start commitments ahead of the Cancún Climate Change Conference, 
based on a survey of Member States54. The EU also intends to produce further fast-start progress 
updates for the subsequent UNFCCC Conferences (2011, 2012)55. The EU welcomes initiatives to 
make climate financing even more transparent56. Monitoring ODA which is related to climate 
change (and other environmental issues)  is a difficult task due to the complexity of the issues and 
their multidimensional character. To help carry out this task, a system of markers (agreed with 
Secretariats of each of the Rio Conventions—see Box 2) has been set up within the DAC/CRS 
                                                 
51European Commission, Stepping up international climate finance: A European blueprint for the Copenhagen 
Deal, COM(2009) 475 final 
52European Council Conclusions on 10/11 December 2009  
53http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/financeadvisorygroup   
54 European Council, EU Fast start finance Report for Cancún, 6 December 2010 
55 In its meeting of 7 December 2010, the ECOFIN Council ’invites the Commission to integrate fast start 
finance reporting into its annual EU accountability and development finance report, with a further end-of-year 
update for UNFCCC meetings as needed.’ (§4) 
56 European Council, EU Fast start finance Report for Cancún, 6 December 2010 
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system. In parallel, other monitoring work is also being carried out, such as the Fast Start Finance 
initiative (www.faststartfinance.org) sponsored by Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK 
and some other countries.  
 
Box 2. The ‘Rio markers’ – monitoring development assistance to address climate change, biodiversity 
and desertification 57 
In 1998 the OECD/DAC added the so called ‘Rio markers’ to the CRS system to enable the identification of 
aid activities related to the three Rio Conventions signed in 1992: the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The use of the markers was made compulsory for DAC 
reporters for aid from 2007 onward. All bilateral aid activities should be screened and marked as having the 
objectives of each Convention as a ’principal objective’, ’significant objective’ or ’not targeted’. Activities 
can be marked for more than one convention, so there are overlaps between ODA volumes targeted at the 
individual conventions. 
The original Rio marker on climate change only covers mitigation related activities. For aid data from 2010 
onwards, a new marker will be introduced in use that also tracks aid in support of climate change adaptation, 
in order to give a more complete picture of climate-change-related ODA.  
Using the Rio markers is fraught with methodological difficulties. The OECD/DAC points out that the 
marker data do not produce exact ODA volumes. Rather, they give an indication of the amounts allocated or 
spent and the extent to which donors address the objectives of the Rio Conventions in their aid programmes. 
2.3.1.2. Volume and focus of EU support 
EU and its Member States are jointly committed to provide fast-start finance amounting to EUR 7.2 
billion in 2010-12. EUR 2.34 billion of this was provided in 2010 (data as of end February 2011). 
The current austerity requirements on national budgets make it more difficult to mobilise funds. 
Nevertheless, the EU seems well on track to meet its overall target. Annex 4 provides a detailed 
breakdown of the commitments. 
 
Fast-start finance is part of the wider action on climate financing being taken by the EU and the 
Member States. Data provided by 10 Member States shows that their non-fast-start climate 
financing in 2010 was almost three times as large as their fast start-financing commitments that 
year.  
 
The EU uses both multilateral and bilateral channels for deploying its fast-start finance; 56% of 
commitments are multilateral and 43% bilateral. Multilateral channels include the Climate 
Investment Funds, the Global Environment Facility, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed 
Countries Fund, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, the Regional Development Banks and UN 
agencies. By channelling funds through existing platforms, initiatives and bilateral structures the 
EU aims to reach the beneficiaries efficiently and minimise additional administrative complications 
and the proliferation of new initiatives. Some 82 % of the funds have climate change as a principal 
objective and 18% as a significant objective. Loans play a large role in EU’s fast-start finance: 55% 
of the commitments are reported as loans and 45% as grants. 
 
Around 35% of the commitments are earmarked for adaptation, 45% for mitigation and 15% for the 
'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation+'-Initiative (REDD+). Support for 
adaptation aims to help poor and vulnerable countries adapt to and build resilience to the adverse 
                                                 
57Source: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/rioconventions.  
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effects of climate change. Funding will help developing countries protect their infrastructure, 
industry and agriculture from changing weather patterns and rising sea levels. It will also support 
investment in water management, drought-resistant crops and disaster risk reduction, and will help 
provide better scientific analysis as the basis for decision making and national planning. 
 
Support for mitigation aims to speed the transition to a low-carbon global economy and to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by promoting the deployment of clean energy technologies. Funding will, 
for example, promote and support low-carbon energy, energy efficiency, low-carbon transport and 
the development of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions.  
 
Support for REDD+ aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions by reducing deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries and by enhancing the sustainable management and 
conservation of forests and carbon stocks. In this context, the EU is seeking to promote synergies 
between REDD+ governance objectives and the EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (EU FLEGT initiative). 
 
Climate issues have become increasingly integrated in broader development strategies (making 
ODA ‘climate resilient’) so that actions to mitigate and adapt to the negative effects of climate 
change often support efforts to reach other MDGs and vice versa, e.g. by fostering climate-resilient 
development and access to clean energy. The EU will continue working to integrate climate change, 
biodiversity and other global commitments more fully into its development strategies. 
2.3.1.3. The global context 
The EU has been the largest contributor to mitigation-related ODA since well before the 
Copenhagen conference. The European Commission and DAC-reporting Member States committed 
EUR 7.7 billion to aid activities aimed at climate change mitigation between 2007 and 2009. This 
represented 50% of global reported aid to combat climate change. These activities targeted areas 
which are closely linked to the objectives of fast-start finance.  
 
After Japan, the EU as a whole has pledged the largest amount to fast-start finance (see Table 6). 
Note, however, that it is impossible to make like-for-like comparisons of fast-start contributions and 
pledges by different donors, as the metrics used vary as do the definitions of what qualifies as fast-
start finance. Japan, for instance, counts other official flows (covering a range of non-ODA funding 
forms, such as export credits, as part of its fast-start finance.  
 
Table 6 - Pledges to fast-start finance (2010-12) and reported ODA to mitigation 2007-2009 
 
 Total pledged fast-
start finance 2010-
12 (EUR million ) 
Total ODA to 
mitigation 2007-2009 
(2008, EUR million) 
Australia 413 337
Canada 292 108
Japan 11.278 6.070
Norway 752 643
Switzerland 101 70
US 1 278* n/a
EU 7.200 7.580
* = US data is for fiscal year 2010 only 
Source: www.faststartfinance.org for fast-start finance pledges and OECD/DAC for ODA to mitigation58 . 
                                                 
58 Activities marked with a ‘principal’ or a ‘significant’ objective are included). The ODA data is for the 
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2.3.1.4. Measuring additionality 
The European Council has endorsed the principle that climate financing should not undermine the 
fight against poverty and continued progress towards the MDGs59. The Council has also agreed that, 
while support for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries will require additional resource 
mobilisation from a wide range of financial sources, ODA will continue to play a role, particularly 
in supporting adaptation (including disaster risk reduction), in the most vulnerable and least-
developed countries60. 
 
Paragraph 95 of the Cancún Agreements states that developed countries will provide ’new and 
additional resources’ as fast-start finance. It is important for the credibility of the commitments that 
fast-start climate finance is not replacing other development finance. However no agreed definition 
exists of what constitutes ‘new and additional’.  
 
The general understanding of additionality is that certain financing sources or types of expenditure 
should not be lower than a pre-defined benchmark or reference level. In the case of climate finance, 
this concerns in particular the relation of climate finance to official development assistance (ODA), 
as referred to by the Council.  
 
Climate-related financing will normally be reported as ODA as long as the support fulfils the 
OECD/DAC criteria of ODA. As climate and development finance are mutually reinforcing and the 
objectives intertwined, trying to separate the two would appear artificial and unproductive. While 
adaptation projects will, as a rule, show multiple benefits, most mitigation projects will also have 
developmental benefits (e.g. reducing deforestation or renewable energy projects). Climate-related 
financing will also come in non-ODA form, e.g. through non-concessional loans or official export 
credits which do not qualify as ODA and possibly in countries not included in the DAC list of ODA 
recipients. 
 
EU Member States use different definitions of additionality as shown in Figure 8. Some Member 
States aim for additionality related to climate related funding, while others include climate spending 
in their efforts to increase ODA. Three Member States define additionality as ODA over and above 
the UN ODA target of 0.7% of GNI. One Member State states explicitly that fast-start financing is 
strictly additional to the aid budget and will not be reported as ODA. The most commonly used 
reference year is 2009, with some Member States using 2010. Some Member States finance climate 
efforts from outside the ODA budgets or through innovative sources. Some Member States use a 
combination of the definitions in the graph and some have not yet decided on a definition of 
additionality. One Member State notes that development cooperation and climate change are so 
closely linked that it is difficult to distinguish between the two objectives in terms of funding.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
European Commission and the 15 Member States which report to the OECD/DAC. No mitigation data was 
available for Luxembourg or the US which do not report on the Rio markers. No mitigation data was available 
for the Netherlands for 2009 
59European Council Conclusions of 30 October 2009, §23 
60Conclusions on Climate Change and Development of the General Affairs and External Relations. Council of 17 
November 2009, §15 
 EN 44   EN 
Figure 8 - Definitions of additionality used by EU Member States in reporting fast-start financing in 
the context of this report 
 
Source: Questionnaire on financing for development61. 
 
At an aggregate EU level, given that the EU pledge was made collectively, the additionality 
requirement of the Copenhagen Accord should also be applied collectively. Since the EU’s view is 
that ’traditional’ aid to reduce poverty should not be diverted in order to fund climate change 
activities, total ODA less climate related ODA would be an appropriate benchmark for gauging to 
new and additional climate finance, within the context of the specific definitions used by various 
Member States, as outlined above. This would make it possible to check whether increases in ODA-
related climate finance are really additional or whether they encroach on other areas of ODA.   
 
To even out annual variations, the ODA part of the benchmark could be defined as the average level 
of EU ODA budgetary commitments in the period 2007 to 2009, expressed in absolute and real 
terms. A benchmark level for climate-related ODA is harder to obtain because, as was highlighted 
above, the current climate change marker only covers mitigation. Data on adaptation will only be 
available from 2010 onwards. For the years 2010 to 2012 a distinction would ideally need to be 
made between fast-start finance and other climate-related finance, but there is no way to track fast-
start finance within the DAC system.  
 
The average EU total ODA for the period 2007 to 2009 in constant 2008 prices is EUR 48.6 billion 
and the corresponding amount for mitigation-related ODA is EUR 2.5 billion. For the purpose of 
this illustrative exercise it is assumed that the average total adaptation-related ODA for the period 
corresponded to the same share – 35% - of total climate-related as the share of adaptation reported 
for fast-start finance. This would give an estimate of adaptation-related ODA of around EUR 1.4 
billion and total climate-related ODA of some EUR 3.9 billion. The benchmark level would be 
EUR 44.7 billion. By this reasoning, if climate finance is to be additional, the EU’s total ODA 
excluding climate-related ODA should be higher than this benchmark level in the years 2010-12. 
Figure 9 illustrates this, using this report’s estimate for the EU’s total ODA in 2010 – namely –
EUR 53.5 billion in constant 2008 prices. This is EUR 8.7 billion above the benchmark level, which 
                                                 
61 Based on 26 responses, of which 2 did not reply to the question. The European Commission is included as a 
‘Member State’ in the text. Two countries reported using two definitions. The ’Other’ category includes Member States 
that have not yet decided on a definition of additionality and two Member States that have not reported any definition 
9
7
4
8
Additional to climate
related funding in a
specific reference year
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corresponds to the maximum potential volume of climate finance that would be additional without 
cutting into support to other sectors. This is enough to cover the EUR 2.3 billion in constant 2008 
prices dedicated to fast-start finance and a constant level of EUR 3.9 billion of non-fast-start finance 
for 2010 compared to 2007-2009, which would imply a fairly strict definition of additionality of 
fast-start finance being in addition to climate finance in previous years. However, the latter can only 
be verified once the 2010 data on Rio-marked ODA become available.  
 
Figure 9: Calculating the additionality of climate finance – an illustrative example, EUR million in 2008 prices  
 
 
Average 2007-2009 2010
Fast-start - 2 291
Non fast-start (est) 3 887 3 887
Other ODA 44 713 47 280
 30 000
 35 000
 40 000
 45 000
 50 000
 55 000
Benchmark 
EUR 44.7 billion
Volume above 
benchmark
in 2010:
EUR 8.7 billion
Total ODA 2010: 
EUR 53.5 billion
 
Source: OECD DAC for ODA and mitigation data 2007-2009 for DAC reporting Member States. Financing for 
development questionnaire for non-reporting Member States and 2010 data. Mitigation data was not available 
for Luxembourg or for the Netherlands in 2009. 
 
Consequently, if the EU continues to scale up ODA in 2011 and 2012 towards meeting its aid 
targets in 2015, the additionality requirement could be met, since the increase in total ODA is likely 
to exceed any increase in climate-related ODA (both fast-start and non-fast-start finance). This 
would be in line with the EU commitment that ’climate financing should not undermine or 
jeopardise the fight against poverty and continued progress towards the Millennium Development 
Goals’. 
 
It should be clear from the above that it is hard to quantify the benchmark because of the 
unreliability of the data on EU climate finance. Once higher-quality data become available, it will 
be possible to monitor precisely the additionality of EU fast-start. In particular, the additionality 
exercise requires more complete data, including data on adaptation financing, and further progress 
in the methodology and application of the OECD DAC Rio Markers.  
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2.3.2. Biodiversity 
EU Commitments  
European Council conclusions on the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD): 
outcome of and follow-up to the Nagoya biodiversity conference, 20 December 2010: The 
EU and its Member States have committed themselves to implementing the strategy for 
resource mobilisation and to substantially increasing resources (financial, human and 
technical) from all possible sources balanced with the effective implementation of the CBD 
and its strategic plan. The EU will actively involved in developing baselines for monitoring 
the implementation of the strategy, and into implementing the COP 10 decision to adopt 
targets at CBD COP 11, provided that robust baselines have been identified and endorsed 
and that an effective reporting framework has been adopted. 
2.3.2.1. Background  
In recent decades unprecedented economic growth and human development have benefited people 
across the globe. However, these benefits have come at the cost of degraded ecosystems and loss of 
biodiversity caused by changes in land use, over-exploitation, the spread of invasive species, 
pollution and climate change. These negative effects are not only of concern because of the 
important intrinsic value of Nature, but also because they result in a decline of the ‘ecosystem 
services’ which natural systems provide. These services include producing food, fuel, fibre and 
medicines, regulating water, air and climate, maintaining soil fertility, storing carbon and recycling 
nutrients. Any loss of such services could have serious economic and social consequences, as has 
recently been shown 62. 
 
A global strategy to combat biodiversity loss for the coming decade was adopted at the tenth 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 10) of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) in Nagoya (Japan) in October 201063. The plan is backed up by a strategy for mobilising 
resource to help achieve the CBD’s three objectives. This strategy aims to substantially increase 
international financial flows and domestic funding for biological diversity in order to significantly 
reduce the current funding gaps and thus help ensure that the Convention is indeed implemented. 
The EU is working on a biodiversity strategy that will be adopted in 2011 and that follows on from 
the EU’s previous Biodiversity Action Plan. The new strategy will integrate the EU’s CBD 
commitments and the EU headline target – which is to  the loss of biodiversity and the degradation 
of ecosystem services in the EU by 2020, and indeed to restore them as far as possible, while 
stepping up the EU’s contribution to averting global biodiversity loss64. 
 
The EU recognises that the link between ecosystems and employment, income and livelihoods in 
developing countries is even stronger than in developed countries.65 Consequently, the 
                                                 
62Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) study, http://www.teebweb.org/  
63The Convention on Biological Diversity entered into force in 1993 and has three main objectives:  i) the conservation 
of biological diversity; ii) the sustainable use of the components of biological diversity; and iii) the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources. The Convention obliges developed countries to 
provide new and additional financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention (Article 20).  
64EU Council Conclusions on Biodiversity: Post-2010 EU and global vision and targets and international ABS regime, 
15 March 2010 
65EU Council conclusions on Biodiversity: Post-2010 EU and global vision and targets and international ABS regime, 
15 March 2010 
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Commission’s Communication on Policy Coherence for Development states that the EU should 
‘enhance funding earmarked for biodiversity and strengthen measures to mainstream biodiversity in 
development assistance’66. This ambition is carried forward in the EU Development Policy (the 
European Consensus on Development Cooperation)67 and Neighbourhood Policy68. 
 
Indeed, one of the aims of the EU’s Biodiversity Action Plan was to increase the development 
cooperation funds earmarked for biodiversity while mainstreaming biodiversity more effectively 
into EU and Member States’ development aid budgets. Biodiversity is thus an integral part of EU’s 
development cooperation policy and activities. Until now, these activities have been monitored by 
reporting on the Biodiversity Action Plan. Ahead of the Nagoya meeting the Council asked the 
European Commission to continue reporting on the amount of funds related to biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use69.  
2.3.2.2. Volume and focus of EU support 
From 2007 to 2009, the EU committed, on average, EUR 1.3 billion per year to biodiversity-related 
aid.70 The volume increased by more than 50% during this period in real terms; from EUR 1 billion 
in 2007 to EUR 1.5 billion in 2009 (see Figure 10). In contrast the share of activities which had 
biodiversity as their principal objective decreased from 36% in 2007 to just 15% in 2009. 
 
Figure 10: EU's biodiversity-related ODA by objective. 2007-2009, commitments, EUR million at 
constant 2008 prices 
Source: OECD DAC/CRS71. 
 
Among EU Member States, Germany, France and Spain were the largest donors, but several other 
countries also donated substantial amounts during this period (see Table 7). Member States that are 
not DAC members are also contributing to the effort, as evidenced by the appearance of the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Romania in the table.  
 
                                                 
66COM (2005) 134 final 
67COM (2005) 311 final 
68COM (2003) 104 final, COM (2004) 373 final 
69EU Council Conclusions on Preparation of the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 10) to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 14 October 2010 
70See the Box on the Rio markers above for an explanation of how this amount is calculated. 
71 Luxembourg does not report on the Rio markers. No data for the Netherlands for 2009 
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The EU’s biodiversity-related aid as a share of total EU ODA increased from 2.1% in 2006 to 3.2% 
in 2009. One major challenge in increasing the share is the low priority often given to biodiversity 
by partner countries faced with other needs. Moreover, very few Member States have dedicated 
funds for biodiversity. Exceptions include the UK’s Darwin Initiative and the Swedish International 
Biodiversity Programme SwedBio72.  
 
Table 7: EU’s biodiversity-related bilateral aid, 2007-2009, commitments, EUR million at constant 
2008 prices 
 2007 2008 2009 Average  
2007-2009 
Austria  10  22  21  18  
Belgium  47  83  92  74  
Czech Republic  2  3  2  2  
Denmark  71  113  84  89  
Finland  35  90  82  69  
France  115  154  168  145  
Germany  169  197  217  194  
Greece  3  3  6  4  
Ireland  20  14  75  36  
Italy  80  54  45  60  
Netherlands  156  170  n/a  163  
Portugal  1  1  3  2  
Romania  0.05  0.06  0.06  0  
Slovenia  1  1  1  1  
Spain  67  240  207  171  
Sweden  0  10  5  5  
United Kingdom  7  12  11  10  
European Commission73  207  239  517  321  
Total  991  1 406  1 533  1 310 
Source: OECD DAC/CRS74. 
 
Nearly a third of the EU’s biodiversity-related aid goes to Africa and around one fifth each to 
America and Asia (see Figure 11). The support is divided between over 140 regions and territories. 
One fifth of the support has no specific geographical focus. 
 
                                                 
72Commission Staff Working Document, Consolidated Profile Accompanying Document to the Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - the 2010 Assessment of Implementing the EU Biodiversity 
Action Plan, SEC(2010) 1163 final, p. 131, 90 and 94. 
73 The European Commission did not consistently use the Rio Marker on biodiversity until 2009. As a consequence, the 
European Commission data reported to the DAC and presented in the table are currently under review. Preliminary 
revised volumes are 2007: EUR 75 million, 2008: EUR 151 million, and 2009: EUR 412 million. 
74 Luxembourg does not report on the Rio markers and there is no data for the Netherlands for 2009. Activities marked 
with a ‘principal’ or a ‘significant’ objective are included. Monterrey survey for the Czech Republic, Romania and 
Slovenia. 
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Figure 11 - EU’s biodiversity-related bilateral aid by geographic area, 2007-2009, percentage share, 
commitments 
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Source: OECD DAC/CRS75 
 
In terms of sectors, the EU’s biodiversity-related aid falls primarily within environmental 
protection, followed by water and sanitation, agriculture and forestry (see Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: EU’s biodiversity-related bilateral aid by sector, 2007-2009, percentage share, commitments 
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Source: DAC/CRS76 
2.3.2.3. The global context 
Global ODA for biodiversity rose in 2009 after a small decline in 2008 (see Table 8). In terms of 
activities reported to the OECD/DAC the increase was 24% in real terms to a total of EUR 3.0 
                                                 
75 see footnotes 73 and 74 
76  see footnotes 73 and 74 
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billion in 2009 in constant 2008 prices. The US does not report on the Rio markers and data for the 
Netherlands are missing for 2009. The annual contribution of each country can be estimated at 
around EU200 million. The EU contribution corresponds to around half of all biodiversity-related 
ODA over the period 2007 to 2009. 
 
Table 8: Total biodiversity-related bilateral aid 2007-2009, commitments, EUR million at constant 
2008 prices 
 
 2007 2008 2009 Average 
2007-2009 
Australia  43  67  110  73 
Canada  43  36  125  68 
Norway  53  72  202  109 
Japan  1 233  608  787  876 
Korea  9  17  29  18 
Switzerland  33  19  26  26 
US  187  199  205  197 
EU  991  1 406  1 533  1 310 
Other  2  6  2  4 
Total  2 594  2 430  3 019  2 681 
Source:  OECD DAC/CRS77 
The EU and its Member States provide contributions to a number of biodiversity-related 
conventions: the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species, the African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbird Agreement 
and the World Heritage Convention78.  
 
In addition, the EU Member States are important contributors to the Global Environment Fund (GEF) 
and the UNEP Environment Fund. The GEF serves as the financial mechanism for the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. It has been replenished five times. EU Member States provided EUR 1.096 billion 
to explain GEF-4, which represented 52% of total contributions79.  
 
Preliminary data on the recently-concluded explain GEF-5 shows that, compared to the previous 
replenishment, EU Member States increased their contributions considerably - by 24% - to EUR 1.357 
billion, or 54% of total contributions80. The UNEP Environment Fund will spend around a fifth of its 
budget on biodiversity-related activities in 2012-2013. EU Member States contributed EUR 43.9 million 
to the UNEP Fund in 2009 and EUR 39.2 million in 2010, which in both years corresponded to around 
three quarters of total contributions/pledges81.  
                                                 
77 Luxembourg does not report on the Rio markers and there are no data for the Netherlands for 2009. Activities 
marked with a ‘principal’ or a ‘significant’ objective are included. Monterrey survey for the Czech Republic, 
Romania and Slovenia. USAID, Biodiversity Conservation and Forestry Programs Annual Report, October 2010. The 
United States does not report on the Rio markers. The US data in the table are labelled ‘funding’ in the USAID report  
78See SEC(2010) 1163 final for details 
79SEC(2010) 1163 final 
80GEF Secretariat & World Bank, Summary of Negotiations Fifth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund, May 17, 2010, 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF-A.4 
7%20Summary%20of%20Negotiations%20of%20the%20Fifth%20Replenishment%20of%20the%20GEF_0.pdf  
81http://www.unep.org/rms/en/Financing_of_UNEP/Environment_Fund/index.asp  
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2.4. Increasing international support to Developing Countries through Innovative 
Financing Sources and Mechanisms  
EU Commitments 
Conclusions 11 November 2008 (Common EU position for the Doha Financing for 
Development Conference: 
The EU welcomes the success of the pilot phase of implementation of innovative sources of 
financing and calls for a change of scale in this area. It encourages all donors which have 
shown their ability to provide stable and predictable resources in a coordinated manner 
and to participate in existing initiatives in the field of health (air ticket levy/UNITAID, 
IFFIm/GAVI, AMC). It encourages broad collaboration, which includes the private sector, 
civil society and the international financial institutions, to experiment with and implement 
new mechanisms and partnerships allowing an increase in financing for development, 
including via the carbon market. The EU will study the creation of tools to assist private 
financing for development, in particular to mobilise savings used for the benefit of 
developing countries.  
European Council (October 29 and 30, 2009) 
– agreed on the need to prepare a coordinated strategy for exiting from the broad- based 
stimulus policies when recovery is secured, 
– invited the Commission to examine innovative financing at the global level, with a view 
to facilitating fiscal exit strategies and fiscal consolidation, 
– recognised the need to significantly increase financing to help developing countries 
implement ambitious climate mitigation and adaptation strategies, without jeopardising 
the fight against poverty and continued progress towards the MDGs, 
– highlighted the role of innovative financing in ensuring predictable flows of financing 
for sustainable development, especially towards the poorest and most vulnerable 
countries. 
European Council (June 15, 2010) 
The EU is seriously considering proposals for innovative financing mechanisms with 
significant revenue generation potential, with a view to ensuring predictable financing for 
sustainable development, especially towards the poorest and most vulnerable countries. 
The EU calls on all parties to significantly step up efforts in this regard, welcomes the 
ongoing work by the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development, and takes 
note of the ongoing work of the Task Force on International Financial Transactions for 
Development and of the Task Force on Innovative Financing for Education. 
Innovative financing mechanisms have been under discussion and trial for some years in order to 
address financing needs for development. Innovative sources of financing could play a more 
prominent role in the near future, not least because of the difficulties of many donor countries in 
meeting their ODA commitments in the medium term. Development budgets are coming under 
increasing pressure, in particular because of the difficult situation of public finances in many donor 
countries as a consequence of the crisis. The reference here is to innovative sources of development 
finance, and it is therefore not confined to ways to increase official development assistance (ODA). 
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The recent Commission Communication "Taxation of the Financial Sector"82 mentions arguments 
for a fair and substantial contribution, by the financial sector, to address many and varied key 
challenges for the EU, including "commitments towards developing countries and to combat 
climate change and global resource scarcity." The Commission is currently conducting an impact 
assessment on new financial sector taxes; the impact assessment is expected to be published before 
the summer 2011. Depending on the findings of the impact assessment and on concrete 
Commission proposals revenues from such taxes could possibly be used to also respond to global 
and European challenges, such as development and the achievement of the MDGs and other 
internationally agreed development objectives, as well as efforts to tackle climate change. 
 
In its Staff Working Paper "Innovative financing at a global level"83, the European Commission 
provided an assessment of the various instruments of innovative financing relating to the financial 
sector, climate change and development on the basis of a number of criteria (see Box 3 below). 
Box 3. Review of Innovative financing instruments 
Air ticket levy. UNITAID is a drug purchasing facility aimed at combating the major pandemic diseases 
affecting the developing world. UNITAID buys the necessary drugs and diagnostics and negotiates 
significant reductions in the prices of pharmaceutical firms. Almost half of the available funding comes from 
a solidarity contribution levied on air tickets. This is already applied in 11 countries and it has enabled France 
for example to generate an extra EUR 160 million in conventional aid. 
International Financing Facility.  The International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) exists to 
rapidly accelerate the availability and predictability of funds for immunisation. The funds raised by IFFIm 
are used by the GAVI Alliance, a public-private partnership which aims to reduce the number of vaccine-
preventable deaths and illness among children under five. So far IFFIm has raised more than USD3 billion 
for the GAVI Alliance’s immunisation programmes. IFFIm's financial base consists of legally binding grants 
from its sovereign sponsors. By signing the grant agreements, these countries have agreed to pay these 
obligations in a specified schedule of payments over 20 years. 
Advance Market Commitments (AMCs) for vaccines aim to encourage the development and production of 
affordable vaccines tailored to the needs of developing countries. Through a forward-looking binding 
contract from donors and international agencies guaranteeing a viable market for target vaccines, AMCs 
encourage vaccine makers to develop or build manufacturing capacity for urgently needed vaccines. The 
binding contract guarantees a pre-agreed price for the first doses of vaccines sold to developing countries, so 
that companies can re-coup their investment costs. In exchange, participating companies must guarantee to 
supply vaccines for the long term at a pre-agreed sustainably low price that developing countries can afford. 
In the AMC pneumococcal pilot, the governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Russia, and 
Norway and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation have committed USD1.5 billion, with GAVI promising to 
allocate USD1.3 billion through 2015. In March 2010, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Pfizer Inc. became the 
first two companies to make long-term commitments to supply new vaccines for the Pneumo AMC. The two 
participating firms committed to supply 30 million doses each per year for a 10 year period. These doses will 
be sold at USD3.50 each rather than at the current price in industrialised countries of USD70 per dose. 
EU ETS Auction Revenues.  Some Member States used the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
auctioning revenues for development. According to Commission estimates, ETS auction revenues could 
reach EUR 50 billion annually by 2020.  The total revenues Germany raised, for example, were EUR 528 
million in 2009 and EUR 560 million in 2010, of which EUR 230 million were reported as ODA. The 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) coordinates its 
activities with the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). BMZ’s 
programmes are fully integrated with existing development cooperation. 
                                                 
82COM52010)549 of7.10.2010  
83 SEC(2010)409 of 1.4.2010 
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National Lotteries.  The Belgian Survival Fund (BSF), financed with proceeds from the national lottery, was 
created in 1983 by the Belgian Government in response to drought and famine in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
following year, BSF and IFAD formed a partnership to pursue a common goal; helping poor people in rural 
areas overcome poverty and improve food security. Joint Programme (JP) interventions target the most 
vulnerable populations in the most fragile parts of Africa. From January 2010 the BSF will be renamed the 
Belgian Fund for Food Security (BFFS) to better reflect its food security agenda. The International 
Communities programme is the UK Big Lottery Fund’s way of helping disadvantaged communities overseas. 
It will have a budget of up to £80 million between 2010 and 2015. 
Depending on the mechanism, at most six Member States raised funds via innovative mechanisms 
in 2010. The use of the IFFIm was most common (France, Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Spain and 
United Kingdom) , followed by AMC (United Kingdom and Italy) and Debt2Health (Germany 
only).   
 
Austria and Germany have introduced air ticket levies, but the funds raised are not earmarked for 
development cooperation. The United Kingdom also supports the Private Infrastructure 
Development Group (PIDG) governed by a donor council with members from 8 donors, and utilises 
innovative facilities to address market failures preventing private investment in infrastructure in 
developing countries. Social and environmental safeguards conform to World Bank standards. 
 
A new tax on international financial transactions (FTT or Tobin tax) is supported by several 
Member States.  In a report released in April 2010, the IMF proposed instead a levy on the balance 
sheets of all financial institutions and a "financial activities tax" on pay and profits, rather than a tax 
on international transactions.  The IMF concluded that “there may indeed be a case to supplement a 
levy of the kind described above with some other form of taxation, but an FTT does not appear well 
suited to the specific purposes set out in the mandate from G-20 leaders84.” Some Member States 
such as Belgium, France and Spain support the introduction of an FTT at EU level or worldwide.  
 
The recent Commission Communication on "Taxation of the Financial Sector"85 established a clear 
link between a number of key challenges for the EU (including "commitments towards developing 
countries and to combat climate change and global resource scarcity") and the "fair and substantial 
contribution" of the financial sector "to address the above challenges".  
 
The Commission is currently conducting an impact assessment on new financial sector taxes which 
is due to be published in 2011. Revenues from such taxes could potentially, as part of the national 
or EU budgets, or through some form of earmarking to international funds, be used to respond to 
global and European challenges, such as development and the achievement of the MDGs, as well as 
efforts to tackle climate change. 
                                                 
84IMF (2010) - Financial Sector Taxation. The IMF’s Report to the G-20 and Background Material. p. 17 
85See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/com_2010_0549_en.pdf  See 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/com_2010_0549_en.pdf  
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Table 9 - EU Innovative Sources for Development Cooperation (EUR million, 2007-2009) 
 
Mechanism & Instrument 2007 2008 2009 Average EU Member States 
Solidarity 300 289 255 281  
National Lottery 133 114 90 112 Belgium, UK  
New Taxes 167 175 165 169  
of which Adaptation Fund 2 2 3 2   
of which Airline Levy 165 173 162 167 France  
Catalytic - - 76 25  
Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) - - 76 25 Italy, UK  
Leveraged - 223 1,102 442  
Frontloading of ODA (e.g. IFFIm 
bonds issued) 
- 223 1,102 442 France, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, UK, 
Total 300 512 1,433 748  
Sources: Annual Reports for Lotteries, UNTAID for Airline Levy, UNFCC for Adaptation Fund, GAVI for 
AMC and IFFIm, OECD DAC for EU philanthropy 
 
Only nine Member States are planning to step up support for innovative financing mechanisms with 
significant revenue generation potential aimed at ensuring predictable financing for sustainable 
development. For example, Germany is setting up a new special fund under public law 
(Sondervermögen “Energie- und Klimafonds”) to finance national and international programmes in 
the fields of energy efficiency, renewable energies and climate change. The fund will be in 
operation from 2011 onwards, with a small amount of funding available from contractually agreed 
payments by energy utilities. From 2013 onwards additional revenues from auctioning EU 
emissions allowances (compared to the 2008 level of EUR 915 million; excluding emissions trading 
in the aviation sector) will be channelled to the special fund. It is expected that several hundred 
million euro of climate and environment related ODA will be committed annually through this fund 
from 2013 onwards, subject to parliamentary budget approval. EUR 31.5 million will be committed 
as climate and environment related ODA from this fund in 2011. 
 
As shown in Table 9 above, amounts raised from innovative sources for development cooperation 
from EU Member States have been increasing over the period 2007-2009. National lotteries in 
Belgium and the United Kingdom have been used to fund development programmes, while the air 
ticket levy has contributed to the fight against HIV/AIDS through UNITAIDS and the 2% levy of 
the "Certified Emission Reductions" (CERs) issued in respect of each project under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) has raised about EUR 7 million for climate change adaptation. 
Overall, these innovative sources have had a limited impact, equivalent to just 3% of EU-15 ODA 
in 2009. However, catalytic (AMC) and leveraged (IFFIm) tools are now starting to produce flows 
for the benefit of developing countries.  Flows included in the table are funds raised on international 
bond markets. The interest and principal on these bonds will need to be paid and donor 
contributions counted as ODA as the bonds are redeemed.   
 
Although small, these innovative sources represent an important option in a period of hard-pressed 
aid budgets. However, they also raise legitimate issues in terms of additionality and earmarking of 
aid funds, coupled with ring-fencing of specific tax revenues. 
EU philanthropy and private donations to developing countries have existed for many years and 
therefore can hardly be considered innovative. Although smaller than in North America, they 
amount to about EUR 2.5 billion per year over the period 2007-2009 according to OECD/DAC 
statistics. These private flows are often supported by EU Member States through tax discounts that 
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are not considered as ODA, as they are not flows from the official sector, but nevertheless help to 
increase resources available to developing countries. 
 
2.5. Leveraging Private Flows  
EU Commitments 
●Conclusions 11 November 2008 (Common EU position for the Doha Financing for 
Development Conference)§10: “The EU is committed to promote policies and instruments 
supporting private investment and the expansion of partner countries' private sector in 
support of an inclusive and sustainable economic growth. The EU also recalls the positive 
impact and importance of migrants’ remittances.” 
§ 27: "The EU recognises the development impact of remittances in migrants’ countries of 
origin. It encourages all countries the need for an enabling environment, the EU 
encourages the promotion of financial sector development in countries of origin. It 
commits to adopt “General Principles for International Remittances Services" agreed by 
the Committee on Payments and Settlements Systems (CPSS) and operational definitions 
and recommendations allowing the improvement of data on remittances and calls for all 
countries to do the same. The EU also encourages partner countries to reduce the cost and 
improve the safety of transfers, and to support the migrants’ initiatives with a view to 
reinforce the impact of remittances on economic and social development. Underlining, in 
this regard, to address gender equality and empowerment of women to reinforce the 
impact of remittances on development". 
●Council Conclusions of 18 May 2009 (support to developing countries in coping with the 
crisis) § 11: “The Council expresses concern about the negative impact of the crisis on 
remittance flows. Bearing in mind their importance for development, the EU will further 
work towards enhancing the impact of remittances on development, including through the 
reduction of transaction costs. In this regard, the Council welcomes the work in progress 
in international fora, including inter alia the G8 Global Remittances Working Group, 
chaired by the World Bank, and work towards the establishment of an African Remittances 
Institute.” 
Council Conclusions of 18 November 2009 on Policy Coherence for Development §10: "to 
promote transparent, cheaper, faster and more secure flows of remittances to migrants' 
countries of origin, and to ensure that relevant legislation does not contain provisions 
hampering the effective use of legal remittance channels.” 
 
In 2009, the Council emphasised the importance of mobilising all possible sources of financing for 
development, including export credits, investment guarantees and technology transfers, as 
instruments to leverage assistance aimed at stimulating inclusive growth, investment, trade and job 
creation. The quality of information on this type of financing is important in order to ensure global 
accountability and to better grasp the development impact of different financial sources and flows. 
This requires a comprehensive overview of as many development-relevant financial flows as 
possible and from as many donors as possible. Some of these non-ODA flows are, in principle, 
tracked under the established OECD/DAC reporting system, which needs to be developed further. 
Not all EU Member States have a reliable system in place yet to monitor such flows. Improving 
data on the different flows is, however, essential to enable better use of ODA to leverage more, and 
complementary, flows for development.  
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In July  2009, at the L´Aquila summit, the G8 Heads of States endorsed the '5x5' objective and 
pledged “to achieve in particular the objective of a reduction of the global average costs of 
transferring remittances from the present 10% to 5% in five years through  enhanced information, 
transparency, competition and cooperation with partners.” 
2.5.1. Private Capital Flows 
Foreign Direct Investment. The economies of many developing countries suffer from a general 
shortage of capital, especially foreign direct investment (FDI). To increase foreign investment and 
prevent the flight of domestic private capital, many developing countries are working to provide 
companies with transparent and simple regulatory and fiscal frameworks, expanded access to 
finance, business development services, technology and innovation – in short creating a favourable 
business climate.   
 
The majority of Member States reported that they support private flows through investment 
guarantees, dedicated funds, preferential loans and support for joint ventures in developing 
countries in sectors that have high returns in terms of development, often through bilateral 
agreements.  
 
Some Member States and the Commission also have special programmes to promote microfinance. 
Germany, for example, supports the Regional Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Investment 
Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa (REGMIFA). REGMIFA is promoted by a donor consortium 
composed of leading Donors/DFIs (including, inter alia, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Spain) 
and IFIs, and led by the German Financial Cooperation (KfW). It aims to enhance long and 
medium-term financial needs of local financial intermediaries providing funding to Micro, Small 
and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Dedicated institutions in Member States, such as national development agencies and development 
finance institutions, are in charge of specific tools and projects. For example, the Belgian 
Investment Company for Developing Countries (BIO), which was created in 2001 by the Belgian 
State and Belgian Corporation for International Investment (BMI/SBI), aims to promote a strong 
private sector in developing countries and/or emerging economies so that these can accomplish 
sustainable development, promote social welfare and decrease poverty. BIO supports the local 
private sector directly (loans, equity stakes, guarantees for local micro, small and medium 
enterprises) and indirectly through intermediary financial institutions (banks, non-banking financial 
institutions, investment companies/funds aimed at SMEs and microfinance institutions or MFIs). 
BIO also provides grants for feasibility studies and technical assistance to local enterprises and 
intermediary financial institutions.  
 
Several Member States also contribute to initiatives led by the international financial institutions 
that provide capital, guarantees, and various forms of finance and risk management tools to the 
private sector. To invigorate the business and investment climate in South Eastern Europe the 
Austrian Development Agency (ADA) strongly supports the World Bank initiative “The Road to 
Europe: Program of Accounting Reform and Institutional Strengthening (REPARIS)”. This is a 
regional programme aimed at creating a transparent policy environment and an effective 
institutional framework for corporate reporting. The programme is designed around the 
introduction, implementation and effective enforcement of relevant portions of the EU acquis to 
southern-eastern European countries in order to contribute to foreign direct and portfolio 
investment, foster private and financial sector developments, improve the business environment and 
investment climate, and facilitate potential integration into (or harmonisation with) the European 
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Union. Denmark, in cooperation with AfDB and Spain, is working on establishing an African 
Guarantee Fund in order to enable MSME’s to gain greater access to financial services.  
 
The EU promotes foreign and domestic investments through its support for the private sector in 
developing countries. The vast majority of support is provided through national support 
programmes, the remainder being through regional programmes (including All ACP programmes). 
In the same framework, the European Investment Bank (EIB) is entrusted with the management of 
the Investment Facility (IF) provided from the EU Member States' budgets via the European 
Development Fund (EDF). The IF, alongside the EIB own resources,  meets the financing needs of 
investment projects in the ACP region with a broad range of loans and flexible risk-bearing 
instruments. In line with the objectives set out by the EU Policy and by the international community 
in the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the EIB’s overriding aim is 
to support projects that deliver sustainable economic, social and environmental benefits through: 
supporting responsible private and public investments; fostering regional cooperation and 
integration; mobilising domestic savings and acting as a catalyst for foreign direct investment; 
encouraging the broadening, deepening and strengthening of the local financial sector; and relying 
on/promoting partnerships.  
 
The European Commission encourages blending mechanisms, in which grants are added to loans as 
a way of achieving a number of objectives, including the need to increase the volume of private and 
public development finance in a context of restricted resources. In order to support the EU policy, 
regional strategy and partnership in the targeted region and countries, the European Commission 
has set up five regional blending facilities: the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF); the 
Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF); the EU–Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF); 
the Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF) and the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA). 
The potential range of instruments includes: technical assistance (TA); feasibility studies; 
investment co-financing; equity participation; risk-capital; interest rate subsidies; on-lending; 
guarantees; insurance subsidies; and incentive payments. TA/feasibility studies and interest rate 
subsidies provide for the largest number of projects. The facilities cover similar broadly defined, 
sectors, i.e. transport, energy, social, environment and finance for SMEs. Partners in the beneficiary 
country can be public, private or mixed, with public partners dominating the current projects aside 
from SME support. 
 
Alongside the regional frameworks, the European Commission plays an active role in the sector 
approach, mainly in cooperation with Member States. An interesting example of this is provided by 
the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF), an innovative Fund-of-
Funds, providing global risk capital through private investment for energy efficiency and renewable 
energy projects in developing countries and economies in transition. Launched in 2004, GEEREF 
aims to accelerate the transfer, development, use and enforcement of environmentally sound 
technologies for the world's poorer regions, helping to bring secure, clean and affordable energy to 
local people. GEEREF was initiated by the Directorate General for Environment and the Directorate 
General for Development Co-operation (DEVCO) of the European Commission.  It is sponsored by 
the European Union, Germany and Norway and advised by the European Investment Bank Group. 
It has secured funding for a total of EUR 108 million and is considered as an ODA by DAC. 
 
According to Eurostat86, net FDI from the EU27 to developing countries peaked in 2007 and has 
been declining since then, as shown in Figure 13 below. 
                                                 
86 Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union situated in Luxembourg. Its task is to provide the 
European Union with statistics at European level that enable comparisons between countries and regions 
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Figure 13 – Net FDI Flows from EU to Developing Countries (EUR billions, current prices) 
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Corporate Social Responsibility refers to the voluntary inclusion of social and environmental 
concerns, beyond the minimum legal requirements, in companies' business operations to address 
societal needs.  It has become an increasingly important concept and is part of the debate about 
globalisation, climate change, competitiveness and sustainability. CSR practices are not a substitute 
for public policy, but they can contribute to a number of public policy objectives in developing 
countries, especially in relation to labour markets, labour standards, skills development, more 
rational use of natural resources and overall poverty reduction. 
 
In Europe, the promotion of CSR reflects the need to promote common values and increase the 
sense of solidarity and cohesion. In order to promote awareness and the adoption of CSR principles 
by companies operating in developing countries the Commission is supporting several projects 
totalling approximately EUR 50 million in the period 2004 – 2010. The Commission regularly 
consults its High-Level Group of Member States representatives and its European Multi-
Stakeholder Forum on the international aspects of CSR policies.  
The vast majority of Member States undertake national action to promote CSR principles and 15 of 
them report that they advocate the adoption of internationally agreed principles and standards on 
corporate social and environmental responsibility by European companies. Most of them strongly 
support multilateral initiatives such as: 
• The OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises which 
promotes voluntary standards of responsible business conduct within the framework of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. These guidelines are currently undergoing a 
review which is likely to be completed in May 2011. Twenty-three EU Member States and the 
Commission have created National Contact Points on the implementation of the guidelines.  
• The UN Global Compact, which is a voluntary corporate citizenship initiative for companies 
committed to supporting and enacting a set of 10 core values in the areas of human rights, 
labour, the environment and combating corruption. Global Compact Local Networks have been 
established in 20 EU Member States. 
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• The International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions and recommendations on labour 
standards. 
• the IFC’s "Performance Standards on Environment and Social Sustainability". 
• European Development Finance Institution (EDFI) “Principles for Responsible Financing”.  
• the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
• the Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI). 
• the mandate of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on business and human 
rights, Professor John Ruggie. 
• the OECD initiative concerning a “Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of 
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas”. 
• OECD Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials. 
• FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. 
• Realising Rights: the Ethical Globalisation Initiative (EGI) spearheaded by Mary Robinson. CSR 
is one of the core activities of EGI with a focus on a few countries (e.g. Liberia and Ghana) in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
There are a variety of other activities supported by a few Member States.  
 
The Austrian Development Agency (ADA) offers Business Partnerships to Austrian/European 
companies on a co-financing basis. One typical example is the hepatitis vaccination programme of 
the OMV, the leading Austrian oil and gas corporation. The project, implemented in Pakistan, 
focuses on vaccination and medical education and is part of a comprehensive development 
programme which includes water and infrastructure. Another example is the business partnership 
with five European carpet retailers and the STEP foundation. It focuses on the elaboration of 
common CSR-standards for the entire value chain in carpet manufacturing in Nepal and Pakistan. 
 
The German Government has defined its own CSR Strategy and brought forward a CSR Action 
Plan that builds on broad consultation with stakeholders. The international and development policy 
perspective is included in the national CSR Strategy. Development Partnerships with business 
companies (develoPPP.de). Since 1999, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development has supported more than 1,200 projects with an amount of approx. EUR 500 million. 
The majority of these projects contain CSR components. 
Denmark’s Innovative Partnerships for Development (IPD) Programme sets out to promote better 
working and living conditions for employees, their families, the community and society at large by 
advancing strategic CSR and socially responsible innovation.  
 
The UK Government is a strong supporter of responsible business behaviour.  The UK promotes 
adherence to the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, which set recommendations for 
good corporate behaviour. NGOs and trades unions can lodge, and have lodged, complaints against 
companies for breaching the Guidelines. Under the OECD mechanism the UK government 
investigates the complaints and produces a conclusion, with recommendations for improvement if 
necessary.   
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Social and environmental considerations in public procurement rules. The EU public 
procurement Directives87 allow contracting authorities to take into account environmental and 
social considerations at all stages of the procurement procedure. The prerequisite is that these 
considerations are linked to the subject matter of the contract or to the execution of the contract, if 
they are addressed in the contract performance clauses, and comply with the fundamental principles 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (transparency, non-discrimination) and with relevant EU 
law.  EU Member States may introduce more specific rules in their national legislation, in order to 
further promote the inclusion of social and environmental considerations in public procurement, 
provided such national rules are in line with the public procurement Directives and all relevant EU 
law. Also, on 28/01/2011 the Commission published a guide to taking account of social 
considerations in public procurement88.  
 
A number of Member States reported substantial reforms of their rules in 2010.  
 
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland is defining a new case management process. This is an 
overall process which has been ongoing since 2009 and is based on updating manuals and 
templates. A new initiative during 2010 has been the consistent addition of social and 
environmental clauses into terms of reference templates. These new templates and interlinked 
manuals are being put into use, even though the case management process software is not yet 
usable. 
 
In 2010 the government of the Netherlands started to implement its new policy on sustainable 
public procurement. From January 2010 environmental criteria have been applied and from 2011 
onwards social criteria will also be applied.  Public procurement is used to pursue various policy 
objectives, including development objectives. The government links its public procurement policy 
to economic diplomacy, activities of multilateral organisations (e.g. ILO) and supply chain 
initiatives (e.g. the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative and ‘fair trade municipalities’). The 
government has chosen to apply fundamental labour standards and human rights on a generic basis 
(i.e. in a uniform manner in all public procurement). The development aim is to bring about 
improvements in the entire supply chain (a process-oriented approach). For a limited number of 
products, for which community-supported supply chain initiatives exist, supplementary standards 
apply. These standards relate to living wages/income (or fair trade), working hours, and 
occupational health and safety. The system is designed to be as simple as possible for both 
contracting parties and suppliers, and to be consistent with actual practice. It only applies to large 
contracts (above EUR 133,000 for goods and services). Companies will be held accountable for the 
way they fulfil their supply chain responsibilities with regard to the product, work or service they 
deliver. 
2.5.2. Remittances 
Remittances sent by migrants to their countries of origin, private by nature, are essential to 
improving the livelihoods of millions of people and for some countries are more significant in 
volume terms than ODA.  
 
                                                 
87Directive 2004/17/EC of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ L 134, 30.4.2004) and Directive 2004/18/EC of 31 
March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts (OJ L 134, 30.4.2004). 
88See http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6457&langId=en 
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According to a recent Eurostat publication89, the total number of non-nationals (i.e. persons who are 
not citizens of their country of residence) living on the territory of the EU Member States on 1 
January 2009 was 31.9 million, representing 6.4% of the total EU population. More than one third 
of them (11.9 million) were citizens of another Member State. Among the non-EU foreign 
population living in the EU in 2009, 48.2% are citizens of a High Human Development Index (HDI) 
country (with Turkey, Albania and Russia accounting for almost half); 44.4% are citizens of a 
Medium HDI country (one fifth of whom are citizens of Morocco, followed by nationals of China 
and Ukraine); only 7.4% of the non-EU foreign population living the EU are from developing 
countries with a lower HDI (30% of whom have Nigerian or Iraqi citizenship).  
 
With regard to migration flows in 2008, another recent Eurostat publication90 indicated that in 2008 
EU Member States received a total of 3.8 million immigrants and at least 2.3 million emigrants are 
reported to have left one of the EU Member States. Compared with 2007, immigration to EU 
Member States is estimated to have decreased by 6 % and emigration to have increased by 13 %. 
The scale and patterns of immigration differ from one Member State to another. It is estimated that 
more than a half (55%) of immigrants to the EU in 2008 previously resided outside the EU, while 
44% of immigrants had previously also lived in one of the EU Member States (other than the 
country of immigration).  
 
The impact of the economic crisis on migration employment, migrant stocks and flows is not easy 
to assess, but it is generally acknowledged that migrants are often more affected by the economic 
downturn either because they work in sectors that are more affected by the crisis, such as tourism or 
construction, or because of their particular vulnerability.  
 
According to World Bank data, global remittance flows to developing countries grew from 2007 (EUR 203 
billion) to 2008 (EUR 220 billion). Remittance flows started to decrease in the last quarter of 2008. For 2009 
global remittances to developing countries remained stable at EUR 220 billion. In 2010 the growth in 
remittances is expected to have resumed and attained EUR 245 billion-91  
Worker remittances are defined by the World Bank as the sum of three components: (a) workers’ remittances 
recorded under the heading “current transfers” in the current account of the balance of payments; (b) 
compensation of employees which includes wages, salaries, and other benefits of border, seasonal, and other 
non-resident workers (such as local staff of embassies) and which are recorded under the “income” 
subcategory of the current account; and (c) migrants’ transfers which are reported under “capital transfers” in 
the capital account of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Yearbook.  
 
Data on remittance flows are not always reliable, as a large proportion of remittances are not 
recorded in official statistics. The World Bank estimated that immigrants sent about USD440 billion 
of remittances and worker compensations to their countries of origin in 2010. Of these, USD325 
billion were sent to developing countries, although only USD22 billion went to low income 
countries, compared to about USD56 billion of ODA in 2009. The relative importance of 
remittances in terms of volume is therefore sometimes exaggerated in the case of low income 
countries.  
 
                                                 
89Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 45/10. 
90Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 1/11. 
91World Bank Migration and Remittances (Excel files attached to Outlook for Remittance Flows 2011-12: Recovery 
after the crisis, but risks lie ahead) data as of November 2010 converted into Euro using Eurostat’s 
Euro/ECU exchange rates - Annual data.   
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According to WB statistics, remittances from EU Member States to all countries (developed and 
developing) grew steadily between 2004 and 2008 and then declined in 200992.  Available data 
point to a further slight decline in 2010. 
 
Figure 14 – Remittances from EU Member States to All Countries  
 
Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators 
 
According to Eurostat most remittances from EU Member States registered in their Balance of 
Payments statistics93 are sent to developing countries. Of the EUR 30.3 billion of remittances 
reported in official statistics for 2009, EUR 8.3 billion were intra-EU and EUR 22 billion extra-EU. 
EUR 19 billion were sent to developing countries94.  
2.5.2.1. Donor Initiatives 
In recent years the importance of remittances has been recognised, and several international 
initiatives propose concrete measures to measure them more accurately, assess their impact in 
country specific contexts, lower transfer costs, make them safer and faster, formalise them and 
leverage their impact on development by developing incentives for investment. 
                                                 
92World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
93Data on remittance flows are often underestimated due to the use of informal remittance channels, irregular 
migration, and ambiguity in the definition of migrants (foreign born versus foreigner, seasonal versus 
permanent).  The quality of data is also affected by lack of adherence to IMF guidelines on BOP statistics by 
some countries and differences between host and recipient countries’ records.  
94http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=bop_remit&lang=en 
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Box 4. Summary of main international initiatives 
Guidelines for the compilation of data on remittances have been drafted by the 'Luxembourg Group'95 the 
'General Principles for International Remittances Services' and the recent G8 initiative of a 'Global 
Remittances Working Group' coordinated by the World Bank. The G20 Summit in Seoul of November 2010 
recognised the importance of facilitating international remittance flows and enhancing their efficiency to 
increase their contribution to growth with resilience and poverty reduction, and committed to support the 
above initiatives towards a reduction of the global average cost of transferring remittances.  
On a number of occasions (see above) the EU has undertaken to make remittances cheaper, faster 
and more secure and to maximise their development impact.  
 
Some EU Member States follow a multi-pronged approach to foster remittances. The Netherlands is 
a good example, focusing on creating favourable conditions to reinforce the positive link between 
remittances and development through its own policies on remittances. The Netherlands contributes 
to the development of the financial sector in countries of origin. The aim is to achieve a more 
sustainable development impact of remittances. Lastly, the Netherlands aims to increase the poverty 
alleviation effect of money transfers by promoting small-scale initiatives by migrants.   
2.5.2.2. Improving data on remittances 
Eurostat has started regular collection of data on remittances flows from each EU Member State and 
third countries. This information is regularly updated (most recently in December 2010). Generally, 
Member States still combine different data compilation methods for remittances, as these flows are 
difficult to capture. In the past, the ITRS (International Transactions Reporting System, a data 
collection system based on data from banks and enterprises on individual transactions) was the main 
source for data compilation, but direct reporting by Money Transfers Operators, surveys and 
administrative data have also gained in significance in the meantime. The main reference for data 
compilers is the IMF's manual "International Transactions in Remittances": Guide for Compilers 
and Users", which was prepared by members of the Luxembourg Group and which are already 
applied by a number of Member States. At present more precise data on remittances are transmitted 
to Eurostat only on a voluntary basis - only data for Total World, Intra/Extra EU and Intra/Extra 
Euro Area are mandatory for Quarterly Balance of Payments reporting. The ECB also publishes 
data on workers' remittances for the euro area. 
 
In response to the increasing demand for data on remittances, Eurostat launched a new annual 
survey in 2009, in which it asked Member States to provide statistics on remittances and 
compensation of employees, collected as part of balance of payments statistics. 
 
According to the responses to the Commission's annual questionnaire on financing for development, 
14 Member States have no robust and reliable data concerning the amounts and destination of 
remittances from their country, such as ad-hoc surveys, while 12 Member States said their data are 
robust.  Twelve Member States have not adopted and do not intend to adopt the operational 
definitions, recommendations and best practices on improving the quality and coverage of data on 
remittances according to the compilation guide drafted by the "Luxembourg Group".   
                                                 
95The Luxembourg Group was created as an informal working group of practitioners to consider the difficulties of 
collecting and compiling remittance data. The objective of the Group is to make recommendations for improvements 
that should lead to the production of a compilation guide for remittance statistics. Jointly with Eurostat and the World 
Bank, the IMF planned the first meeting of the Luxembourg Group (and constituted its secretariat) which was held in 
June 2006 with participation from 16 countries. 
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2.5.2.3. Favouring cheaper, faster and more secure flows of remittances  
According to the World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide, the cost of sending remittances from 
the EU, measured for a USD200 transfer, has been falling steadily since 2008 in France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom, while remaining above the general averages in Germany. The United 
Kingdom and Italy have an average total cost below the overall average (8.89 percent). As shown in 
Table 10 below, costs declined in France and Italy and increased in Germany. However, the 
average cost is still higher than the 5% target by 2014 set at the L’Aquila G8 Summit. The EU has 
not developed its own monitoring system. 
 
Table 10 - Average Cost to transfer USD200 for EU G8 Countries (%) 
 
Country   2008   Q1 2009   Q3 2009   Q1 2010   Q3 2010  
 France  10.92 11.50 11.15 10.01 8.95 
 Germany  14.07 13.53 12.71 11.85 12.67 
 Italy  10.03 7.36 8.21 8.11 7.87 
 United Kingdom  10.26 10.27 9.05 8.29 8.07 
 G8 Average  10.26 10.32 8.80 8.37 8.40 
 Global Average  9.81 9.67 9.40 8.72 8.89 
Source: World Bank 
 
Banks remain more expensive than Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) and the differing importance 
of each channel in EU Member States may explain price variations across countries, as banks 
dominate the money transfer market in France or Germany, for example, while MTOs are relatively 
more important in the United Kingdom.  
 
Some Member States - including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
- have set up remittance price comparison websites. The German government has set up a 
remittance price comparison website (www.geldtransfair.de). This was done in cooperation with the 
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, who now own the ongoing project. The objective is 
the reduction of transfer costs for formal remittances from migrants living in Germany to their 
countries of origin.  In 2009 Italy launched the “Rome Road Map for Remittances” at an 
International Conference. A dedicated website on the costs of remittances has been elaborated by 
stakeholders and co-funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has operated since 2009 
(www.mandasoldiacasa.it); it has been the first such website certified by the World Bank as being 
compliant with current applicable standards. The Netherlands supports a remittances comparison 
website (www.geldnaarhuis.nl). This website provides information in eight languages on money 
transfer costs charged by banks and money transfer offices. 
2.5.2.4. Policy environment  
Substantial progress has been achieved in the form of the adoption of the Payment Services 
Directive (PSD) in November 2007, which lays the legal foundation for an EU-wide single market 
for payments, although it applies to intra-EU money transfers only. Fourteen Member States have 
gone beyond the requirements of the Directive to cover transfers between operators when one of 
them is outside the EU or when the transaction is made in currencies other than those existing in the 
EU.  Fully implemented in the EU Member States since November 2009 - with the exception of 
Poland which is expected to adopt it in 2011 - it allows for a new category of non bank service 
provider, namely the "Payment institutions", i.e. money transfer operators or telecom providers for 
their pre-paid activities, which are now recognised as a separate payment service provider and 
subject to specific authorisation. They have to comply with appropriate prudential and regulatory 
requirements harmonised throughout the EU/EEE. This directive has resulted in increasing 
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competition, with 131 new licences obtained in EU Member States in October 2010, most of them 
in the United Kingdom. In addition, the E-Money Directive adopted in October 2009, which has to 
be transposed by 30 April 2011, will authorise e-money institutions (such as issuers of pre-paid 
cards, on-line or telecom providers for their pre-paid activities) to carry out business activities other 
than issuing e-money. Here again, the EMD still only applies to payments made within the 
EU/EEE, but the Member States have the right to extend its scope should they so wish. Both 
directives will be evaluated by the end of 2012, when their economic impact will be assessed and 
recommendations will be made regarding their potential revision. 
 
In the Council Conclusions of 30 November 2009, the EU undertook "to promote transparent, 
cheaper, faster and more secure flows of remittances to migrants' countries of origin, and to ensure 
that relevant legislation does not contain provisions hampering the effective use of legal remittances 
channels", within the broader context of migration which is one of the five priorities of the work on 
Policy Coherence for Development. The European Commission intends to keep up its efforts to 
identify any provisions hampering the effective use of legal remittances channels in the context of 
promoting mobile banking and transfers. It is sometimes argued that the legislation on anti money-
laundering and counter terrorism financing may be perceived as a barrier for migrants to send 
money through formal channels as well as a burden on money transfer operators. So far, no Member 
State has conducted an assessment of the impact of the legislation on anti money-laundering and 
counter-terrorism financing on the remittances' market.  
 
As part of the Stockholm Programme, which is the 5-year plan (2010-2014) in the area of justice 
and home affairs96, the European Council invited the Commission to submit proposals on how to 
further ensure efficient, secure and low-cost remittance transfers, and enhance the development 
impact of remittance transfers, as well as to evaluate the feasibility of creating a common Union 
portal on remittances to inform migrants about transfer costs and to encourage competition among 
remittance service providers.  
 
A number of targeted initiatives have been set up to support developing countries in establishing a 
policy framework that is more conducive to remittances, such as the Commission's support for the 
establishment, under the auspices of the African Union,  of an African Institute for Remittances and 
the contributions by a number of Member States and the Commission to the multi-donor Financial 
Facility for Remittances of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) which, 
inter alia, provides grants for innovative projects that support: i) the creation of enabling 
environments for market development, openness and transparency; ii) the design of innovative 
business models; iii) the introduction of new technologies as a means for better financial inclusion; 
iv) financial access and services to rural remote areas; and v) migrant investment and 
entrepreneurship. France and the African Development Bank also organised two workshops in 
November 2009 with relevant local stakeholders in Bamako and Casablanca in order for them to 
share experiences on existing regulatory frameworks and discuss potential improvements to be 
made in terms of cost reduction, formalisation of flows, and suppression of barriers to competition 
and so on. More could be done to support developing countries in improving data collection, and to 
strengthen their capacity in policy making, for example to counter potential anti-competitive 
behaviour of money transfer operators. 
 
In a different vein, recent measures by some Member States, such as the decree in Italy requiring 
money transfer operators to inform local police within 12 hours if the person wishing to transfer 
                                                 
96http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/jun/eu-jha-council-jun-10-stockholm-programme-action-plan-conclusions.pdf 
 EN 66   EN 
funds is unable to present a residence permit, could be counter-productive from a development 
perspective, because such restrictions will increase the use of informal less secure channels to 
transfer remittances. 
2.5.2.5. Support for the Financial Sector in Developing Countries 
The Commission and EU Member States also implement programmes in partner countries with the 
aim of developing the financial sector (e.g. microfinance, technical assistance on financial sector 
regulation and supervision). Through its development cooperation, the EU supports the creation of a 
more favourable business environment in developing countries. Denmark, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom contribute to the Partnership for Making Finance 
Work for Africa, a major initiative that has been launched as part of the G8 commitments of the G8 
Heiligendamm summit of 2007, to support the efforts of African countries to boost economic 
growth and fight poverty by encouraging and facilitating development of the financial sector. 
Germany also cooperates bilaterally with partner countries in advancing financial sector 
development, including the banking sector. German Financial Cooperation (KfW) is one of the 
world’s major investors in microfinance. Germany is active in several international initiatives that 
aim to improve the overall banking system, e.g. Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening 
Initiative (FIRST), Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), and the Access to Insurance Initiative (A2II). Furthermore, Germany co-chairs the G20 
expert working Group on SME Finance, aiming in particular at improving access to finance for 
SME in developing countries. 
Eight EU Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
the United Kingdom) declare they have implemented solutions internally and in cooperation with 
third countries to overcome barriers to access to financial services by migrants and their families, 
with a view to reinforcing the impact of remittances on their economic and social development. 
Two other Member States (the Czech Republic and Greece) plan to implement such solutions in the 
near future. Eight Member States (Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom) have implemented the "General Principles for International Remittances 
Services" agreed by the Committee on Payments and Settlements Systems (CPSS) and referred to in 
the Council Conclusions of November 2008.  
 
Some Member States (such as Finland) feel that current payment services already meet the needs of 
migrants at a reasonable cost and therefore take the view that no action is necessary. The share of 
remittance services providers in the overall payment transmission is minor, the bulk of payments 
are transferred via banking channels. Furthermore, there are no indications that the current payment 
services do not satisfy the needs of migrants.  In other cases there are few immigrants from 
developing countries (Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia). 
 
To improve financial literacy and access to financial services, the UK informs migrants about 
financial products suited to their needs and also works through dialogue with the private sector. The 
UK prepared a leaflet explaining what information has to be given to the sender of money, what 
needs to be checked to make sure that the money reaches the recipient safely and what rights the 
sender has if things go wrong.  The Netherlands recently evaluated its cost comparison website. As 
most migrants have access to financial services similar to that of the rest of the population in the 
EU, the cost of remittances depends mainly on access to financial services in non-EU countries.  
2.5.3. Leveraging private flows 
There have been a limited number of initiatives by Member States on leveraging private flows to 
developing countries. 
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One of the most significant is the support provided by Germany, France and the Netherlands for the 
Local Currency Financing Fund “The Currency Exchange” (TCX). TCX provides market risk 
management products in developing and emerging markets. This unique fund focuses on currencies 
and maturities which are not covered by regular market providers. In this way, TCX helps provide 
local microfinance institutions and banks, bilateral and multilateral development financers, and 
enterprises with long term finance in local currency.  
The Netherlands has also supported several private public partnerships (PPPs) in development 
cooperation.  At present there are 75 PPPs in various sectors: health, agriculture, water, trade and 
energy. They take various forms: innovative public private financing mechanisms, technical support 
to enhance the business climate, product development, promotion of inclusive business models, 
pilots for sustainable trade, and capacity building for local water utilities. 
 
Sweden has launched a new programme called “Business for Development” or B4D. The B4D 
programme contains tools for new forms of dialogue and collaboration with the private sector.  The 
purpose is to mobilise resources and encourage companies to develop their core activities so that 
they can contribute even more to ensuring better conditions for poor people. The B4D toolbox 
contains, among others, “Innovations Against Poverty”, “Challenge Funds” and “Market 
Transformation”. 
 
2.6. Supporting Trade Capacity through Aid97 
EU Commitments 
On 15 October 2007, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Aid for Trade Strategy 
with the following objectives:  
- Quantitative Aid for Trade (AfT): ambitions within the gradual increase of overall EU aid 
(Member States’ and European Commission’s collective spending on Trade Related Assistance to 
reach EUR 2 billion annually by 2010). 
- Enhancing the Pro-poor Focus and Quality of EU AfT 
- Increasing EU-wide and Member State donors’ capacity in line with globally agreed aid 
effectiveness principles 
- Building upon, fostering and supporting ACP regional integration processes with an ACP-
specific angle of EU AfT 
2.6.1. Background 
Increased participation in world trade has the potential to be an engine for growth and poverty 
reduction in developing countries by generating revenues and employment, lowering prices on 
essential goods and promoting technology transfer and increased productivity. Market opening and 
strengthened international trade rules provide new opportunities, but are not on their own sufficient 
to generate trade, especially in the poorest countries. Many countries face internal "behind the 
border" constraints such as a lack of productive capacity, poor infrastructure, excessive red tape and 
inability to meet standards in high value export markets - all of which impact negatively on the 
competitiveness of developing country exports and undermine the potential benefits of increased 
imports. Trade-related development assistance – known as Aid for Trade (AfT) – targets these 
                                                 
97 This chapter summarises the Aid for Trade monitoring report 2011, which is included in Annex 6. The report 
provides detailed analyses of the data and issues covered in this summary. 
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“supply-side” constraints. It also strengthens countries’ capacity to negotiate and implement trade 
agreements to reap the most benefit from increasing trading opportunities.  
 
The EU and its Member States adopted a joint Aid for Trade Strategy on 15 October 2007 that aims 
at supporting all developing countries, particularly the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), to better 
integrate into the world trading system and to use trade more effectively in promoting the 
overarching objective of eradicating poverty in the context of sustainable development.  
 
The strategy embraces the full AfT agenda, which can be divided into six categories 1) Trade policy 
and regulations; 2) Trade development; 3) Trade-related infrastructure; 4) Building productive 
capacity; 5) Trade-related adjustment; and 6) Other trade-related needs. Categories 1, 2 and 6 
correspond to more narrowly focused ‘Trade-Related Assistance’ (TRA). TRA plus the remaining 
categories are referred to as ‘the wider Aid for Trade agenda’, which has emerged as the concept of 
ODA to benefit trade has broadened. The OECD/DAC tracks ODA in each of the AfT categories 
through its Creditor Reporting System (CRS). 
 
The EU AfT strategy is a joint strategy to which EU Member States have signed up. In addition, 
several Member States have adopted specific AfT strategies in line with their national development 
policies. Sixteen Member States98 and the EU responded this year to the OECD/WTO AfT 
questionnaire which is intended to acquire information on the progress by individual donor 
countries with a particular focus on outcomes of AfT strategies and programmes. The responses 
show that Member States and the EU generally continue their engagement without 
significantly altering their strategy. Yet, six Member States adjusted their national AfT strategy 
since 2008 in areas such as regional integration, ‘economic growth’ and  enhanced engagement with 
the private sector. Six Member States foresee further changes in their strategies in the near future.  
 
The Commission prepares every year a monitoring report in order to assess progress in 
implementing the commitments made by the EU and its Member States in the EU AfT Strategy. 
This is done in close coordination with the AfT reporting that is carried out by the WTO and the 
OECD, in the context of the monitoring of global AfT. The present chapter is a summary of the 
fourth EU AfT monitoring report, which is included in Annex 5, together with sub-annexes. More 
background, explanations and analysis of the issues covered in this summary can be found there. 
2.6.2. Trade Related Assistance 
Trade-Related Assistance supports developing countries to design and implement trade policies and 
agreements, to stimulate trade by domestic firms and encourage investment in trade-oriented 
industries. In 2005, the EU and its Member States committed to increase its collective TRA to EUR 
2 billion per year from 2010 - EUR 1 billion by the EU and EUR 1 billion in bilateral aid from the 
Member States. Last year's monitoring report showed that the EU and Member States already met 
their EUR 2 billion target for TRA in 2008. In 2009, the EU as a whole continued to increase its 
TRA commitments substantially, reaching almost EUR 3 billion, compared to EUR 2.4 in 
2008 (Figure 15). This results mainly from an increase in Member States TRA commitments, from 
EUR 1.4 billion in 2008 to EUR 2 billion in 2009. Four Member States make up 76% of total 
commitments in TRA provided by Member States in 2009: Germany (34%), the UK (17%), Spain 
(15%) and Belgium (10%).  
Member State financial commitments in 2009 increased in particular for Category 2 "Trade 
development, for which an increase of 50% was recorded. Trade development represented close to 
                                                 
98 BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LI, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK 
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80% of total Member States TRA commitments in 2009. In contrast, the EU TRA was almost 
evenly split over the TRA categories in 2008 and 2009. 
 
Figure 15 – Trade Related Assistance 
(EU and EU Member States, EUR million) 
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Source: OECD CRS Database, Doha Development Database, Monterrey Questionnaire 2011 
 
In terms of geographical coverage, EU and Member States TRA volumes towards Africa 
increased substantially compared to 2008; it reached EUR 1.1 billion in 2009, representing 40% 
of all TRA (compared to 25% in 2008). Asia received the second largest share of TRA (23%), 
followed by Latin America (16%), Europe (5%) and Oceania (1%). Many programmes have a 
global coverage and are therefore classified by the OECD as geographically "unspecified" – the 
total amount for this category is EUR 0.43 billion. 
 
2.6.3. Total 'wider' Aid for Trade 
The AfT concept has widened over the years to include more general support for infrastructure and 
productive sectors, whereas the original scope of AfT did not stretch far beyond TRA, i.e. 
supporting beneficiaries to formulate and implement trade policies. Last year's report indicated an 
all-time high of total EU and Member States Aid for Trade commitments in 2008; the latest data for 
2009 show that this high level was not an isolated event: The commitments increased slightly 
(+1.4%) in 2009 and reached a total of almost EUR 10.5 billion - EUR 7.1 billion from EU 
Member States and EUR 3.3 billion from the EU (Figure 16).  
 
The EU and its Member States accounted for about 37% of AfT from the world’s major bilateral 
and multilateral donors in 2008-2009 and is together the world's largest provider of AfT. This is 
a substantial increase compared to 2004-2005, when their share was 30% of the total. The EU on its 
own is after Japan the world largest donor of AfT, representing 11.4% of the world's total. 
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Figure 16  Aid for Trade(EU and EU Member States, in EUR million) 
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Source: OECD CRS Database, Doha Development Database, Questionnaire on financing for development 
2.6.3.1. Aid for Trade by EU provider 
After having increased by 55% in 2008, AfT from Member States practically stabilised in 2009. EU 
AfT commitments continued to increase, albeit at a slower pace (+9.5% in 2009 compared to +25% 
in 2008). The slowdown in Member State commitments is largely attributable to France and 
Germany in 2009, as shown in Table 11. Yet they remain the largest Member State donors of AfT; 
together with the UK accounting for more than 60% of total AfT from EU Member States. 
 
Table 11 Amounts of Aid for Trade by Member States: 2000-2009 
 
(EUR million) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 18 15 63 21 17 27 26 44 51 58 
Belgium 86 114 186 135 178 155 156 209 221 389 
Bulgaria       0 0 0 0 
Cyprus       - - -  
Czech Rep.       3 3 0 0 
Denmark 495 81 206 188 367 410 189 255 173 251 
Estonia       0 0 0  
Finland 29 31 41 38 43 100 64 84 135 256 
France 301 635 329 466 527 755 744 1 017 1 738 1 090 
Germany 613 962 816 776 889 1 138 1 495 1 213 2 036 1 889 
Greece   6 4 12 14 22 11 10 13 
Hungary       - - -  
Ireland 18 19 19 22 26 20 29 30 52 44 
Italy 152 105 164 187 70 310 239 111 186 202 
Latvia       0 0 0 0 
Lithuania       0 0 1 0 
Luxembourg  3 2 15 14 11 12 27 28 22 
Malta       - - -  
Netherlands 221 343 463 303 461 384 686 510 466 515 
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Poland       - - 0  
Portugal 23 30 17 8 41 61 7 47 13 66 
Romania       - 0 0  
Slovakia       - - -  
Slovenia       1 1 2 0 
Spain 225 253 306 366 247 135 561 474 701 757 
Sweden 143 192 135 170 150 200 259 267 225 247 
United Kingdom 998 631 422 670 286 665 480 380 1 240 1 335 
EU MS 3 322 3 413 3 175 3 369 3 327 4 384 4 975 4 685 7 279 7 137 
EU 1 277 1 741 2 036 1 903 1 444 2 117 2 563 2 436 3 056 3 345 
Grand Total 4 599 5 154 5 210 5 272 4 770 6 501 7 538 7 120 10 335 10 482 
Source: OECD CRS Database, Doha Development Database, Questionnaire on financing for development 
 
2.6.3.2. Aid for Trade by category 
Figure 17 illustrates the trend for total EU and Member States’ AfT for each AfT category. 
Commitments for building productive capacity (BPC in the Figure) have increased 
considerably in recent years, and reached a record high of EUR 5.6 billion in 2009, representing 
56% of total AfT. This covers support to agriculture, fisheries, banking, business industry etc. The 
second biggest category—trade-related infrastructure (TRI), which covers transport, storage, 
communication and energy—has followed a much more fluctuating path; commitments decreased 
from EUR 4.9 billion in 2008 to EUR 3.8 billion in 2009, after having increased by 76% in 2008. 
This can be explained by the fact this category covers large infrastructure projects for which 
substantial commitments are made on an irregular basis. 
 
Due to the nature of the support – institution building, technical assistance, training etc, 
commitments for trade policy and regulations (TPR) are on a much smaller scale (6% of total AfT 
in 2009). They increased by about 33% in each of 2008 and 2009, a clear indication of the 
continued attention to EU And Member States' support to the capacity of developing countries to 
formulate and implement trade policy. Activities in the trade-related adjustment (TRAdj) category 
have only been reported for ACP countries, and in limited amounts (in 2009 the total for this 
category was EUR 11.3 million), because the relevant sector code was added to the CRS only in 
2008. As a consequence, TRAdj commitments are not shown in the graph. Most programmes under 
category 6 'other trade-related assistance' are in EU Neighbourhood countries and Europe as in 
these regions programmes more often cover areas that go beyond the sectors covered by Aid for 
Trade. They can be part of broader government advice or public reform projects in several sectors 
and as such reported as “Multi-sector Aid”. A total of 67 projects were included in this category in 
2009 representing a total amount of EUR 333 million.  
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Figure 17 Aid for Trade by Category (EU + EU Member States, in EUR million)  
Aid for Trade by Category
(EU + EU MS, in EUR million)
-  
1.000 
2.000 
3.000 
4.000 
5.000 
6.000 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1. TPR 3. TRI 4. BPC 6. Other Source: OECD CRS, 
EU  
Source: OECD CRS, EU 
 
2.6.3.3. Wider Aid for Trade geographical distribution 
Efforts under the EU AfT strategy cover all developing country regions, as reflected in Figure 18. 
Compared to the 2000-2004 average, 2009 EU AfT commitments increased for all regions. 
Comparing with the 2005-2009 average, 2009 commitments only decreased for Europe and North 
of Sahara (between 2008 and 2009 from EUR 1.3 billion to EUR 0.7 billion in Europe and from 
EUR 1.5 billion to EUR 0.8 billion in North of Sahara.  
 
Africa accounted for the largest share of AfT from the EU and its Member States; 
commitments amounted to EUR 4.1 billion corresponding to 41% of total AfT in 2009. Last year's 
report indicated that the relative share of Sub-Saharan Africa was decreasing to the benefit of North 
Africa. However, the 2009 data demonstrates a reverse trend with almost stable commitments in 
North of Sahara and substantial increases in Sub-Saharan Africa. The South of Sahara region 
received by far the largest amounts of AfT of all regions. 
 
Asia received the second largest share of AfT (22% of total in 2009), followed by America 
(11%), Europe (7%) and Oceania (1%). As for TRA, the AfT classified as 'unspecified' (which 
includes programmes with global coverage) increased substantially in recent years and reached 
almost EUR 1.9 billion in 2009 representing 19% of total TRA. This is mainly due to three large 
global commitments to the EU Food Facility which were reported as geographically “unspecified” 
(global coverage). 
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Figure 18 - Aid for Trade by OECD Region (bilateral & regional programmes, EU + EU Member 
States, in EUR million) 
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Source: OECD CRS 
 
The share of AfT to LDCs as percentage of total AfT from EU and EU Member States 
remained relatively stable at 22% in 2009, down from 24% in 2008, as shown in Figure 19. 
LDCs accounted for EUR 2.3 billion in 2009, compared to EUR 7.8 billion to non-LDCs. 
Interestingly, the figure also demonstrates that the LDC share of EU AfT (30% in 2009) has been 
continuously higher than the LDC share of Member States AfT (19% in 2009), despite a decreasing 
LDC share of EU AfT as compared to 2008. 
 
Figure 19 
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2.6.4. Increasing Trade Related Assistance and Aid for Trade to ACP countries 
ACP countries receive specific attention in the EU AfT strategy, including in relation to their 
ongoing regional integration efforts. The assessment of progress in implementing the AfT agenda 
for this group is therefore a key issue in each EU AfT report. 2009 showed a very important 
increase in both AfT and TRA to ACP countries. Total EU TRA commitments reached EUR 
1.16 billion, almost triple the 2008 level. The ACP share of total recipient countries increased 17 
percentage points to 40% of the total. There was a particularly strong increase in regional 
programmes from both the EU as well as Member States which were up six fold compared to 2008, 
almost entirely allocated to Africa. 
 
As regards wider AfT, commitments to ACP countries increased 18% in 2009, reaching a new all-
time high of EUR 3.6 billion (Figure 20). The ACP share of total AfT delivered by the EU and its 
Member States increased four percentage points to 36% in 2009. Again, the overall increase can 
mainly be attributed to increasing commitments in regional programmes (more than doubling from 
EUR 0.4 billion in 2008 to EUR 0.9 billion in 2009), while commitments to bilateral programmes 
remained stable (EUR 2.7 billion).  
 
Figure 20 – Aid for Trade ACP Countries (EU+Member States, EUR million) 
 
 
2.6.5. Effective delivery of Aid for Trade 
The second pillar of the EU AfT Strategy is focussed on enhancing the impact of the support. The 
following sections report on the results of a Field questionnaire99 on AfT to EU and EU MS Field 
offices; and responses to an OECD/WTO questionnaire100 sent out to collect information as part of 
the WTOs work programme on Aid for Trade. This year, the EU's Field questionnaire aimed inter 
alia at deepening the understanding of a series of key issues that emerged from last year's analysis, 
in particular the potential for more joint EU and EU Member States work on AfT in the partner 
countries; perceived absence of comprehensive trade needs assessments; a relatively smaller share 
                                                 
 
82EU delegations and EU Member States embassies in 89 partner countries across the developing world  
completed a questionnaire on how the Aid for Trade agenda is progressing at country and regional level. 
10016 Member States and the European Commission responded to the OECD/WTO Aid for Trade questionnaire 
which is intended to acquire information on the progress by individual donors with a particular focus on 
outcomes of Aid for Trade strategies and programmes. 
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of EU and Member States ODA allocated to AfT in LDCs than for developing countries as a whole; 
and the room for strengthening support to regional integration.  
2.6.5.1. Ownership 
In half of partner countries, EU delegations and Member States representatives report that 
trade is a regular topic in their policy dialogue with the partner country. This is a considerable 
improvement compared to the 33% of positive responses to last year’s questionnaire. But in 37 
partner countries (42%) trade is a topic of policy dialogue only to a limited extent, and in eight 
countries not at all. The Member States responses to the OECD/WTO questionnaire indicate that 
trade is a more regular topic in policy dialogues between donors and regional communities 
(reported by eight Member States) compared to the policy dialogues between donor and partner 
countries (reported by five Member States).  
EU and Member States donors indicated that civil society was always included in the dialogue in 
9% of partner countries. Civil society was sometimes included in the policy dialogue in 40% of the 
cases. Similarly, nine Member States out of 16, and the EU, report in the OECD/WTO 
questionnaire that the private sector is sometimes involved in the policy dialogue. Two Member 
States report that the private sector is always involved in their dialogue with partners. There is, in 
other words, continued room for a broadened dialogue.  
Compared to 2008, an increasing demand for AfT is reported in about 50% of partner 
countries, with a particularly strong increase of AfT demand in EU Neighbourhood countries 
(reported in 70% of cases for this region). It is interesting to note that overall, the Field responses do 
not actually support the notion that there is a clear link between the inclusion of trade issues in the 
policy dialogue and demand for Aid for Trade. On the contrary, there appears to be rather little 
correlation between these two elements and more in-depth analysis is necessary to fully understand 
the inter-linkages between dialogue and demand. 
Almost half of the Field responses report that the partner country has effective national 
coordination processes in place to develop and implement an integrated trade strategy. The 
other half of the countries are said either not to have such coordination processes, or to have them 
formally but not use them actively. Reasons given relate to lack of capacity, understaffing and 
reconciling different interests among the private sector players. This remains an important area for 
further attention to ensure that AfT is effective. 
This year's exercise showed that in half of the partner countries a comprehensive trade needs 
assessment has been undertaken in the last 5 years (and partially in a further 17% of partner 
countries). This is a modest improvement compared to situation signalled in the 2008 responses, but 
still seems to imply that in at least one third of partner countries EU and its Member States are 
providing AfT on the basis of an out of date or non-existent trade needs assessment. In these cases, 
other methods are used to agree on AfT priorities. It should also be noted that even if a recent 
comprehensive trade needs assessment is available, the findings appear to be fully reflected in 
national trade strategies only in about 60% of cases. 
2.6.5.2. Joint Aid for Trade operations and harmonisation: moderate progress 
This year’s field responses indicate that in 21% of partner countries, EU donors significantly 
improved their donor coordination compared to 2008 (in terms of joint needs assessments, joint 
implementation, joint monitoring/evaluation etc). Moderate improvement is reported by 43% of 
respondents. The responses to the OECD/WTO questionnaire support this finding - nine out of 16 
Member States indicate that harmonisation of AfT strategies between Member States have been 
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progressing at a moderate pace. No Member State characterised the overall improvement as 
‘significant’ – suggesting that their "aggregate" response "hides" the important progress 
experienced by some field offices.  
2.6.5.3. Regional dimension of Aid for Trade 
The field responses indicate that in 54% of partner countries EU donors supported (of which 40% 
partially) the partner country in strengthening the inclusion of strategic economic regional 
integration priorities in the national development plan or trade strategy. 64% of responses 
report that this is an improvement compared to 2008. 
 
When grouping the responses by sub-region, a strongly diverging picture emerges. EU donors 
appear particularly to have supported the inclusion of regional economic integration in national 
development plans or trade strategies in the EAC and the Caribbean (60%) and to a somewhat lesser 
extent in Latin America and Neighbourhood (50%). Noteworthy is the relatively low score of other 
African regions where donors are supporting regional integration initiatives at national level, such 
as ESA, SADC, Central and West Africa. Although regional integration is more advanced in some 
regions than in others, this does not fully explain the diverging responses from the EU field offices. 
2.6.5.4. LDCs and EU AfT 
The questionnaires paid specific attention to AfT in LDCs, following last year's finding that the 
share of EU and Member States ODA allocated to AfT in LDCs was smaller than for developing 
countries as a whole, despite the apparent trade-related needs of LDCs. Thirteen of the 37 responses 
to the questionnaire received from EU donors based in LDCs (35%) reported that trade issues were 
a regular element of policy dialogue in their partner countries. Eighteen (49%) said that it was so 
only to a limited extent. Six said that trade was not part of the dialogue at all. In 12 countries 
(32%), the policy dialogue was considered to have improved compared to the situation in 
2008. This should be compared with the responses for all countries for which 45% had noted an 
improvement. As the baseline situation was better in the total sample, this would suggest that 
despite progress, LDCs do not appear to be catching up with the other developing countries on this 
front. Comments relating to the reasons for changes or lack of changes in the LDC policy dialogue 
often relate to either progress or stagnation in trade negotiations. Another reason cited was that 
several countries were in a crisis or post crisis situation, leading to a generally scaled down dialogue 
or a focus on basic constitutional and socio-economic issues. As many as 19 of the joint responses 
received from EU donors in LDCs (more than 50%) considered that demand for Aid for Trade had 
increased since 2008; 11 said it had not. Three reported it had increased significantly.  
 
Responses from EU donors in LDCs indicate a lower degree of availability and use of trade 
policy coordination mechanisms in LDCs as compared to the total sample. Only 11 of the 37 
LDCs (30%) EU field offices considered that national mechanisms were in place to coordinate trade 
policy – featuring inter-ministerial and inter-institutional coordination – compared to 50% for all 
countries. A further 16 (43%) said that such mechanisms existed formally, but were not actively 
used. In 9 countries, such mechanisms were said not to exist.  
 
Several references were made to the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) which could improve 
coordination platforms although there were also quite a number of reports on EIF not using fully its 
potential in this regard.  
 
Responding to the question whether LDCs had carried out a comprehensive trade needs 
assessment in the past 5 years, there were 21 positive answers (57%), 14 negative (38%), and 2 
partially. This indicates if anything a potential worsening compared to 2008 when 22 out of 31 
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(79%) LDCs were said to have undertaken a comprehensive trade needs assessment in the last 5 
years. The score is comparable to the total sample. 
 
33 responses considered that a main constraint to increasing the attention to trade in LDCs was low 
absorption capacity. 21 responses referred to the LDC country’s low capacity to identify needs and 
priorities. Eight responses indicated that the most important or important constraint was insufficient 
availability of donor resources; but 25 considered that this was not important or less important. 
“Other more pressing priorities" were mentioned by 15 respondents as important. No one said 'very 
important', but 15 respondents indicated that they were not sure about the answer to this question. 
 
This indicates a need to focus more on LDCs' capacity to position trade issues in their development 
strategy, identify more clearly the trade-related needs, and place more attention on absorptive 
capacity. 
2.6.5.5. Aid for Trade monitoring and evaluation 
The past few year's have seen a search for improved methods to demonstrate the impact of AfT on 
trade and development performance of partner countries - a challenging task, not least due to 
attribution problems. Asked about the difficulties that donors encounter in assessing AfT 
programmes and projects, EU Delegations in developing countries considered the difficulty in 
obtaining in-country data as the most important challenge (69% of respondents). The 
difficulty to identify quantifiable objectives for intervention was rated as another important 
hurdle (67%). To a slightly lesser extent the difficulty in defining suitable indicators was 
considered as an important challenge (57%). A key aim of monitoring and evaluation is to feed-
back results into the government's trade development strategy. For this specific processes need to be 
in place, but the responses to the EU field office questionnaire indicate that this is often lacking. 
Only 3% of respondents reported that this 'significantly' applies and 37% 'moderately'. This is 
clearly an area where further work is required. Monitoring and evaluation was also addressed in the 
OECD questionnaires: nine Member States indicated that AfT monitoring had moderately 
improved. Regarding evaluation of AfT strategies, programmes and projects, Member States 
reported a number of challenges they face, in decreasing order of importance: 'difficulty of 
assigning trade outcomes to the programme' (attribution) was considered as most the important by 
seven Member States, followed by ‘difficulty in identifying quantifiable objectives’ which was 
considered ‘most important’ by four Member States. 
2.6.6. Conclusions 
The outcome of this year's AfT monitoring exercise demonstrates that both the EU and its Member 
States continue to advance in implementing the EU AfT Strategy. The results point to a 
strengthening of EU engagement in AfT, both in terms of volume commitments as well as on 
enhancing the impact of AfT delivery on the ground: 
 
The EU combined annual AfT reached EUR 10.5 billion in 2009, maintaining the all-time high 
registered the year before and a substantial  increase was reported for EU TRA, bringing the 
collective amount to nearly EUR 3 billion, well above the Hong Kong target to spend (as from 
2010) EUR 2 billion per year on TRA.  
 
Reports from the EU field offices point to moderate improvement in the processes that underpin 
both the volumes and the effectiveness of AfT, such as; addressing trade in the partner-donor policy 
dialogue; improved coordination to develop and implement trade strategies; availability of trade 
needs assessments; joint operations and harmonisation; and the inclusion of strategic economic 
regional integration priorities in national development plans. 
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In order to sustain this advance of the EU AfT agenda and to further strengthen its impact on the 
world's poorest, enhanced endeavours by the EU and Member States are essential in the following 
key areas: 
- Enhancing AfT support to the LDCs by increasing attention to the capacity of LDCs to 
formulate and implement trade development strategies in support of inclusive growth and to 
further capitalise on the potential of the Enhanced Integrated Framework in this respect;  
- Improve the effectiveness of AfT identified at country level, including by making better use of 
trade needs assessments, enhancing the effectiveness of platforms intended to support the 
development of trade related strategies; and acting on opportunities for increasing joint 
operations; 
- Step up support for regional integration, building further on existing initiatives such as the EU 
Aid for Trade packages for the ACP countries and increasing attention to regional issues in 
assistance provided at the national level; and 
- Support partner countries' own monitoring of results and impact of Aid for Trade and the 
progress of their trade development strategies 
The European Commission's Trade and Development Communication which is foreseen for the last 
quarter 2011 provides an opportunity to further highlight these issues and to suggest concrete 
actions on the way forward.   
 
2.7. Reducing the Debt Burden of Developing Countries 
EU Commitments 
Council Conclusions of 18 May 2009: Support to developing countries in coping with the 
crisis (§12):  ‘the EU will continue supporting the existing debt relief initiatives, in 
particular the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative (MDRI) and values the Evian approach as an appropriate flexible tool to 
ensure debt sustainability’.  
In line with the Doha Declaration, the EU has also confirmed in the Council Conclusions 
of 18 May 2009 (§12), that it ’supports discussions, if relevant, on enhanced forms of 
sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms, based on existing frameworks and principles, 
including the Paris Club, with a broad creditors’ and debtors participation and ensuring 
comparable burden-sharing among creditors with a central role for the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWI) in the debate. 
2.7.1. Challenge of recent economic trends: Preserving debt sustainability 
To assess debt sustainability, three main international methodologies have been developed: the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Relief Analyses, the Low Income Countries Debt 
Sustainability Framework (LIC-DSF) and the Middle-Income Countries Debt Sustainability 
Framework (MIC-DSF). They all involve making projections of intended borrowings and economic 
variables over a maximum 20-year period, and then using ratios comparing debt stock, present 
value or service with GDP, exports or budget revenue to assess payment capacity. 
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The indicative debt burden thresholds are not intended to be used as rigid ceilings. There are four 
possible ratings for the risk of debt distress:101  
– Low risk: all debt indicators are well below the indicative debt burden thresholds 
– Moderate risk: the debt service ratio may reach its indicative threshold but debt-stock ratios may 
breach them 
– High risk: the baseline scenario indicates a breach of debt stock and/or service ratios over the 
projection period 
– Debt distress: the country is already having repayment difficulties.  
Operational implications. The classification of risk distress forms the basis for determining the 
grant/loan mix of future International Development Association (IDA) allocations under IDA14 and 
some other multilateral creditors such as the African Development Fund. Accordingly, IDA-only 
countries that are classified at:  
– High risk of debt distress receive 100% grant financing from IDA at a 20% volume discount. 
– Moderate risk of debt distress receive 50% grant financing at a 10% discount.  
– Low risk of debt distress receive 100% loan financing. 
Debt crises tend to be costly and disruptive, especially for the poor and other vulnerable social 
groups. Debt crises also have a negative impact on access to schooling and health services, reducing 
human capital accumulation and long-run economic growth. Therefore, policies aimed at mitigating 
the prevalence and cost of debt crises can yield large payoffs in terms of poverty reduction and can 
play a key role in helping achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Such policies involve a 
broad choice of mechanisms: the promotion of newer and safer debt instruments; regulation  to 
reduce destabilising capital flows; the creation of an effective international lender of last resort; the 
design of a set of guidelines to  limit solvency crises by promoting responsible sovereign borrowing 
and lending to sovereigns; and the design of a mechanism for dealing with sovereign debt crises. 
 
Debt relief provides a crucial cushion to developing countries in times of difficulty. Encouraging 
progress has been made in the past year on  delivering debt relief to heavily indebted poor countries. 
However, the global financial crisis and the recent stagnation of aid flows, means there is still 
concern for the increased debt vulnerabilities of many developing countries. 
 
Until recently, liquidity crises affected mostly financially globalised economies, which borrow in 
foreign currency from the international capital market, and spared low-income countries, which rely 
on more stable official financial flows. Now, however, the process of financial globalisation is 
rapidly expanding to middle and low-income countries (the so-called frontier markets), making 
those countries subject to potential liquidity shocks. The least developed countries that are currently 
in debt distress include Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, the Sudan and Togo. Countries at high risk of debt distress 
include Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, the Gambia, Haiti, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Maldives, Sao Tome and Principe and Yemen. 
 
Debt service burdens of HIPC were expected to remain higher in 2010 and beyond than in the 
pre-crisis years102. The economic crisis led to a drop in the dollar value of exports and GNI. As a 
                                                 
101 UNCTAD, Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA): An E-Learning Training Course 
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consequence, the average external debt-to-export ratio of HIPC increased from 64 to 82% between 
2009 and 2010, and their external debt-to-GNI ratio went from 22.0 to 23.5% over the same 
period103. This is a substantial setback, as it reversed some of the advances achieved between  
2000-2008 period, when debt dropped from 133 to 64% of exports of goods and services and from 
37 to 22% of GNI. 
 
The economic crisis may also have an impact on debt sustainability for Middle Income 
Countries. The IMF has set a framework focusing on the sustainability of both public and external 
debt, implicitly addressing the interaction with the financial sector. The IMF Classical Framework 
for Middle Income Countries with Market Access104 aims to introduce a greater degree of 
consistency and discipline in sustainability analysis in an attempt to make better informed 
judgements under a set of clear and transparent assumptions. To assess sustainability, the IMF looks 
at several scenarios of potential events and projections. The ‘baseline’ medium-term projections of 
the balance of payments and fiscal developments, which is based on current policies projected over 
a five-year horizon, is the benchmark scenario for the IMF DSA framework. The framework is not 
intended to be applied in a completely mechanical and rigid fashion. It serves as an indication of 
potential trends in debt.  
 
The IMF has also developed a set of tools for exploring medium-term current account and real 
exchange rate sustainability. Financial sector stability assessments are made to help identify the 
vulnerability of the financial sector to various shocks. Beyond the baseline projection, the 
framework incorporates a standard set of sensitivity tests. The purpose is to examine the effects of 
alternative assumptions about the time paths of variables affecting both the ability to service the 
debt and the cost of financing it. This framework may be useful in at least three cases:  
- For countries that have moderately high indebtedness, the framework can help identify 
vulnerabilities; 
- For countries on the edge or in the midst of a crisis, it can be used to examine the plausibility 
of the debt-stabilising dynamics set out in the programme projections; 
- In the aftermath of a crisis and/or debt default, it can be useful to examine the consistency of 
the debt restructuring required to achieve a desired or projected outcome. 
2.7.2. Analysis of debt relief initiatives 
25 out of 28 respondents to the questionnaire said they delivered on commitments to the HIPC 
(High Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative and MDRI (Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative), including 
commitments to the IDA and the African Development Bank, without delays. But only 13 have 
taken new steps to help restore and preserve debt sustainability in low-income countries. Most 
Member States agree that action to support external debt sustainability is more effective if 
undertaken multilaterally. Spain mentioned that it has supported the IMF’s temporary moratorium 
on interest payments and the general reform of its financing. 
 
By December 16 2010, debt reduction packages under the HIPC Initiative were approved for 
36 countries, 32 of them in Africa, providing EUR 54.36 billion (USD72 billion)105 in debt-
                                                                                                                                                                  
102According to the latest status of HIPC Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) prepared by IDA and 
IMF staff, September 14, 2010;. confirmed during the Ministerial Meeting On Enhancing The Mobilization Of 
Financial Resources For Least Developed Countries’ Development in Lisbon, 2 3 October 2010. 
103Global Development Finance 2011: External Debt of Developing Countries, World Bank, 12 Dec 2010. External debt 
sustainability and development, UN Report, Sixty-fifth session, July 2010. 
104UNCTAD, Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA): An E-Learning Training Course 
1052010 DAC exchange rate : 1dollar =  0.755 euro 
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service relief over time. Out of the 40 eligible countries, 30 have now reached completion point, 6 
have reached decision point and 4 have yet to begin HIPC. Of these, 24 qualified for irrevocable 
debt relief under HIPC and MDRI.  
 
A ’sunset clause’ was included in the HIPC Initiative to prevent it from becoming a permanent 
facility. The clause has been extended four times to allow the remaining HIPCs to begin to establish 
a policy track record to qualify for HIPC relief consideration. The sunset clause took effect on 
December 31 2006, but the Executive Boards of the IMF decided to grandfather all countries that 
had been assessed (or in the future are assessed) to meet the HIPC Initiative’s income and 
indebtedness criteria based on end-2004 data. This would allow countries that had not yet met the 
policy performance criterion of the HIPC Initiative by the end of 2006 sunset-clause date to become 
eligible for debt relief if they adopt, at any time, a qualifying economic programme.106 
 
Figure 21 – Post decision-point HIPC’s debt stock at different debt relief stages  
(in billions of U.S. dollars, in end-2009 NPV terms) 
 
Source: HIPC Initiative country documents and IDA/IMF staff estimates, September 14, 2010107 
 
The World Bank classifies nearly all of the countries that have yet to complete the Initiative as 
fragile economies, indicating their need for additional assistance to expedite relief. 
 
Some creditors have given debt relief to HIPC that goes beyond the requirements under the 
HIPC Initiative. For Paris Club official bilateral creditors, the amount of beyond HIPC debt relief 
provided was EUR 6.9 billion (USD9.6 billion)108 in end-2009 PV terms. Under the Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) Initiative, the EU cancels all outstanding amounts on special loans of 
eligible least developed countries after the application of HIPC Initiative relief. From the start to the 
end of July 2010, the EU provided additional debt relief on special loans of seven completion-point 
countries and one decision-point country amounting to EUR 53.4 million. 
                                                 
106 IDA and IMF, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)—
Status of Implementation prepared IMF and World Bank staff. October 15, 2007 
107Source HIPC Initiative country documents, and IDA/IMF staff estimates. In “IMF, HIPC Initiative and Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)—Status of Implementation, Prepared by IDA and IMF, September 14, 2010. Note: 
Estimates based on decision-point debt stocks.  
1082009 DAC exchange rate: 1 dollar = 0.719 euro. 
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Seven Paris Club meetings were held in the year to July 2010, all of them devoted to tackling 
the debt of HIPC. Below are three examples:  
• After the HIPC completion in January 2010, Paris Club creditors met with 
representatives of Afghanistan in March 2010. The country obtained a 100% write-off 
on its pre-cut-off-date debt, which included additional debt cancellations granted by 
creditors on a voluntary and bilateral basis. The agreement with the Paris Club creditors 
includes a comparability of treatment clause. 
• In March 2010, a Paris Club meeting was held to consider the debt situation of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo after it reached HIPC completion in January. The 
country obtained a complete cancellation of its stock of eligible debt, with the provision 
that it keep the Paris Club secretariat informed of the progress made with other creditors 
for the next three years. That meeting highlighted the controversial role played by 
vulture funds in the international financial system. The amounts involved were large, 
around EUR 377 million (USD500 million)109, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
obtained a minimum discount on them. 
Box 5 - Review of debt relief by main creditors (Status Dec 2009, HIPC)  
Denmark provides 100% cancellation of ODA loans and non-ODA credits contracted and disbursed before 
September 27, 1999. 
France: cancellation of 100% of debt service on pre-cut off date commercial claims on the government as 
they fall due starting at the decision point. Once countries have reached completion, debt relief on ODA 
claims on the government will go to a special account and will be used for specific development projects. 
Finland: no post-Cancellation of Date (COD) claims. 
Italy: cancellation of 100% of all debts (pre- and post-cut off date, ODA and non-ODA) incurred before June 
20, 1999 (the Cologne Summit) cancellation of related amounts falling due in the interim period. At 
completion point, cancellation of the stock of remaining debt. 
The Netherlands: 100% ODA (pre- and post-cut off date debt is cancelled at decision point) For non-ODA,  
in some cases (Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia), NL will write off 100% of the consolidated amounts on the flow at decision 
point. All other HIPCs will receive interim relief up to a 90% reduction of the consolidated amounts. At 
completion point, all HIPCs will receive 100% cancellation of the remaining stock of the pre-cut off date 
debt. 
Norway and Switzerland have cancelled all ODA claims. 
Sweden and Russia have no ODA claims. 
Spain provides 100% cancellation of ODA and non-ODA claims contracted before January, 2004. 
United Kingdom: ‘beyond 100%’ full write-off of all debts of HIPCs as of their decision points, and 
reimbursement at the decision point of any debt service paid before the decision point. 
United States: cancellation of 100% of all debts (pre and post-cut off date, ODA and non-ODA) incurred 
before June 20, 1999 (the Cologne Summit). At decision point, cancellation of accrued arrears and maturities 
falling due in the interim period. At completion point, cancellation of the stock of remaining eligible debt 
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In July 2010, Guinea-Bissau concluded an agreement with Paris Club creditors to reschedule its 
debt under the Cologne terms, thus reducing by 98% the debt service falling due between January 
2010 and December 2012. Under  the agreement, the country obtained a deferral until December 
2012 of payments on its short-term and post-cut-off-date debts, including a deferral of moratorium 
interest. This was intended to support adjustment efforts in Guinea-Bissau to reach its HIPC 
completion. 
 
The HIPC Debt Relief Initiative and the MDRI have significantly reduced the debt burden in many 
countries, freeing critical resources to help finance governments’ growth programmes.   
The perception of a large fiscal space in some LICs, however, has led to the emergence of new 
creditors and new opportunities to access non-concessional sources of financing. These 
opportunities, while welcome, raise new risks.  Countries are frequently faced with new and 
conflicting market proposals, and other bilateral creditors on new financing options. In many cases, 
they lack the means to fully assess the related costs and risks.  Poor financial choices, including on 
the terms on which new debt is contracted, could contribute to the re-emergence of debt 
vulnerabilities in these countries, putting debt sustainability at risk. 
 
When poor, heavily indebted countries contract commercial loans while simultaneously benefiting 
from IDA grants, credits or debt relief, it is classified as free riding. The World Bank uses this term 
to denote ‘situations in which IDA debt relief or grants could potentially cross-subsidise lenders that 
offer non-concessional loans to recipient countries’. The Bank has proposed a two-pronged 
approach to free riding. First, creditor coordination should be stepped up to prevent non-
concessional lending to the countries concerned and, secondly, these countries should be 
discouraged from non-concessional borrowing through penalties, or reductions in either the amount 
or the grant element of IDA flows110 
2.7.3. Vulture funds or the threats associated with commercial creditor litigation 
The EU should also help  to find ways to tackle the problem of so called “vulture funds”, i.e. to 
prevent the actions of distressed-debt funds. 22 Member States have not planned specific actions to 
prevent aggressive litigation against HIPC. However, some EU countries are already leading the 
way. Spain participates actively in the Paris Club initiative working towards a coordinated fight 
against the implications of action by ’vulture funds’ for debtor countries. In the UK, the Debt 
Relief Act has prevented litigation against HIPCs in UK courts since June 2010 (see Box 6). 
Belgium passed a bill in April 2008 to prevent the seizure or transfer of public funds for 
international cooperation, in particular related to the methods used by vulture funds. Germany, 
Belgium and the European Commission report that they support the African Legal Support Facility 
(ALSF), launched by the African Development Bank (AfDB) in mid 2009, which provides support 
for African countries facing litigation from commercial creditors. 
 
In the US, a member of the. House of Representatives has also tabled legislation that would limit 
the ability of non-participating creditors to seek awards from HIPCs via U.S. courts111. 
 
Therefore, while some commercial creditors continue to pursue litigation to recover claims against 
HIPCs, rather than participate in the provision of debt relief under the Initiative, the incidence of 
new litigation has fallen in recent years. According to survey responses (September 2010) from 
                                                 
110 Free Riding and Debt Relief: Implications for IDA, February 2007. Jan Willem Gunning Free University, 
Amsterdam and AIID and Sweder van Wijnbergen University of Amsterdam and AIID 
111The “Stop VULTURE Funds” Bill introduced in June 2009 
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HIPC authorities, the number of outstanding litigation cases against HIPCs fell from 33 to 14 cases 
in 2008 and then rose to a total of 17 cases in 2009112. 
 
Box 6 – The U.K. Debt Relief Act 
On April 8, 2010, the UK Parliament enacted the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act. It seeks to introduce a 
mandatory element to debt relief under the HIPC Initiative by limiting the proportion of debts previously contracted by 
a HIPC that a commercial creditor can reclaim through litigation under U.K. law. The limit is set in reference to the 
debt reduction expected on claims under the HIPC Initiative. The Act came into force on June 8 2010. 
The key aspects of the Act are: 
1. The debt covered by the Act is the debt eligible for relief under the HIPC Initiative, but it is limited to HIPC debt 
incurred prior to a HIPC’s decision point and prior to commencement of the Act. 
2. Qualifying debt is limited to the debts of the countries that meet the HIPC eligibility criteria in effect at 
commencement. Any changes to those criteria going forward (whether resulting in an expansion or reduction of HIPCs) 
are disregarded by the Act. The Act is therefore restricted to an identifiable stock of historic debt. It makes no 
distinction between HIPC debt still held by the original creditor and HIPC debt that has been traded on the secondary 
markets. 
3. The Act limits the amount of qualifying debt (and associated causes of action such as damages claims) recoverable 
by a creditor in the U.K. courts to the amount the creditor would have received if it had applied the most recently 
published Common Reduction Factor set by the IMF and World Bank under the HIPC Initiative (on top of traditional 
relief). 
4. For the five countries that had not yet reached decision point at the time the Act was passed, no Common Reduction 
Factor was available. As a result, the Act only takes into account the 67% traditional relief, leaving a reduced amount of 
33% payable. This may encourage creditors to settle with the pre-decision-point HIPCs before they reach decision 
point. 
5. In addition to reducing the recoverable amount on due debts, the Act also applies the same reduction to qualifying 
debts on which judgment has been obtained but not yet enforced. 
6. Qualifying debt includes HIPC debt governed by foreign law as well as UK law. Therefore, the Act will apply to 
cases decided by UK courts, where the governing law is foreign. 
7. The Act contains a sunset clause. Unless the UK Government decides to extend the Act permanently or for one year, 
it will expire on June 8 2011. This would also need to be approved by the UK Parliament. 
8. The Act also promotes the negotiated settlement of these debts on terms compatible with the HIPC Initiative by 
excluding from the scope of the legislation debts where the HIPC government does not offer to do this. 
2.7.4. Alternative debt management initiatives 
In their answers to this year’s questionnaire, Member States mentioned an extensive list of debt 
management initiatives beyond HIPC and MDRI:  
• Activities of the African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) 
• The DMFAS Programme (Debt Management and Financial Analysis System), an UNCTAD 
(UN Conference on Trade and Development) provider of technical cooperation and advisory 
services on debt management 
• The DMF (Debt Management Facilitation for Low Income Countries), a World Bank Multi 
Donor Trust Fund, scaling up World Bank work on debt management technical assistance in 
LICs 
• Implementing a bill to prevent the seizure or transfer of public funds for international 
cooperation, in particular related to the methods used by vulture funds. 
• National legislation (Belgium, UK), or within the Paris Club. 
                                                 
1122010 Survey of commercial creditor participation and creditor lawsuits against HIPCs. The survey 
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The African Legal Support Facility decided in November 2010 to provide a USD 500.000 grant 
to fund services of a reputable international law firm in connection with the dispute between the 
government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and a renowned vulture fund. Legal 
assistance to the DRC is the first of its kind by the ALSF since its creation by the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) Group in 2008. The support to DRC falls within the ALSF’s mission to 
provide technical legal advice to its members in creditor litigation. This includes technical legal 
assistance to strengthen their legal expertise and negotiating capacity in matters pertaining to debt 
management, natural resources and extractive industries management and contracting; investment 
agreements and related commercial and business transactions. Belgium and Germany participate in 
the ALSF.  
 
The DMFAS programme offers countries a set of solutions for improving their capacity to handle 
the day-to-day management of public liabilities and produce reliable debt data for policy-making 
purposes. At the programme’s core is software that can be used for the purposes of recording, 
monitoring, reporting and analysis. Usually installed in the Ministry of Finance and/or Central 
Bank, it supports external and domestic public debt (loans and securities), whether this be short-, 
medium- or long-term. It also provides coverage for private debt, grants and on-lent loans. The 
DMFAS enables the debt office to develop a debt database containing detailed and aggregated data 
on loan contracts, bonds and grants, real operations (disbursements and debt service) as well as 
future operations (disbursements and debt service). As the system can process large quantities of 
debt data, more time and energy can be focused on analytical and management tasks. Its design 
allows for easy customisation and adaptation in accordance with the needs and preferences of each 
client institution. It can also be integrated with other financial systems if the institution so wishes. 
 
The DMF is a grant facility financed by a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank that 
helps strengthen debt management policies and institutions in eligible countries by financing the 
systematic application of the World Bank’s Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA). 
It  supports World Bank participation in joint Bank/Fund technical assistance efforts to facilitate the 
country-led application of a toolkit for formulating and implementing a Medium-Term Debt 
Management Strategy (MTDS). 
 
Spain carried out relief of debts contracted before 2003 partially through Debt Swap Agreements. 
In 2009 and 2010, Spain signed Debt Swaps Programmes with LICs and HPCs, including 
Mozambique, Ghana and Bolivia. Italy subscribes to and has been in the lead, as a co-sponsor, of 
the ’principles and guidelines to promote sustainable lending practices in the provision of official 
export credits to LICs’. The provision of official export credits to public buyers and publicly 
guaranteed buyers in LICs should reflect Sustainable Lending practices, i.e. lending that supports a 
borrowing country’s economic and social progress without endangering its financial future and 
long-term development prospects. The Principles will yield their full benefits only if all creditors 
act in harmony. 
2.7.5. Discussion on enhanced forms of sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms 
There is some degree of support among Member States for a reform of the international debt 
rescheduling system. 12 out 28 Member States see a need to reform the international architecture 
for the restructuring of sovereign debts in order to deal with potential cases of debt distress in low-
income countries. Further work is required to reach an EU common approach on this issue. 
 
The German government supports the creation of a debt workout mechanism and wants to promote 
discussions. Although some parties are calling for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism by 
setting up an international arbitration body, Belgium is of the opinion that there is no need for 
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another international body. For Belgium, debt distress in developing countries can be handled 
within the existing frameworks and principles, in particular the Paris Club and the Debt 
Sustainability Framework of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Within the Paris Club, Belgium 
favours broad creditor’ and debtor participation to ensure comparable burden sharing among 
creditors. 
 
Some Member States (Germany for example) feel that a common EU-position must be found. In its 
dialogue, especially with non-Paris Club countries, the EU should stress that debt sustainability is a 
shared responsibility of all borrowers and creditors (including emerging economies). Spain argued 
that a further implication of non-Paris Club members in the debt relief of LICs would be necessary, 
particularly in light of the growing importance of emerging creditors and even private creditors. 
Denmark calls for the involvement of non-Paris Club creditors in restructuring and cancel sovereign 
debt for HIPC countries in the boards of the IMF and the World Bank.  
 
Others (Netherlands, UK) are not in favour of a structural sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. 
They do not see the potential for the EU to take special initiatives, except of course taking part in 
international discussions. 
 
The new debt workout mechanism would be based on the Paris Club but may also involve a role for 
International Financial Institutions within the Debt Sustainability Framework of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions. EU Member States have already agreed to discuss these issues but a common EU-
position may be needed. 
 
On 8-9 April 2010, the OECD, World Bank Group and IMF convened the 11th OECD-WBG-IMF 
Global Bond Market Forum in Washington D.C. Debt managers and central bankers from 23 
advanced and emerging market economies came together with private sector representatives to 
discuss the post-crisis outlook for government bond markets. Discussions focused on four key 
areas: i) the impact of crisis-related measures and the potential implications of exit; ii) measuring 
sovereign risk; iii) the determinants of investor demand; and iv) debt managers’ response to the 
crisis. Overall, participants felt that the steps taken to stabilise financial conditions had generally 
been effective and that conditions in financial markets were normalising.  
Discussions highlighted a number of ongoing risks including:  
i) while credible consolidation plans were needed, fiscal and monetary policy could be 
tightened too soon; 
ii) managing investor uncertainty would prove critical in managing risk in the near-term; 
iii) regulatory changes may lead to a deterioration in conditions in primary and secondary 
markets and aggravate the challenges facing debt managers. 
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3. IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPORT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
3.1. Making EU aid more effective 
EU Commitments 
● On 17 November 2009, the Council (General Affairs and External Relations) adopted 
the Conclusions on an Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, with additions made 
in June 2010 (cross country division of labour DoL) and December 2010 (accountability 
and transparency).113 
● The Operational Framework includes detailed commitments on accelerating Division of 
Labour (DoL); increased use of country systems; ensuring technical cooperation for 
enhanced capacity development; and strengthening accountability and transparency. 
 
Aid effectiveness is one of the key pillars of development cooperation to which the EU and its 
Member States are firmly committed. Improving aid effectiveness will augment the quality and 
impact of aid and contribute to more value for money. 
 
The EU and its Member States are working on a range of measures to implement commitments in 
relation to the Paris Declaration principles and the Accra Agenda for Action. Since 2003 the 
Commission has reviewed the efforts of all EU donors to implement those commitments. The 
replies of the Member States to this year’s questionnaire on financing for development114 show that, 
although some improvements have been made, enhanced efforts are needed to maximise the impact 
of aid.  
 
The Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011 will review the evidence of 
implementing aid effectiveness principles in the wider context of development. The EU as a whole 
will be expected to present results that are in line with the declared EU level of ambition.  
 
In November 2009, the General Affairs and External Relations Council adopted an Operational 
Framework on Aid Effectiveness which contains measures in key areas of the aid effectiveness 
agenda, such as division of labour, use of country systems and technical cooperation for enhanced 
capacity development. Based on Commission proposals, the Operational Framework was 
complemented, in 2010, by a subchapter on cross-country division of labour115 and a new chapter 
on a common EU approach for implementing commitments on mutual accountability and 
transparency116. 
 
Article 210 of the Lisbon Treaty marks a new era in European development policy; it states that , 
the Union and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation, and 
consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organisations and during 
international conferences, and may undertake joint action, and contribute if necessary to the 
implementation of Union aid programmes. 
                                                 
113See Council document 18239/10 of 11.11. 2011: . Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness – Consolidated text. 
114To avoid duplication with the ongoing OECD/ DAC Paris Declaration Survey, the Aid Effectiveness chapter in the 
annual questionnaire on financing for development was substantially reduced. As the results of the OECD/ DAC survey 
have not been available prior to publication of this report, this chapter includes less detailed information than in 
previous years. 
115Council Conclusions of 14.06.2010. 
116 Council Conclusions of 9.12.2010. 
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This is a new opportunity to make EU development aid more effective, efficient, and potent in 
terms of actual impact on the ground. It should also make a real difference in terms of EU political 
impact and visibility. A study carried out on behalf of the European Commission117 found that the 
potential benefits from a European approach (i.e. joint programming, country and cross-country 
division of labour) towards aid effectiveness could save an estimated EUR 3 to 6 billion per year. 
3.1.1. EU and Member States action on ownership 
Ownership is the first principle established in the Paris Declaration. Donors committed themselves 
to respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it. 
 
Member States (20) emphasised consultation as the main tool to build ownership, followed by 
support for capacity development (16). Most Member States rely on bilateral negotiations and 
consultations. Ownership is achieved by aligning strategies and conducting consultations. Germany 
emphasises at national and international levels the importance of capacity development as a 
prerequisite for implementing the aid effectiveness principles, and the need to make capacity 
development support more effective. Capacity development is thus understood as a process 
whereby systems are enabled to unfold their capability for self-reliant action and management. 
 
Sweden highlighted the impact of the choice of aid modalities on ownership. Sweden’s Action Plan 
on Aid Effectiveness, valid 2009-2011, aims in its entirety to increase the conditions for exercising 
country leadership/ownership, e.g. by increasing the use of country systems and applying 
programme-based approaches in Swedish development cooperation. The three-year plan includes a 
number of measures to achieve seven concrete objectives. The plan includes concrete measures 
related to staff incentives to work on aid effectiveness. 
3.1.2. EU and Member States action on alignment 
Increasing alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities, systems and procedures and helping to 
strengthen their capacities is a central principle of the Paris Declaration. To improve alignment 
donors agreed to use country systems (national arrangements and procedures for public financial 
management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring) to the 
maximum extent possible. Using a country’s own institutions and systems increases aid 
effectiveness by strengthening the partner country’s sustainable capacity to develop, implement and 
account for its policies to its citizens and parliament. Donors also committed themselves to align 
their conditions, whenever possible, with their partner’s national development strategy, and make 
them public. Improving the predictability of aid is another aspect of alignment, and donors have 
committed themselves to disburse aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed 
schedules. In terms of technical cooperation, donors have agreed to reduce the stock of parallel 
project implementation units, in order to strengthen the capacities of partner countries. 
 
Use of Country Systems (UCS). A study prepared for the third High Level Forum (HLF3) in 
Accra in 2008118 found that progress in the use of country systems had been limited as only a 3% 
improvement has been recorded in the aggregate (from 40% to 43%), with almost no change in 
country averages. The Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness identified actions (general and 
                                                 
117HTSPE, Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach, October 2009. 
118Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness hosted by the Government of Ghana in Accra, 2-4 September 2008. 
OECD DAC (2008), Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, Joint Venture on Public Financial Management, Report on 
the Use of Country Systems in Public Financial Management. 
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time-bound) for the EU and its Member States to report on. Progress on some of these actions is 
reflected in the responses to the questionnaire as follows: 
 
On using country systems as a first option119, 15 out of 24 Member States supported the use of 
country systems through an assessment to identify internal constraints. 11 Member States revised 
the design of aid instruments irrespective of modality; staff training was provided by 12 Member 
States and 17 out of 24 Member States supported partner country capacity development for 
improving the quality of country systems. 
 
With regard to additional time-bound actions not covered by the questionnaire, in response to the 
action on budget support120 the Commission, following the  public consultation, launched with the 
Green Book on the Future EU Budget Support for third countries of 2010, is currently preparing 
policy proposals on this issue. Likewise, good practice examples on the use of country systems 
collection by the end of 2010 is covered by the DAC work to which the Commission and the EU 
Member States contribute.  
 
On undertaking Joint Assessments to promote the Use of Country Systems121 16 Member 
States supported partner country capacity development for improved quality of country systems; 12 
Member States conducted joint assessments with others; 16 Member States used methodologies and 
results from other donor’s assessments; and 11 Member States made methodologies and results 
from their assessments available to others.  
 
EU Member States usually support UCS through:  
• Use of general and sector budget support; 
• Improving procurement systems to facilitate the actual use of UCS at a later stage’; 
• Public finance management (PFM) at sector level, e.g. Finland: strengthening local PFM-
systems in the planning phase of its forestry sector project and is now using local PFM systems 
both in forestry and water sector cooperation; and 
• Strengthening of domestic accountability systems (for example through support for Supreme 
Audit Institutions in several countries). 
Many EU Member States do not use country systems due to: 
• Lack of quality systems and subsequent fiduciary, political and reputational risk of using country 
systems (particularly for the treasury); 
• Lack of knowledge among staff of different options to gradually use country systems (e.g. 
CABRI dimensions of putting aid on budget), particularly when systems are still weak and 
cannot be fully used;  
• Trade-off between quick implementation and results-orientation and UCS; 
• Overall resource demands/initial labour intensity of increasing use of partners’ systems; and  
                                                 
119 See European Council, 11 January 2011, Doc. 18239/10. Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness – 
Consolidated text: paragraphs 6, 8, 12 and 13 (A. Use of country systems as a first option),  
120’The Commission and its Member Sates will initiate a dialogue towards a coordinated approach on budget support by 
early 2010’. 
121Consolidated version Operational Framework: B. Undertake joint assessments to promote the Use of Country 
Systems, paragraphs 14-17. 
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• Difficulty of assessing systems and processes at decentralised/organisational level, making 
decisions on use or non-use based on incomplete information.  
In 2010, the Belgian Development Cooperation (BDC) developed guidelines for using country 
systems in the field of procurement and financial management. The important aspects of human 
resource management, quality management (monitoring and evaluation), scope management and 
coordination management will be dealt with in a second phase. The BDC subscribes to the Accra 
Agenda for Action and gives priority to the use of country systems. All formulation reports must 
contain an analysis of the opportunity to use the country public procurement and financial 
management systems. If the conclusion is that one of the country systems cannot be used, then a 
donor system should be adopted (ideally in a harmonised way with other donors providing project 
support in the sector).  
 
For the United Kingdom, decisions on the use of country systems are made in the light of DFID’s 
three partnership commitments (commitment to reducing poverty, meeting human rights and 
other international obligations, and improving public financial management and accountability) and 
through dialogue with partner countries and other donors.  Use of country systems is the preferred 
method, providing countries can demonstrate a credible commitment to improving public financial 
management and accountability. This is assessed as part of a fiduciary risk assessment of the 
national Public Financial Management and Accountability system, which is obligatory in country 
planning where financial aid (i.e. use of country PFM systems) is considered. DFID’s approach to 
this is set out in the How to Note: ‘Managing Fiduciary Risk when Providing Financial Aid’ 
(December 2009).  This provides guidance on assessing country PFM systems, including the use of 
additional safeguards, which seek to reduce the risk of using country systems while also helping to 
strengthen them. 
 
Changing the nature of conditionality. 13 out of 14 Member States that answered this question 
said that they harmonised condition with other donors.  Only 3 reduced them. 
Making aid more predictable. Table 12 below presents the ratios between actual ODA flows and 
budgets prepared one or two years before.  Ratios below 100% mean that actual expenditure was 
below budget, while ratios above 100% are over budget.  Table 13 shows that most EU Member 
States’ aid has achieved a good degree of predictability with ratios above the DAC average both for 
one-year and two-year predictability. Only Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain have a 
one-year predictability ratio below average. 
 
15 EU Member States can make multi-annual commitments for projects, twelve for general 
programme based support, and eleven for budget support. For several, outer year budgets are 
indicative and subject to change (e.g. Ireland). 
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Table 12 – Predictability Ratios of 2009 flows 
 
Predictability Ratios of 2009 flows 
One-year predictability 
ratio 
Two-year predictability ratio 
DAC Members 
2009 Outturn/programmed 
early 2009 (%) 
2009 Outturn/programmed early 
2008 (%) 
Australia 111 134 
Austria 100 na 
Belgium 119 56 
Canada 67 97 
Denmark 91 101 
European Commission 117 100 
Finland 103 98 
France 107 68 
Germany  120 140 
Greece na na 
Ireland 88 48 
Italy 60 63 
Japan na na 
Korea 89 na 
Luxembourg 104 97 
Netherlands 85 87 
New Zealand 73 86 
Norway 71 82 
Portugal 97 91 
Spain 82 121 
Sweden 101 113 
Switzerland 99 na 
United Kingdom 99 86 
United States na na 
DAC Total 93 94 
Source: OECD DAC Forward spending plans (2010) 
 
21 Member States stated that they align their technical cooperation to partner country policies and 
plans.19 make the information on expenditure related to providing technical cooperation (including 
in-kind technical assistance) available to the general public. EU Member States gave about 22% of 
their ODA in the form of technical cooperation stand alone projects in 2009, according to data from 
OECD DAC’s CRS database. 
3.1.3. EU and Member States action on harmonisation 
Harmonisation refers to cooperation between donors to improve the efficiency of aid delivery. The 
focus under the Paris Declaration process was initially on how to harmonise rules and procedures 
and on developing new instruments, including programme-based approaches, pooled funding 
arrangements, joint country plans and other common arrangements. Experience suggests that 
organising joint activities with too many donors is often unproductive, and the focus has shifted 
towards achieving a better division of labour among donors, focusing on areas of comparative 
advantage, and using silent partnerships and lead donor arrangements elsewhere. 
 
EU donors have committed themselves to establishing a more effective division of in-country 
division of labour. In terms of achieving this goal, joint programming represents a fundamental 
tool for the EU. In Accra, donors agreed to start a dialogue on cross-country division of labour, 
and this is also a subject for EU-level action in the Operational Framework. Coordinating missions 
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is also important in terms of harmonisation, since the number of donor missions often represents a 
serious challenge in terms of the time and resources that must be devoted to these visits. 
 
Better in-country division of labour. Since 2008, the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of 
Labour and Complementarity (FTI DoL), which involves the European Union and currently 14 
Member States as facilitators has supported DoL processes in approximately 30 partner countries. 
The network of EU DoL is being continuously updated and is regularly used for communication. 
Work is underway to facilitate better web-based communication and information exchange, 
fulfilling one of the commitments with regard to DoL adopted in the Operational Framework on 
Aid Effectiveness122.The 3rd Monitoring Report and Progress Review of the EU Fast Track 
Initiative on Division of Labour123 and trends since 2008 show encouraging progress, especially in 
the 19 countries involved since the beginning. 
 
There is widespread use and institutionalisation of donor mappings as an aid management 
instrument, an upward trend in country-level agreement on sector definitions as an important 
precondition for DoL and solid use of lead donor arrangements that can generate more momentum 
for DoL. Perceptions of partner country commitment to DoL processes have also somewhat 
improved. The results of DoL processes are increasingly positive with regard to the quality of sector 
dialogue and, to a lesser degree, the rationalisation of aid allocations. Responses show an increasing 
expectation of positive contributions to aid and development effectiveness. Nevertheless, the DoL 
approach is demanding and takes time to yield measurable results. It still faces challenges with 
regard to some methodological issues, questions of country ownership and donor commitment. It 
needs to be better adapted to specific country conditions and integrated with other aspects of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. An emerging issue concerning HLF 4 is the rapidly increasing importance of 
‘new donors’ and ‘new funding lines’ reported from country level. This phenomenon adds to the 
complexity of the Global Aid and Development Architecture. 12 EU Member States (out of 23 that 
responded) have fully integrated the principles of the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and 
Division of Labour (2007) in their strategies, staff guidance and programming processes/guidelines.  
Another six have done so partially, while only two have not done so yet. 
 
Delegated cooperation. 15 out of 23 Member States have legal and administrative arrangements 
for delegated cooperation in place. As regards the European Commission, Finland’s assessment 
procedure for indirect centralised management was finalised in June 2010, providing a framework 
for cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the European Commission.’ All projects funded 
by CyprusAid are implemented through the delegated cooperation method. 
 
For the following organisations the European Commission assessment procedure to administer EU 
funds under indirect management has been concluded: Agence Française de Développement (AFD), 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Cooperation Technique Belge 
(BTC CTB), Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW), UK 
Department for International Development (DFID), NL Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Instituto 
Portugues de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento (IPAD), Lux-Development SA, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Finland, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA)and the British Council. For the 
following organisations the assessment is ongoing: France Cooperation Internationale (FCI),  
Societa Italiana per le Imprese al’Estero (SIMEST), Agencia Española de Cooperación 
Internacional al Desarrollo (AECID), Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de 
                                                 
122I. Division of Labour, paragraph 4. 
123European Commission, The 3rd Monitoring Report and Progress Review of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division 
of Labour, Draft Version, February 24 2011. 
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Administración y Políticas Públicas (FIIAPP) and Australian Development Agency (AusAID). 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom subscribe to the 
Nordic Plus principles124 for delegated cooperation, where Nordic Plus countries have agreed to 
mutually approve each other as potential partners for delegated co-operation arrangements. The 
majority of Member States (14 out of 23) do not have a mechanism in place at headquarters level to 
track cases of delegated cooperation.   
 
Improving joint programming. Overall Member States reported 13 cases of joint programming, 
only five of which involved joint analysis and response strategies according to the EU agreed 
Common Format for Country Strategy Papers. A recent desk review of the experience with joint 
programming125 found that there has been a lack of progress in implementing joint programming.  
Joint programming differs greatly from country to country. Experiences range from agreeing a 
strategy (e.g. Sierra Leone, Somalia) to harmonising approaches at sector/programme level. These 
findings are confirmed by the 2011 survey. Only 13 Member States out of 27 are currently involved 
in joint programming exercises.  Reasons for not participating vary. Cyprus, for example, does not 
do programming directly but participates in programming of Lead Donors through delegated 
cooperation. Malta works directly with NGOs. Poland and Romania cannot carry out multi-annual 
programming due to the fact that ODA budget allocations are annual. The United Kingdom is 
involved in joint programming in a number of countries, such as Bangladesh, where a joint 
cooperation strategy involving the government and 17 development partners including the UK was 
signed in 2010. Other examples are Afghanistan, Kenya,  Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, which all use 
different models depending on the country context. In South Africa, the UK is signed up to a 
Country Strategy Paper that is in line with the 2006 Council Conclusions.   
 
Cross-country division of labour. The Commission survey revealed that in recent years, EU 
Member States have reorganised their bilateral aid portfolios by refocusing their assistance, often in 
the presence of stable or increasing aid budgets. There are 123 cases of planned exits by EU 
Member States from 69 partner countries. Italy, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom accounted 
for three quarters of the exit cases. There seem to be only five cases of EU Member States currently 
starting a new bilateral aid relationship. Once EU Member States leave a country, some ODA that is 
counted as country programmable aid - CPA (e.g. cultural cooperation, scholarship via state 
programmes, special education schemes like German schools abroad) and some ODA that does not 
count as CPA (ODA through NGOs and Civil Society, imputed student cost, equity capital 
investment) may remain.  
 
Exit takes time. In the case of the German cooperation, partner governments and other donors are 
informed and if possible consulted, as the exit period lasts normally for several years. It allows for 
orderly conclusion of activities, achievement of intended results and, if possible, other donors to 
take over certain support schemes. 
3.1.4. EU and Member States action on mutual accountability 
Mutual accountability lies at the heart of the Paris Declaration, and is a process by which two (or 
multiple) partners agree to be held responsible for the commitments that they have voluntarily made 
to each other. It helps build trust and partnership around shared agendas and provides incentives for 
                                                 
124 These are principles developed to enhance aid effectiveness. Delegated cooperation is aimed at significantly 
reducing the transaction costs for both partner governments and donors. http://www.norad.no/en/  (Norad - Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation) 
125European Commission, IQSG Secretariat, DG DEV A, State of Play of EU Joint Programming  of External 
Assistance - Desk Study of Recent Experiences,  2010. 
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behaviour change needed to achieve better results. A central aspect is making aid flows more 
transparent. Likewise, as stated in the Operational Framework126 'in the Accra Agenda for Action, 
donors and partner countries agreed to provide timely and detailed information on current and 
future aid flows in order to enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit by developing 
countries’. 
 
Improving mutual accountability. A 2010 study127 of national mutual accountability initiatives in 
70 countries found that only 8 partner countries made major progress on mutual accountability, 52 
partner countries do not have an aid policy or agreed document outlining targets for ODA providers, 
and 32 partner countries had an aid information management system in place. In almost all 
countries, non-DAC donors, global funds and NGOs do not supply data to aid management 
systems. Joint frameworks for monitoring joint commitments have been set up in at least 15 priority 
countries for EU Member States (i.e., Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). They are 
either formal frameworks or policy dialogue groups. In 2010, for example, the United Kingdom 
worked with other partners to establish and review mutual accountability frameworks in a number 
of countries including Ghana (aid policy and joint donor Performance Assessment Framework), 
Bangladesh (joint cooperation strategy), Uganda (to help develop an aid policy and joint 
Memorandum of Understanding ), Nepal (the joint transparency and accountability initiative with 
the UN and a number of bilateral donors) and Zambia (to develop a new Joint Assistance Strategy).  
 
Making aid more transparent. Increased reporting on ODA flows. Most EU non-DAC donors 
report their ODA to the OECD/DAC. The Commission encourages all of them to do this, in line 
with DAC reporting rules, although none of the EU-12 is yet a DAC member. Bulgaria and Malta 
have yet to start reporting systematically to the DAC. The Commission will continue to work with 
the DAC secretariat to provide support to the EU’s non-DAC donors to enhance their statistical 
reporting capacity. 
 
The European Commission and several Member States (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) are party to the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative (IATI) launched in 2008 at Accra. IATI’s role is to develop consistent and 
coherent international standards for the way donors report more timely information on past and 
future aid spending. 21 out of 22 Member States make their ODA volumes public on their websites, 
often in an annual report. Member States mentioned several good examples of ODA data tools. In 
Mozambique the Government of Mozambique Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and 
Budget processes, in Ethiopia the Development Assistance Group (DAG) and EU, in Vietnam, the 
EU annual blue book exercise and annual Ministry of Foreign Affairs report. For the Netherlands, 
an important tool to disclose information on aid volumes is the Bi-annual Results Report that 
presents the results achieved and the Dutch policy and philosophy on giving aid. The report is 
meant to inform parliament, stakeholders and the public. The Results Report is coproduced by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Dutch CSOs. 
3.1.5. EU action on managing for development results 
The promotion of management for development results (MfDR) is central to the entire aid 
effectiveness agenda. It means that stakeholders hold partner country governments and donor 
agencies accountable to show results, i.e. to demonstrate the effectiveness and actual impact of aid. 
                                                 
126Consolidated version: IV Accountability and transparency, paragraph 1 
127UN Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), Review of Progress in International and National Mutual 
Accountability and Transparency on Development Cooperation, May 2010. 
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It means that donors and recipients oblige each other to demonstrate that they are honouring their 
commitments and promises. 
 
12 Member States (out of 23 who replied) provide support for MfDR. The results approach suffers 
from an over elaborate and technical approach focused on donors and their capacity. Donor 
countries are struggling to demonstrate their attribution rather than their contribution to partner 
countries’ results. Donors could increase support to partner countries to focus on results (improving 
statistical data, analytical capacity etc) and then use these results to communicate to the public the 
successes and challenges of their development cooperation programmes 
Sweden felt that the aid effectiveness agenda needed to be more specific to different cooperation 
contexts, particularly in conflict and post-conflict countries and in reform cooperation with Europe, 
including how the reporting and measurement of results is conducted.  
 
3.2. Supporting better Global Governance 
EU Commitments 
March 14, 2002 European Council Conclusions on the International Conference on Financing for 
Development. To influence the reform of the International Financial System by combating abuses of 
financial globalisation, strengthen the voice of developing countries in international economic 
decision-making, and, while respecting their respective roles, enhance coherence between the UN, 
International Financial Institutions and the WTO. 
3.2.1. Introduction 
The objective of this Chapter is to give an update of the reform initiatives in the main International 
Financial Institutions (namely the World Bank, IMF, and to a lesser extent, other key multilateral 
development banks), as well as the UN and its specialised agencies.  
 
The reform of these institutions was accelerated by perceived shortcomings in the international 
financial and monetary architecture revealed by the global financial and economic crisis in 2008-
2009, the effects of which continue to be felt today and are further exacerbated by increases in 
commodity prices in early 2011. An objective would be to ensure more effective and coordinated 
management of global issues, such as financial stability, food and energy security, climate change 
and the fight against major pandemics. The main challenge is to strike the correct balance between 
legitimacy (through representativeness and accountability) and the effectiveness of global 
institutions. 
 
The way forward that the Commission proposed in 2010128 was as follows: 
• The Commission will monitor emerging discussions on how best to use the general SDR 
allocations, in particular to the benefit of low-income countries. 
• In line with the decision taken by the G20 and the Joint World Bank/IMF Development 
Committee, the EU and other Governors on the Boards need to ensure that the increases in 
developing and transition countries voting shares are implemented swiftly in both institutions 
and that the IMF quota is revised. 
                                                 
128 COM (2010) 159 of 21.04.2010 and Statement of Commissioner Piebalgs at the World Bank/ IMF Development 
Committee meeting in April 2010 
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• Europe’s voice international financial institutions should be amplified through consolidated, less 
fragmented European representation, with the ultimate objective of having a single European 
seat at the IMF and the World Bank. EU coordination should be stepped up, particularly within 
regional development banks. 
• The replenishments for concessional arms of Multilateral Development Banks such as the IDA at 
the World Bank Group and the African Development Fund at the African Development Bank are 
of particular concern regarding assistance to the most vulnerable.  
• The ’UN system-wide coherence reform’ needs support in order to reduce fragmentation of the 
UN to strengthen its operational capacity and improve its efficiency at headquarters and in the 
countries where it operates. 
The next section presents the key reforms in the above areas undertaken in Multilateral Institutions. 
It sets out the points of view of the European Commission and Member States, based on their 
responses to the relevant part of the questionnaire.  
3.2.2. Reforming multilateral institutions 
3.2.2.1. IMF129 
The 2008 quota and voice reform was the first step towards realigning IMF members’ quotas with 
their relative positions in the world economy. On 16 December 2010, the IMF’s Board of 
Governors approved a far-reaching quota and governance reform130. Once implemented (no target 
date so far), the reform package will result in: (a) a doubling of quotas; (b) a shift of more than 
6%of quota shares to dynamic emerging market and developing countries, Brazil, China, India, and 
Russia will be among the 10 largest shareholders in the Fund, while the combined voting share of 
the US and EU Members will fall below 50%, and (c) preserving the quota and voting share of the 
poorest member countries. A comprehensive review of the current quota formula will be completed 
by January 2013. Completion of the 15th General Review of Quotas will be brought forward by 
about two years to January 2014. Any future realignment is expected to result in increases in the 
quota shares of dynamic economies in line with their relative positions in the world economy. 
 
New concessional facilities for Low Income Countries (LICs) were established in January 2010 
under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) as part of a broader reform to make the 
Fund’s financial support more flexible and better tailored to the diverse needs of developing 
countries. Access limits and norms were broadly doubled. Financing terms were made more 
concessional, and the interest rate will be reviewed every two years. All facilities support country-
owned programmes aimed at achieving a sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with 
strong and durable poverty reduction and growth. These facilities are as follows: (a) The Extended 
Credit Facility; (b) The Standby Credit Facility (SCF); and (c) The Rapid Credit Facility (RCF).   
 
The 2010 reforms do not fully address the existing agenda. One major ongoing effort is for any 
future competition for the leadership of the IMF to become more open. All of the Fund’s ten 
Managing Directors have been European. All eight of the Deputy Managing Directors (First 
Deputies since 1994) have been from the United States. For the past decade, while non-European 
candidates for Managing Director have been nominated but ultimately rejected, pressure has been 
intense for the selection process to be fully open to all candidates regardless of geography. The 
                                                 
129See summary posted in December 2010 http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2010/12/28/2010-the-year-of-imf-reform/ 
130http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/quotas.pdf 
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IMF’s Executive Board, which selects the Managing Director, agreed in principle several years ago 
to open up the process, but winning higher political support for the reform has not been easy. EU 
members are ready to participate in changing the process of appointing the Heads of the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The heads and senior leadership of all IFIs should be 
appointed through an open, transparent and merit-based process, irrespective of nationality and 
gender. This change should apply to all IFIs including the IMF and the World Bank.  
3.2.2.2. World Bank (WB) Group 
On April 25 2010, the Development Committee endorsed WB general and selective capital 
increases equivalent to EUR 66.7 billion131 (USD86 billion). The IDA16 replenishment was 
concluded with an 18% increase (compared to IDA15) for a total amount of EUR 38.2 billion 
(USD49.3 billion). The World Bank’s governance reform is to be implemented in two phases, the 
first of which has already been approved and is under implementation. The package aims to create a 
new WB Group that is strategically focused on where it can add most value, has 21st century 
governance, remains financially strong, and is more responsive, innovative and accountable. This 
will be pursued through the following additional measures: 
• Shifting voting power for developing and transition countries (DTCs) to 47.19% for the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), representing a total shift of 
4.59% to DTCs since 2008132; 
• The Bank's private-sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC,—significantly 
increasing DTC voting power from 33.4% at present to about 40%; 
• International Development Association (IDA)—raising the voting shares of borrowing member 
countries from about 40% prior to the reforms to around 46%; 
• Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)—maintaining voting power parity between 
developed and developing members; 
• In all institutions, helping the smallest poor members to maintain their voice and voting power; 
• Establishing unique IBRD Shareholding Principles, primarily reflecting evolving economic 
weight and the Bank’s development mission, including: (a) economic weight in the world 
economy, measured through a formula which is compatible with - but also suitably different 
from - IMF quotas; (b) integrated, substantive and permanent recognition of past member 
contributions to IDA, combined with incentives for future IDA contributions; and (c) moving 
over time towards equitable voting power between developed country and DTC members; 
• Holding regular IBRD and IFC shareholding reviews every five years to allow for more 
dynamism and to account for changes in economic weight and member contributions to the 
World Bank Group mission; 
• Amplifying the DTC voice on the World Bank Boards by adding a third Director to represent 
member countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in October 2010; 
                                                 
131 Using an average 2010 US$/Euro exchange rate of 0.775. 
132http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/22553921/DC2010-006(E)Voice.pdf 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/22553921/DC2010-006(E)Voice.pdf  
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3.2.2.3. Regional Development Banks 
EU countries also play a major role in the financing and governance of the regional development 
banks listed below. These institutions play an important role in transferring aid flows to developing 
countries and European countries in transition. They have recently risen to the twin challenges of 
carrying out their mandate of reducing poverty and at the same time responding to the adverse 
effects of the economic crisis and its impact on economic growth in many countries. 
 
African Development Bank (AfDB). Donors concluded negotiations of the Twelfth Replenishment 
of the African Development Fund (ADF-XII) in October 2010. They agreed133 on a replenishment 
level equivalent to EUR 7.4 billion (USD 9.5 billion) for the ADF over the next three years (2011-
2013), a 10.6% increase in donor contributions over ADF-11.  This came as an important 
complement to the endorsement on May 27 2010 by governors representing AfDB’s shareholders of 
a tripling of the Bank’s capital resources to nearly USD100 billion134.  
 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Board of Governors had 
already agreed in 2009 to triple ADB’s capital base from EUR 42.7 billion to EUR 127.9 billion 
(USD 55 billion to USD 165 billion).135  The negotiations on the replenishment of the Asian 
Development Fund (ADF X) are due to commence next year.  ADF IX mobilised over EUR 8.5 
billion (USD 11 billion136). 
 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The IDB’s Board of Governors on July 21 2010, agreed 
to the terms of the increase of the Bank’s ordinary capital by EUR 54 billion (USD 70 billion). 
 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). A capital increase from EUR 20 
billion to EUR 30 billion was agreed in May 2010. 
3.2.2.4. UN System 
The 2010 annual progress report on Financing for Development137 noted that ’The systemic reforms 
decided at the 2005 World Summit have yet to be fully implemented.’ The reforms envisaged 
improving the transparency, representativeness and effectiveness of the principal UN bodies and 
included major challenges, such as reform of the Security Council and establishment of a Human 
Rights Council, as well as the challenge of achieving system-wide coherence by improving the 
coherence of operational activities. Some progress has been made during 2010. 
 
The system-wide coherence reform (SWC) is important to reduce fragmentation of the UN system 
and strengthen its operational capacity by improving coordination between agencies and reducing 
fragmentation. The ‘delivering as one’ initiative138 announced in 2007 and implemented in 8 pilot 
countries is intended to make the UN more coherent, effective and efficient. This process, strongly 
supported by the EU, has moved relatively fast and created an important ‘bottom-up’ momentum. 
Furthermore the call for UN system-wide coherence has led many UN entities to develop intra-UN 
partnerships and cooperation. Building on the positive experience of the pilot countries and the 
                                                 
133http://www.afdb.org/en/news-events/article/african-development-fund-replenished-with-usd-9-5-billion-7335/#; 
http://www.afdb.org/en/news-events/article/african-development-fund-replenished-with-usd-9-5-billion-7335/#  
134http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-sectors/topics/capital-increase/; http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-sectors/topics/capital-increase/.  
135http://www.adb.org/Documents/Brochures/InFocus/2010/General-Capital-Increase-V.pdf; 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Brochures/InFocus/2010/General-Capital-Increase-V.pdf.  
136http://www.adb.org/adf/highlight.asp , http://www.adb.org/adf/highlight.asp. 
137http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/SEC_2010_0420_COM_2010_0159_EN.PDF; 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/SEC_2010_0420_COM_2010_0159_EN.PDF.  
138http://www.undg.org/?P=7. 
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progress made on UN business practices by heads of UN agencies, funds and programmes, the 
SWC agenda has managed to move forward. However, the results of this initiative have yet to be 
assessed through a performance evaluation. 
 
Other important reform processes, also framed in the context of SWC, have made major progress, 
such as the humanitarian reform and the reform of the UN gender architecture.  The humanitarian 
reform process launched by the international humanitarian community in 2005 seeks to improve the 
effectiveness of humanitarian response by ensuring greater predictability, accountability and 
partnership. To strengthen the foundation for understanding the process, Regional Office for Asia 
Pacific (ROAP) conducts workshops on humanitarian reform at regional and national level to 
promote regional and country-level progress towards humanitarian reform and create dialogue 
between policy-makers and practitioners on the reform. The key elements of the reform are: (1) the 
Cluster Approach; (2) a strengthened Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) system; (3) more adequate, 
timely, flexible and effective humanitarian financing; and (4) the development of strong 
partnerships between UN and non-UN actors. 
 
On 2 July 2010, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution on ’System-wide 
coherence’ establishing the new UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 
to be known as UN Women. With the adoption of this resolution, the new entity will be in a position 
to close the current gap between the normative and operative work of the UN on gender aspect, 
promote effective system-wide mainstreaming in the UN system, and improve accountability. 
 
There are also reforms to strengthen UN accountability in a process initiated about five years ago139. 
Achievements during 2010 were as follows:  
• Transparency and Integrity: (a) The UN has implemented a financial disclosure programme for 
senior officials and procurement officers to ensure that potential conflicts of interest that may 
arise from staff members’ private holdings, affiliations, or activities can be identified and 
addressed appropriately; and (b) the UN issued a policy on the ’Reporting, Retaining and 
Disposing of Honours, Decorations, Favours, Gifts or Remuneration.’  
• Procurement: The UN amended the Award Review Board and formed the Senior Vendor Review 
Committee to strengthen internal control, transparency, accountability and risk mitigation in the 
UN procurement process.  
• Ongoing Commitments: Currently, the Department of Management is undertaking a 
comprehensive review of delegation of authority; and (b) the UN is introducing the International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) to improve the quality and transparency of 
financial reporting. WFP has adopted these standards and, due to delays, other agencies are 
expected to complete roll-out by 2013.  
3.2.3. Feedback from the EU and Member States 
There were 12 questions in the EU and Member State questionnaire that related to governance 
reforms at the World Bank and IMF. This section reports feedback received from 27 Member States 
and the EU. Very few of the respondents chose not to answer each question. The responses show a 
diversity of opinions and differences on key approaches that would need to be reconciled for the EU 
                                                 
139http://www.un.org/en/strengtheningtheun/accountability.shtml; 
http://www.un.org/en/strengtheningtheun/accountability.shtml  
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group to adopt a consensus towards the Bretton Woods institutions. Details of the questionnaire and 
responses may be found in Annex 8.   
 
With respect to World Bank reforms, some issues were raised repeatedly. The key concerns and 
proposals were as follows: (a) decentralisation of the Bank; (b) use of results-based approaches for 
greater effectiveness; (c) fairer voting power/greater voice for developing countries; and (d) open 
selection of Bank President (and of senior management). There were also multiple mentions of 
using a corporate scoreboard and the importance of improved internal governance. Overall, this 
agenda seems aligned with ongoing reforms and issues highlighted in the previous section. 
 
On the issue of quota realignment at the IMF, 16 Member States (out of 27 replies) felt it would 
increase the institution’s legitimacy. However, 11 Member States disagreed.  Many in the latter 
group felt that the reforms did not go far enough. Others were concerned by the increased 
importance of the G20 and the diminishing role for small economies. A number thought ministers 
should be more involved in decisions. This issue was raised specifically in question 75 (do you 
support the creation of a Ministerial Council for the IMF with decision-making powers?) with 16 of 
25 respondents in favour. Finally, a few were concerned that the IMF may be drifting away from its 
core mandate, even though others thought it should expand that mandate. The issue of broader 
governance reform and open selection of head of IMF was also mentioned. 
 
Respondents were equally split over whether the EU should have a single representation at the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Feedback provided showed that countries had concerns 
such as: (a) a single euro area representation may make more sense, especially at the IMF; (b) how 
would intra-EU coordination will work and conversely existing coordination mechanisms seemed 
sufficient to others; (c) need to preserve specific separate interests of individual shareholders and of 
small countries; (d) a potential difficulty is mobilising funding; and (e) loss of synergies within 
current constituency groups, some of which include non-EU countries. Many of these concerns 
were also expressed as risks to overcome by countries that were in favour of a single representation, 
at least for the euro area. The need to reach a common position was mentioned again as a challenge. 
Related to the coordination issue, almost three-quarters of respondents felt there should be stronger 
Brussels-based coordination on World Bank and MDB issues. 
 
Three respondents were dissatisfied with the outcome of voice and participation reforms at the 
World Bank and five were highly satisfied. The remaining two-thirds were somewhat satisfied. 
Nevertheless, major concerns and observations were raised by respondents that were less than very 
satisfied, in particular: (a) insufficient recognition of the efforts of smaller states and the need to 
give adequate weight to IDA contribution; (b) poorer countries may have been left-out; and (c) the 
process should have been less complex/confusing and more transparent.  
 
A small majority of EU Member States (59%) felt that the EU should push for a greater portion of 
IDA resources to be allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa. In the absence of a follow-up question, the 
reasons for the negative answers cannot be determined.  As this may be due to a concern over aid 
effectiveness or other reasons, a follow-up question to this effect could be included in subsequent 
questionnaires. In contrast, the overwhelming majority (93%) were in favour of creating of a 
permanent IDA crisis window (CRW) and at the time of writing this reform has now been agreed 
to. 
3.2.4. Concluding Observations 
In 2010, two major risks faced by the IFIs were effectively mitigated. Capital increases were 
successful and so was the replenishment of IDA, the biggest IFI concessional lending window. IFIs 
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are continuing to implement governance reform programmes, give greater voice to their borrowing 
member countries and promote stronger inclusiveness and accountability. The World Bank’s 
decision to open more documents and databases to the public is also noteworthy. In terms of the 
UN, it is important not to lose the momentum of reforms; especially regarding adoption of 
International Public Sector Accounting Services (IPSAS). 
 
An issue not addressed in the above analysis but worth mentioning here concerns another type of 
financing of IFIs and other international agencies through multi-bilateral resources – bilateral 
funding disbursed through multilateral agencies. These resources in practice increase the amount of 
concessional resources available for developing countries. However, these earmarked resources also 
contribute to the fragmentation of donor programmes and may affect IFIs and UN agencies’ 
governance and distort resource allocation. For example on the estimated budget for a given agency 
or programme, only about one-third of it comes from untied ‘core’ resources. The rest are 
earmarked for specific projects, some quite small, in target countries and for activities that may not 
be fully aligned to that agency’s core competencies. Furthermore, the agency Executive Board only 
approves the core budget, which leads to limited oversight over the majority of the resources. 
 
The feedback from EU Member States proved useful. It also identified significant differences on 
key issues that would need to be resolved for the EU 27 Member States to speak with the same 
voice at the Boards of the IMF and the World Bank. Most Members States agreed that the EU 
internal coordination should be improved. While a limited consolidation of European representation 
looks likely to take place in the IMF, a specific intra-EU coordination in the World Bank and 
multilateral development banks could be warranted. 
 
 
